In a word, I think there are few that compare the life of an emperor of Turkey or Tartary, or any wicked, sensual worldling, with the life of many a thousand persecuted and tormented saints, but will confess, that no distributive justice doth make in this life so sufficient a difference, as may make men know the justice of the governor, the desirableness of a holy state, or the danger of the contrary. It was the observation of this which made most of the atheists of the world think that there was no God, or that he exercised no moral government over men; and that made even the innocent often to stagger, and tempted them to think their labours and sufferings were all in vain, till they looked before them to the end.a

And if God's justice make not a sufficient difference here, it is certain there is another life where he will do it; because, else, he should not be just, his laws would be delusory, and his government be defective, and successful only by deceit.

Object. God is not obliged to do justice to men any more than to any other creatures: he suffereth the dog to kill the hare, the deer, and the innocent sheep; the kite to kill the harmless doves and chickens; the ravenous birds, and beasts, and fishes. to devour and live on the rest; and man upon all; and he is not bound to do them justice.

Answ. The brutes are no subjects capable of moral government; and, consequently, of propriety, right or wrong. God, that made them incapable of government, thereby declared that he intended them not for it. Let no man here play with am biguities, and say, "That God governeth all the creatures.' The word 'government' is taken equivocally, when it is applied to a dead or brutish subject, a ship, a coach, a horse, a dog, and meaneth not the same thing which we discourse of; it is moral government by laws and judgment which we treat of. When God had made man a governable creature, he thereby mum: nec ei similius inveniri posse quicquam, quam qui inter nos justissimus est.-In Thaet.

d How like a Christian was that of Anaxagoras (in Laert. p. 85). Hic non modo generis gloriâ et opibus, verum animi quoque magnitudine clarissimus fuit: quippe qui universum patrimonium suis sponte concessit. Quo cum ab eis insimularetur negligentiæ, Quid ergo, inquit, nonne vos ista curatis? Deinde ab eis profectus, ad speculandum rerum naturam se contulit, rei et publicæ et privatæ omnino negligens; adeo ut cuidam se ita compellanti, nullane tibi patriæ cura est? dixerit, Mihi vero patriæ cura est, et quidem summa; digitum in cœlum intendens. Bene merenti, bene profuerit; male merenti par erit.-Plaut. Tes ayase's dyadà noiêt, dictum Cleobuli. Phocilidis. Μὴ κακὸν ἔν ἔρξης σπειρειν ἴσον ἐς ἐνι' πόντῳ. Qui indignum honore afficiunt, stultitiæ opinionem habent.-Cicer.

declared his will, to be himself his Governor, which is all the obligation that God is capable of as to actions, ad extra. He, therefore, that made the rational world his kingdom, did thereby engage himself to govern them in justice; there is, therefore, no comparison between the case of men and brutes, who never were subjects, but utensils, in his kingdom.

Sect. 2. II. If there were no retribution in the life to come, the secret sins and duties of the heart and life would be under no sufficient government: but the secret sins and duties of the heart and life are under a sufficient government; therefore, there is a retribution in the life to come.

e

This argument is a particular instance to clear the former general argument: the major is proved by experience. The heart is a fountain of good and evil. Men cannot see it, and therefore pretend not to govern it, or make laws for it; if they did, it would be all in vain. The heart may be guilty of atheism, blasphemy, idolatry, malice, contrivements and desires of treason, murder, incest, adultery, fraud, oppression, and all the villany in the world, and no man can know or punish it; and God doth not do it ordinarily in this life, with any sufficient act of justice. So, also, all those sins which men are but able to hide, as, secret murders, treasons, revenge, slanders, fraud, &c., do escape all punishment from man. And God hath no observable, ordinary course of outward justice in this word, but what he exerciseth by men, though, extraordinarily, he may otherwise sometimes interpose: and how easy and ordinary it is for subtle men to do much wickedness, and never be discovered, needs no proof. The like we may say, in some measure, of those secret duties of heart and life, which have neither reward nor notice in this life; and, if observed, are usually turned into matter of reproach.

e

The minor needeth no more proof, when we have proved

* Qui largiuntur indignis ea quæ dignis conferri debebant, tria committunt absurda, nam et ipsi jacturam faciunt, et in bonos contumeliosi sunt, et malos roborant, materià vitiorum suppeditatâ.-Antonin. Stultissimum est existimare omnia justa esse quæ scita sint in populorum institutis, aut legibus. Etiamne si quæ sint tyrannorum leges, si 30 illi Athenis leges imponere voluissent? Aut si omnes Athenienses delectarentur tyrannicis legibus, num idcirco hæ leges justæ haberentur ? Nihilo credo magis illa quàm interrex noster tulit, ut Dictator quem vellet civium, indicta causa, impune 'posset occidere. Est enim unum jus quo devincta est hominum societas, &c.—Cic. de leg. 1. p. 225. Idem undique in infernum descensus est; said Anaxagoras to one that lamented that he must die in a strange country.-Laert. in Anaxag.

already that God is our Governor. It is certain that the secret acts of heart and life are as much under his government as the open, and therefore shall have equal retribution.

Sect. 3. III. If there were no life of retribution after this, the sins of the great ones and rulers of the world, and all others that by strength could make their part good, would be under no sufficient justice; but the sins, even of the greatest and strongest, are under sufficient justice; therefore, there is a life of retribution after this.

The major is clear by experience: the sins of all the sovereigns of the earth are rarely under sufficient justice in this life. If there were no punishment hereafter, what justice would be done upon a Tamerlane, a Bajazet, a Mahomed, a Dionysius, an Alexander, a Cæsar, a Marius, a Sylla, a Sertorius, and many hundred such, for all the innocent blood which they have shed, for their pride and self-exalting. What justice would be done on kings, and emperors, and states, that have none above them, for all their lusts and filthiness, their intemperance and sensuality, their oppression and cruelty. I know that God doth sometimes punish them by rebels, or by other princes, or by sickness in this life; but that is no ordinary course of justice, and therefore not sufficient to its ends. Ordinarily, all things here come alike to all; and what justice would be done upon any rebels or robbers that are but strong enough to bear it out? Or upon any that raise unrighteous wars, and burn, and murder, and destroy countries and cities, and are worse than plagues to all places where they come, and worse than mad dogs and bears to others? If they do but conquer, instead of punishment for all this villany, they go away here with wealth and

glory.f

The minor is past question: therefore, certainly, there is another life where conquering, rewarded, prospering, domineering sin shall have its proper punishment.

f Næ illi falsi sunt qui diversissimas res pariter expectant, voluptatem et præmia virtutis.-Salust. Ut ex barba capillos detonsos negligimus; ita ille divinus animus egressurus, quo receptaculum suum conferatur, ignis illud exurat, an feræ distrahant, an terra contegat, non magis putat ad se pertinere, quam secundinas ad editum infantem. Sen. Ep. 93. Maximum est argumentum naturam ipsam de immortalitate animorum tacite judicare, quod omnibus curæ sint, et maxime quidem, quæ post mortem futura sunt.-Cic. Cum natura cæteros animantes abjecisset, ad pastum, solum hominem erexit, et ad cœli quasi cognationis domiciliique pristini conspectum excitavit. Tum speciem ita formavit oris, ut in eâ penitus reconditos mores effingeret.-Cic. 1. de legib.

Sect. 4. IV. If God rule not man by the hopes and fears of certain good and evil hereafter, he ruleth him not according to his nature but God doth rule man according to his nature. Ergo.

The minor needeth no proof: the major is proved by experience. The nature of man is to be most moved with the hopes and fears of good and evil after death, otherwise death itself would comparatively seem nothing to us. No other creature hath such hopes and fears. If you ask, how can I tell that? I answer, as I can tell that a tree doth not hear, and a stone doth not feel or see, because there is no appearance of such a sense, whose nature is to make itself manifest by its evidences where it is. Brutes show a fear of death, and love of life, but of nothing further; of which there is evidence enough to quiet a mind that seeketh after truth, though not to silence a prattling caviller. This will be further improved by that which followeth.

Sect. 5. V. If the world cannot be governed according to its nature and God's laws, without the hopes and fears of good and evil after death, then the objects of such hopes and fears is certain truth. But the antecedent is true; therefore, so is the consequent.

That the nature of man requireth a moral government, and not only a physical motion, is already proved. Physical motion only determineth the agent to act, and produceth the act itself quoad eventum. Moral government doth institute for the subject a debitum agendi et habendi, and judgeth him accordingly.g If there were no government but physical motion, there were no debitum in the world, neither offici, præmii vel pœnæ, vel jus possidendi, vel injuria: no right or wrong: for physical motion doth equally produce the act in perjury, murder, treason, adultery, as in good deeds: and it never produceth an act which eventually never is. Therefore, there should be nothing a duty but what cometh to pass, if physical motion were all the government. Government, then, there must be and what God requireth of all by nature, I have showed before. Now, that there is a moral impossibility of the performance of this in any sincerity, so as to intimate any laudable government of the world, I shall further prove:

8 Piso (in Cic. de fin. 1. 5. p. 199.) speaking of corporal and sensitive good, saith, Quibus tantum præstat mentis excellens perfectio, ut vix cogitari possit quid intersit. So that the perfection of the mind is the perfection of the man.

1. If, according to the present temper of man, there be no motives, which would ever prove sufficient to resist all the temptations of this life, to keep us in true obedience and love to God unto the end, without the hopes and fears of good and evil after death; then cannot the world be governed according to God's laws, without such hopes and fears of futurity. But the antecedent is true; ergo, so is the consequent.

If God had prescribed man a course of duty in his laws, as to obey and love him upon terms of fleshly suffering, and had not given man such motives as might rationally prevail for the performance, his laws had been all in vain. He that hath made holiness our indispensable duty, hath certainly left us motives and rational helps to perform it. But so many and great are the temptations of this life, and so strong is our sense, and so great are the sufferings of the obedient, that in this our imperfection we could never go through them without the motives which are fetched from another life. h 1. It would weaken the hands of the best, as to their duty; it would embolden them to sin; it would give victory to all strong temptations. Let every reader but consult with his own soul, and though it be granted that virtue should be chosen for its own sake, how dear soever it may cost, yet let him without lying say, what he thinketh he should be and do in case of temptations, if he knew that he had no life to live but this. I am not sure, but I will freely confess what I think most, that now are honest, would be and do. First, they would observe how little difference God maketh between the obedient and disobedient in his providence, and how ordinarily his present judgments are not much to be feared. And hence they would think, that he maketh no great matter of it, what they either are or do; and so their very love of virtue would be much debilitated: nay, the sufferings of the virtuous would tempt them to think that it is no very desirable way. And though still they would have something within them, which would tell them, that honesty, and temperance, and piety are good, yet the natural love of themselves is so deeply planted in them, and so powerful, that in most great temptations it would prevail. They would venture upon lying and perjury, rather than lose their liberty, or livelihood, or reputation. They would do any thing which the rulers bid them, or any one that is

h Ex ipsa vitâ discedimus tanquam ex hospitio, non tanquam ex domo: commorandi enim nobis natura diversorium, non habitandi domum dedit.Cic. in Cat. Maj.