Considerations on the Choice of Public Rulers: On the Extent of Their Powers; and on the Best Means of Securing the Advantages, and Reforming the Abuses, of Popular ElectionsHopkins & Seymour, 1805 - 156 من الصفحات |
من داخل الكتاب
النتائج 1-5 من 17
الصفحة
... not the less pernicious , that it emanates from the Society , · • 131 X. Equality of Rights as advantageous to the highest Ranks , as to the lowest , • · 135 INTRODUCTION . IMPRUDENT MPRUDENT trust to agents and servants ,
... not the less pernicious , that it emanates from the Society , · • 131 X. Equality of Rights as advantageous to the highest Ranks , as to the lowest , • · 135 INTRODUCTION . IMPRUDENT MPRUDENT trust to agents and servants ,
الصفحة
... trust to agents and servants , in business or in private families , is found to corrupt their morais ; producing peculation and disorder , in proportion to the extent of the trust ; to the number employed ; and to the temptations to ...
... trust to agents and servants , in business or in private families , is found to corrupt their morais ; producing peculation and disorder , in proportion to the extent of the trust ; to the number employed ; and to the temptations to ...
الصفحة 15
... trust to any set of persons . Nor is there any instance of any company of men in business , not instituted by a government , hav- ing adopted so ruinous a measure . But the Romans deserve much praise for parting with so much power 15.
... trust to any set of persons . Nor is there any instance of any company of men in business , not instituted by a government , hav- ing adopted so ruinous a measure . But the Romans deserve much praise for parting with so much power 15.
الصفحة 16
... trusts by far too great for human nature . HENCE , as the Roman senate , or directing council , had no power to take money from the people , or to give commissions , places , or con- tracts , to their friends , and as they themselves ...
... trusts by far too great for human nature . HENCE , as the Roman senate , or directing council , had no power to take money from the people , or to give commissions , places , or con- tracts , to their friends , and as they themselves ...
الصفحة 20
... , will by that means be served , and their national or local pride gratified , in proportion as the candi- date is qualified and honest in the discharge of his trust . BESIDES , even the worst of men respect and admire 20.
... , will by that means be served , and their national or local pride gratified , in proportion as the candi- date is qualified and honest in the discharge of his trust . BESIDES , even the worst of men respect and admire 20.
طبعات أخرى - عرض جميع المقتطفات
عبارات ومصطلحات مألوفة
absolute power affairs allow appointed army assembly bank bribing a majority cerns choose civil command consequence consul councils court direct disposal distribute justice district effects emoluments enacting laws equal votes executive expected friends give Gracchus HENCE higher ranks historians imprudent increase the number individuals interest intrusted judges jury legislators limited monarchy lord high admiral lute magistrates manage military force murder national officers national senate necessary neighbours neral number of men number of voters obliged obtain oppress passions patricians persons and property plebeians possessed pretences prevent produced proprietors province provincial senators prudent public agents public offices regulations representatives respective Roman constitution Roman republic Roman senate Rome rulers sanguinary schemes seems sena Servius Tullius slaves sole power sovereign power stewards suppose taking the votes talents Tarquin taxes tempted think proper Tiberius Tiberius Gracchus tion trust tyranny virtue ward ward-voters wardens and jury-men whole society
مقاطع مشهورة
الصفحة 57 - ... such persons with the magistracy, or even with the right of voting. " Would it not be prudent, and give greater steadiness and respectability to national deliberations, if none were allowed to hold any magistracy, or to vote for any public officer, until they were forty years of age ? Such a regulation would very much lessen the number of voters without injuring the...
الصفحة 58 - Would it not be prudent, and give greater steadiness and respectability to national deliberations, if none were allowed to hold any magistracy, or to vote for any public officer, until they were forty years of age ? Such a regulation would very much lessen the number of voters, without injuring the rights of any class, and would put the magistracy, the election and control of public agents, and the judging and voting on laws, into the hands of men, who from having cooler pa*w>n(, and more experience,...
الصفحة 57 - As there are so many instances of young persons, who, in a few years after their majority, spend their fortunes and ruin their health, from the want of experience, and from the violence of their passions, their own interest being an insufficient check to prevent them, nothing can appear more imprudent than to entrust such persons with the magistracy, or even with the right of voting.
الصفحة 59 - Every three hundred of these, living most contiguous, to form a w«rd, and to meet in a church, or some other convenient place, on a certain day annually, to elect two provincial senators, and one ware'en or judge for the ward.
الصفحة 50 - But by the constitution which was formed for the bank, the directors are not only elected annually, but they are liable to be superseded at any time by their constituents, and each director is liable individually, for every act which he has not protested against which the members of congress are not.
الصفحة 51 - ... congress with power over the property of the nation; yet the American legislators did not think it prudent to allow the directors of the bank any absolute power whatever.