Considerations on the Choice of Public Rulers: On the Extent of Their Powers; and on the Best Means of Securing the Advantages, and Reforming the Abuses, of Popular ElectionsHopkins & Seymour, 1805 - 156 من الصفحات |
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الصفحة 16
... . HENCE , as the Roman senate , or directing council , had no power to take money from the people , or to give commissions , places , or con- tracts , to their friends , and as they themselves had to pay a full share of every tax , 16.
... . HENCE , as the Roman senate , or directing council , had no power to take money from the people , or to give commissions , places , or con- tracts , to their friends , and as they themselves had to pay a full share of every tax , 16.
الصفحة 17
... council of wasting the public treasure by an unnecessary accumulation of offices , or by ex- travagant contracts . Nor did the patriots of Rome ever charge the senate , not even during the sixteen years that Hannibal continued in Italy ...
... council of wasting the public treasure by an unnecessary accumulation of offices , or by ex- travagant contracts . Nor did the patriots of Rome ever charge the senate , not even during the sixteen years that Hannibal continued in Italy ...
الصفحة 94
... council is obtained by allowing the members a considera- ble share of the money taken from the people , and as much of it must be given to persons who are disagreeable to him , it is natural for him to wish to be relieved from the ...
... council is obtained by allowing the members a considera- ble share of the money taken from the people , and as much of it must be given to persons who are disagreeable to him , it is natural for him to wish to be relieved from the ...
الصفحة 99
... council of twenty - four men , twelve of whom were to be chosen annually by the assembly of representatives . It is evident , that the division of the sove- reign power in this constitution , had the same tendency to produce altercation ...
... council of twenty - four men , twelve of whom were to be chosen annually by the assembly of representatives . It is evident , that the division of the sove- reign power in this constitution , had the same tendency to produce altercation ...
الصفحة 100
... council , uncontrolled by individual responsibi- lity . Besides , as the members of the executive council and the representatives were as strong- ly tempted to increase the number of places and perquisites , as the members of the ...
... council , uncontrolled by individual responsibi- lity . Besides , as the members of the executive council and the representatives were as strong- ly tempted to increase the number of places and perquisites , as the members of the ...
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absolute power affairs allow appointed army assembly bank bribing a majority cerns choose civil command consequence consul councils court direct disposal distribute justice district effects emoluments enacting laws equal votes executive expected friends give Gracchus HENCE higher ranks historians imprudent increase the number individuals interest intrusted judges jury legislators limited monarchy lord high admiral lute magistrates manage military force murder national officers national senate necessary neighbours neral number of men number of voters obliged obtain oppress passions patricians persons and property plebeians possessed pretences prevent produced proprietors province provincial senators prudent public agents public offices regulations representatives respective Roman constitution Roman republic Roman senate Rome rulers sanguinary schemes seems sena Servius Tullius slaves sole power sovereign power stewards suppose taking the votes talents Tarquin taxes tempted think proper Tiberius Tiberius Gracchus tion trust tyranny virtue ward ward-voters wardens and jury-men whole society
مقاطع مشهورة
الصفحة 57 - ... such persons with the magistracy, or even with the right of voting. " Would it not be prudent, and give greater steadiness and respectability to national deliberations, if none were allowed to hold any magistracy, or to vote for any public officer, until they were forty years of age ? Such a regulation would very much lessen the number of voters without injuring the...
الصفحة 58 - Would it not be prudent, and give greater steadiness and respectability to national deliberations, if none were allowed to hold any magistracy, or to vote for any public officer, until they were forty years of age ? Such a regulation would very much lessen the number of voters, without injuring the rights of any class, and would put the magistracy, the election and control of public agents, and the judging and voting on laws, into the hands of men, who from having cooler pa*w>n(, and more experience,...
الصفحة 57 - As there are so many instances of young persons, who, in a few years after their majority, spend their fortunes and ruin their health, from the want of experience, and from the violence of their passions, their own interest being an insufficient check to prevent them, nothing can appear more imprudent than to entrust such persons with the magistracy, or even with the right of voting.
الصفحة 59 - Every three hundred of these, living most contiguous, to form a w«rd, and to meet in a church, or some other convenient place, on a certain day annually, to elect two provincial senators, and one ware'en or judge for the ward.
الصفحة 50 - But by the constitution which was formed for the bank, the directors are not only elected annually, but they are liable to be superseded at any time by their constituents, and each director is liable individually, for every act which he has not protested against which the members of congress are not.
الصفحة 51 - ... congress with power over the property of the nation; yet the American legislators did not think it prudent to allow the directors of the bank any absolute power whatever.