party. Nor is a ruling or opposition party in the senate ever mentioned by any historian, from the building of Rome to the final subversion of the republic by Augustus and Antony, which was a period of 711 years.

THE harmony and consequent decorum and respectability of the Roman senate, forms a striking contrast, when compared with the open disgraceful broils, and the still more disgraceful private intrigues, of all senates which have had the disposal of offices, or could connive with those who had that power. Committing the sole direction of the national force to a numerous senate so constituted, but retaining the disposal of commissions, seems to have been a most prudent arrangement, as it was peculiarly the interest of the senators to keep peace and enforce the laws, and to prevent any individual from rising to absolute power. And as every individual of the army depended upon the people for promotion, the

senators could not expect that the army would assist them to extend their power over the people; nor did the senate ever attempt to make use of the army for that purpose: so that by this wise regulation, the Roman armies could be augmented to any extent, without endangering public liberty. The method of electing the public officers by the people, not only prevented an increase of the army from being dangerous to liberty: it also afforded the highest encouragement to virtue, as it converted the public offices into prizes, to be obtained by those who excelled in abilities, integrity, and patriotism. For when electors to an office are so numerous, that the value of the office will not pay the expense of bribing a majority, and if it cannot be obtained by the interest of friends, then, acquiring a character for abilities, integrity, and application to business, is the direct and surest method to obtain the votes of the electors, whether they be virtuous or vicious. A virtuous elector will vote for the

candidate who he thinks possesses these qualifications in the highest degree, both from regard to such a character, and also from regard to the public good. An elector of a selfish disposition will also give his vote the same way, though in part from different motives.For as the views of such a person are to serve himself, he will be ready to give his vote to any person for money, or for any other advantage. But where the electors are so numerous that the majority of voters can have no hope of obtaining the office for themselves or friends, or of obtaining a bribe, in that case it is the interest of the majority, however selfish, to vote for the best qualified and most patriotic candidate, as their personal interest, by having a share in the public advantages, will by that means be served, and their national or local pride gratified, in proportion as the candidate is qualified and honest in the discharge of

his trust.

BESIDES, even the worst of men respect and

admire a virtuous character; and where interest does not interfere, will always prefer a good to a bad man. Even bands of robbers, who have occasion to deposit their plunder, are careful to choose the most honest person they can find to intrust it with; and if they have a choice of two or more honest men, they choose the one most capable to protect it, that is, the person of the greatest honesty and abilities.

HENCE, as the majority of the people elected all the public officers at Rome, every person who aspired to preferment, would exert himself to the utmost to please the society, in order to gain their votes, not by a mean, cringing, base conduct (as the practice is where a few men have the disposal of offices) but by acquiring a character for talents and integrity.

THE Roman youth seem to have made themselves first known when learning their exercise

in the Campus Martius, and afterwards in the lower public offices; and it was by exertions in these, and by patriotic actions which were conspicuous to the whole people, that candidates recommended themselves to the higher offices.

WHAT a noble emulation must such views have excited in the breast of every Roman! And what an encouragement to the practice of the noblest virtues, when a character for such was the only road to power and pre-eminence! This view of the Roman constitution seems sufficiently to account for the numerous instances of wonderful disinterestedness and patriotism, recorded by the Roman historians, which have been looked upon as fabulous by the generality of readers. And even philosophers, who could not disbelieve facts so well attested, seem to have thought them above nature, and have endeavoured to account for them, by supposing that the ancient Romans