our parts, exclusive of what must befall them in another world, we would not, for all that this world has to offer, be subject to the distress and anguish and terror with which the minds of such persons must be torn and distracted. On the contrary, to say nothing of that inward peace and serenity, of those refined and rational pleasures, and all those secret comforts and satisfactions which are annexed to the practice of virtue; the advantages of living according to the rules of it have not only been demonstrated and displayed by moralists and philosophers; recommended and inculcated by founders of states and lawgivers; but acknowledged and assented to, even by the profligate and profane.

The peculiar advantages of a vicious conduct we have already considered, and placed in the strongest light. In opposition to which, it is but just that we now place those mischiefs, of which it is also the immediate and undoubted cause: mischiefs, which it would fill a volume to enumerate; which are too obvious to need reciting, and too horrible to need exaggeration ! However, while the casual and transient advantages, which some reap from an immoral course, are magnified through envy, or misrepresented through ignorance; its ruinous consequences to so many others ought not to be passed over. For these we can consider in no other light than as the implicit declarations of God himself against vice, and in fa

VOL. III.

vour of virtue. It is always beneficial to society, by advancing every true end of government, nor does it obstruct the present welfare of particulars so often as is apprehended. For how many causes and accidents may contribute to our good and ill success, which are no way dependent on our character or conduct? Had these been worse, is it certain that our fortune would have been better? or, if we have not prospered, is it clear that virtue was the only thing that stood in our way? They who are the least disposed to make concessions in its favour, must yet allow, that to improve the understanding and morals is sometimes the means of improving our situation in life; that, to be good citizens, and worthy members of society, is one of the roads to honour and advancement; and that to be honest and industrious, is often the means of having riches in possession. And thus, by a careful attention to the general order of nature and providence, we are enabled not only to confute, but to retort the specious and popular objection against that order, drawn from those accidents and events, by which it appears to be disturbed and interrupted.

We have seen that both the systems are quite consistent and of a piece; nor is it easy to imagine how greater favour could have been shewn to virtue, without precluding its appointed trial; or how God could have declared for it more explicitly without defeating the very end he proposed.

For, if his design was the manifestation of moral characters, there must be time and opportunity for the discovery: till they are drawn out and displayed in their several ways, those important distinctions, which justice and equity have reserved to their appointed season, would be premature and without foundation. Precipitate measures are not to be expected from perfect wisdom, however suitable they might be to the impatience of such persons, as would neither leave sinners room for repentance or amendment; nor suffer good men "to perfect holiness in the fear of the Lord.”

We see then, in the next place, that the irregular and seemingly inverted distribution of temporal blessings, which is the grand objection against Providence, is not only consistent with the Divine purposes, but necessary to their accomplishment. For had it been more equal and exact, the occasions for the exercise of virtue would have been less frequent; the motives to it less pure; and the merit of it less resplendent.

But supposing that we had not been able to discern the reasons of such inequalities; still the moral œconomy would have corresponded in this point with the natural and civil system, in which we find the general good is the great end in view. What we call the gifts of nature and of fortune are alike promiscuously bestowed. And it would be a vain, if not a presumptuous curiosity, which should demand to be informed, why some are born

to health, strength, beauty, parts, and the like, while others, of far greater worth, are wholly destitute of those advantages or unhappily distinguished by the opposite defects. For this would be to ask why the general and stated laws of matter and motion, as well as those of human appointment, were not originally so framed, as to favour the merit of certain particulars, who may suffer greatly in consequence of their present disposition. If upon such grounds the regular course of nature was frequently altered, or suspended during some periods of the Jewish, and in the infancy of the Christian dispensation, such extraordinary exertions of the Divine Power subsisted no longer than the peculiar reasons for which they were ordained. And even in those times, the blessings and judgments that were bestowed and inflicted were rarely of a private nature, or, if really such, it was because the persons had a civil and sacred character, which rendered their conduct or fortune of the highest importance to the world in general, and therefore proper objects of God's particular and more immediate attention.

The foregoing observations may serve as answers to various calumnies of those profane writers who have struck at the root of all faith and piety, while they strove to divert their readers at the expence of the Divine administration. For how much soever the deity may seem to depart from the rules of just retribution at present, we

have abundant reason for concluding that all his acts and decrees are founded upon them, and will at last return to a perfect conformity with them.

No one was more sensible of this truth than David himself, so long as he was capable of judging coolly and dispassionately. But our judgment of things depends very much on the present state and disposition of our minds, just as the appearance of outward objects varies according to the light in which they are placed, and the situation from whence they are beheld. The rays of Truth can seldom penetrate through the gloom of melancholy. Reason indeed might correct these illusions of fancy; but grief and reason, alas! seldom dwell together. The justice of God's government becomes matter of question, when we ourselves are sensible of inconvenience under it. No matter how many orders of creatures are blessed, or how many systems are benefited by it. For how is it credible that the world should be governed by perfect wisdom, while we are unhappy in it; or how is it possible that should be conducive to the good of the universe, which is contrary to our own? Such is the logic in vogue among the suffering part of mankind, with whom sentiment and self-love are the rule of judging. In spite of all the arguments that may justly be alleged to confirm their faith, their notions of Providence still vary with their condition, and their doubts keep pace with their misfortunes.