But while this distinction is clearly implied, and even professedly acknowledged, by the disputants, it is worthy of careful remark, how extensively it is overlooked and kept out of sight in practice; how commonly, almost universally, we find writers and reasoners taking up the question, even with much ability and eloquence, and arguing it out sometimes on the one, sometimes on the other ground, forgetful of their own professions, and in a way often quite inconsistent with them.

Thus we continually find the professed advocates of an external revelation and historical evidence, nevertheless making their appeal to conscience and feeling, and decrying the exercise of reason, and charging those who find critical objections in the evidence with spiritual blindness and moral perversity; and, on the other hand, we observe the professed upholders of faith and internal conviction as the only sound basis of religion, nevertheless regarding the external facts as not less essential truth which it would be profane to question. It often seems to be rather the want of clear apprehension in the first instance of the distinct kind and character of such inquiries, when on the one side directed to the abstract question of evidence, and when on the other pointing to the practical object of addressing the moral and religious feelings and affections, which causes so many writers on these subjects to betray an inconsistency between their professed purpose and their mode of carrying it out. They avow matter-of-fact inquiry,- a question of the critical evidence for alleged events, yet they pursue it as if it were an appeal to moral sentiments; in which case it would be a virtue to assent, and a crime to

deny if it be the one, it should not be proposed as the other.

Thus it is the common language of orthodox writings and discourses, to advise the believer, when objections or difficulties arise, not to attempt to offer a precise answer or to argue the point, but rather to look at the whole subject as of a kind which ought to be exempt from critical scrutiny, and be regarded with a submission of judgment, in the spirit of humility and faith. This advice may be very just in reference to practical impressions; yet, if the question be one (as is so much insisted on) of external facts, it amounts to neither more nor less than a tacit surrender of the claims of external evidence and historical reality. We are told that we ought to investigate such high questions rather with our affections than with our logic, and approach them rather with good dispositions and right motives, and with a desire to find the doctrine true; and thus shall discover the real assurance of its truth in obeying it: suggestions which, however good in a moral and practical sense, are surely inapplicable if it be made a question of facts.

If we were inquiring into historical evidence in any other case (suppose, e. g., of Cæsar's landing in Britain), it would be little to the purpose to be told that we must look at the case through our desires, rather than our reason; and exercise a believing disposition, rather than rashly scrutinize testimony by critical cavils. Those who speak thus on the question of religious belief, in fact shift the basis of all belief from the alleged evidence of facts to the influence of an internal persuasion: they virtually give up the evidential proof so strongly insisted on, and confess that the

whole is, after all, a mere matter of feeling and sentiment, just as much as those to whose views they so greatly object as openly avowing the very same thing.

We find certain forms of expression commonly stereotyped among a very large class of divines, whenever a critical difficulty or a sceptical exception is urged, which are very significant as to the prevalent view of religious evidence. Their reply is always of this tenor: "These are not subjects on which you can expect demonstrative evidence: you must be satisfied to accept such general proof or probability as the nature of the question allows. You must not inquire too curiously into these things: it is sufficient that we have a general moral evidence of the doctrines. Exact critical discussion will always rake up difficulties; to which, perhaps, no satisfactory answer can be at once given. A precise sceptical caviller will always find new objections as soon as the first are refuted. It is in vain to seek to convince reason, unless the conscience and the will be first well disposed to accept the truth." Such is the constant language of orthodox theologians. What is it but a mere translation into other phraseology of the very assertions of the sceptical transcendentalist?

Indeed, with many who take up these questions, they are almost avowedly placed on the ground of practical expediency rather than of abstract truth. Good and earnest men become alarmed for the dangerous consequences they think likely to result from certain speculations on these subjects; and thence, in arguing against them, are led to assume a tone of superiority, as the guardians of virtue and censors of right, rather than as unprejudiced inquirers into

the matters of fact on which, nevertheless, they professedly make the case rest. And thus a disposition has been encouraged to regard any such question as one of right or wrong, rather than one of truth or error; to treat all objections as profane; and to discard exceptions unanswered as shocking and immoral.

If, indeed, the discussion were carried on upon the professed ground of spiritual impression and relig ious feeling, there would be a consistency in such a course; but, when evidential arguments are avowedly addressed to the intellect, it is especially preposterous to shift the ground, and charge the rejection of them on moral motives; while those who impute such bad motives fairly expose themselves to the retort, that their own belief may be dictated by other considerations than the love of truth.

Again: in such inquiries there is another material distinction very commonly lost sight of, the difference between discussing the truth of a conclusion, or opinion, and the mode or means of arriving at it; or the arguments by which it is supported. Either may clearly be impugned or upheld without implicating the other. We may have the best evidence, but draw a wrong conclusion from it; or we may support an incontestable truth by very fallacious argu

ments.

The present discussion is not intended to be of a controversial kind: it is purely contemplative and theoretical. It is rather directed to a calm and unprejudiced survey of the various opinions and arguments adduced, whatever may be their ulterior tendency, on these important questions; and to the attempt to state, analyze, and estimate them, just as they may

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seem really conducive to the high object professedly in view.

The idea of a positive external divine revelation of some kind has formed the very basis of all hitherto received systems of Christian belief. The Romanist, indeed, regards that revelation as of the nature of a standing oracle, accessible in the living voice of the Church; which, being infallible, of course sufficiently accredits all the doctrines it announces, and constitutes them divine. A more modified view has prevailed among a considerable section of Anglican theologians, who ground their faith on the same principles of Church authority, divested of its divine and infallible character. Most Protestants, with more or less difference of meaning, profess to regard revelation as once for all announced, long since finally closed, permanently recorded, and accessible only in the written divine word contained in the Scriptures; and the discussion with those outside the pale of belief has been entirely one as to the validity of those external marks and attestations by which the truth of the alleged fact of such communication of the Divine Will was held to be substantiated.

The scope and character of the various discussions raised on "the evidences of religion" have varied much in different ages; following, of course, both the view adopted of revelation itself, the nature of the objections which for the time seemed most prominent, or most necessary to be combated, and stamped with the peculiar intellectual character and reasoning tone of the age to which they belonged.

The early apologists were rather defenders of the Christian cause generally; but, when they entered on evidential topics, naturally did so rather in accordance