■read Cicero's work on the nature of the As the principles and feelings of our nature, that Codrus wishe It is indeed that Codrus wished to inculcate the principle of patriotism in his countrymen. If he had merely issued a proclamation, commanding every citizen to prefer the interest of his country to his own life, he would have been giving them a moral precept, but without a corresponding doctrine. If he had joined to this proclamation, the promise of honour and wealth as the rewards of obedience, he would have been adding a very powerful doctrine, yet nevertheless such a doctrine as must have led much more directly to patriotic conduct than to patriotic feeling and principle. Vanity and avarice, without patriotism, might have gained those rewards: But if he wished to excite or to cherish the principle of patriotism in the hearts of his people, he chose the most eloquent and prevailing argument, when he sacrificed his life for them, and thus attracted their admiration and gratitude to that spirit which animated his breast, and their love to that country of which he was at once the representative and the ransom. It is indeed a striking and yet an undeniable fact, that we are comparatively little affected by abstract truths in morality. The cry of a child will produce a greater movement, in almost any mind, than twenty pages of unanread Cicero's work on the nature of the s, without acknowledging the justice of the ostle's sentence upon that class of reasoners, professing themselves to be wise, they bene fools." s the principles and feelings of our nature, ch are addressed in religion, are precisely same with those which are continually exised in the affairs of this world, we may ext to find a resemblance between the doces of a true religion and the means and uments by which a virtuous man acquires influence over the characters and conduct nis fellow creatures. When a man desires ther to do any thing, that is the precept; en he enforces it by any mode of persuasion, t is the doctrine. When the Athenians were var with the Heraclidæ, it was declared by Oracle, that the nation whose king died I should be victorious in the contest. As n as this was known, Codrus disguised himwent over to the camp of the enemy, and osed himself there to a quarrel with a solr, who killed him without knowing who he 5. The Athenians sent to demand the body heir king; which so alarmed the Heraclifrom the recollection of the Oracle, that y fled in disorder. Now, let us suppose that Codrus wish It is indeed a proclamation, commanding evprefer the interest of his country =, he would have been giving precept, but without a corres ine. If he had joined to this the promise of honour and wealth Is of obedience, he would have - very powerful doctrine, yet nevh a doctrine as must have led irectly to patriotic conduct than eeling and principle. Vanity and out patriotism, might have gained s: But if he wished to excite or The principle of patriotism in the s people, he chose the most elorevailing argument, when he sacTe for them, and thus attracted their nd gratitude to that spirit which s breast, and their love to that which he was at once the represen ne ransom. ed a striking and yet an undeniable e are comparatively little affected truths in morality. The cry of a roduce a greater movement, in alind, than twenty pages of unanswerable reasoning. An instinctive acquaintance with this fact guides us in our dealings with our fellow creatures; and He who formed the heart of man, has attested his revealed word, by showing his acquaintance with the channel through which persuasion and instruction might be most effectually communicated. It may therefore be useful to illustrate, at greater length, the analogy which exists between the persuasions of the gospel, and those which might be fixed on as the most powerful arguments capable of being addressed to any human feelings on the subject of human interests. Let us, then, present to ourselves a company of men travelling along the sea-shore. One of them, better acquainted with the ground than the rest, warns them of quicksands, and points out to them a landmark which indicated the position of a dangerous pass. They, however, see no great reason for apprehension; they are anxious to get forwards, and cannot resolve upon making a considerable circuit in order to avoid what appears to them an imaginary evil; they reject his counsel, and proceed onwards. In these circumstances, what argument ought he to use? What mode of persuasion can we imagine fitted to fasten on their |