we have no reason to believe that these are really the actions of God. But if, on the contrary, they have a strong and distinct tendency to elevate and dilate our notions of goodness, and are in perfect harmony with these notions, we have reason to believe that they may be the actions of God; because they are intimately connected with those moral convictions which form the first principles of all our reasonings on this subject. This, then, is the first reasonable test of the truth of a religion—that it should coincide with the moral constitution of the human mind. But, secondly, we know, that, independently of all moral reasoning or consideration, our minds, by their natural constitution, are liable to receive certain impressions from certain objects when present to them. Thus, without any exercise of the moral judgment they are liable to the impressions of love and hatred, and fear and hope, when certain corresponding objects are presented to them. And it is evident that the moral character is determined by the habitual direction which is given to these affections. Now, if the actions attributed to God by any system of religion, be really such objects, as, when present to the mind, do not stir the affections at all, that religion cannot influence the character,

and is therefore utterly useless: If they be such as do indeed rouse the affections, but at the same time give them a wrong direction, that religion is worse than useless; it is pernicious But if they can be shown to be such as have a necessary tendency to excite these natural emotions on the behalf of goodness, and to draw the current of our affections and wills into this moral channel, we are entitled to draw another argument, from this circumstance, in favour of the truth of that religion; because we may presume that God would suit his communications to the capacities and instincts of his creatures. The second test, then, of the truth of a religion, is—that it should coincide with the physical constitution of the human mind. But, farther, there is much moral evil and much misery in the world. There are many bad passions in the mind; and there is a series of events continually going forward, which tend to excite a great variety of feelings Now, a religion has one of the characters of truth, when it is accommodated to all these circumstances, when it offers pardon without lowering the standard of moral duty; when its principles convert the varied events into opportunities of growing in conformity to God, and of acquiring the character of happiness; and when

it tempers the elevation of prosperity and the depression of adversity. The third test, then, of the truth of a religion, is—that it should coincide with the circumstances in which man is found in this world. It may be said, that a religion in which these three conditions meet, rests upon the most indisputable axioms of the science of human nature. All these conditions can be proved to meet in the religion of the Bible; and the wide divergence from them which is so palpable in all other religious systems, philosophical as well as popular, which have come to our knowledge, is a very strong argument for the Divine inspiration of the Bible, especially when the artless simplicity of its manner and the circumstances of the country in which it was written are taken into consideration.

It may be proper to remark, that the acts attributed to the Divine government are usually termed "doctrines," to distinguish them from the moral precepts of a religion.

When I make use of the terms "manifestation," and "exhibition," which I shall have frequent occasion to do in the course of the following observations, I am very far from meaning any thing like a mere semblance of action without the substance. In fact, nothing

can be a true manifestation of the Divine character, which is not, at the same time, a direct and necessary result of the Divine principles, and a true narration of the Divine conduct. But these terms suit best with the leading idea which I wish to explain,-viz. that the facts of revelation are developments of the moral principles of the Deity, and carry an influential address to the feelings of man. The whole of their importance, indeed, hinges upon their being a reality; and it is the truth of this reality which is demonstrated by their holy consistency with the character of their Author, and their sanctifying applicability to the hearts of his creatures. I may observe also, that, in the illustrations which are introduced, I have aimed rather at a broad and general resemblance, than at a minute coincidence in all particulars, which is perhaps not attainable in any comparison between earthly things and heavenly.

I. As it is a matter of the very highest importance in the study of religion, to be fully satisfied that there is a real connexion between happiness and the knowledge and love of God, I have commenced these remarks by explaining the nature of this connexion. I have here endeavoured to show, that the object of a true

religion must be to present to the minds of men such a view of the character of their great Governor, as may not only enable them to comprehend the principles of his government, but may also attract their affections into a conformity with them.

II. I have made some observations on the mode in which natural religion exhibits the Divine character, and in which it appeals to the human understanding and feelings. And here I have remarked the great advantage which a general principle of morality possesses in its appeals to minds constituted like ours, when it comes forth to us in the shape of an intelligible and palpable action, beyond what it possesses in its abstract form.

III. I have attempted to show that Christianity possesses this advantage in the highest degree; that its facts are nothing more than the abstract principles of natural religion, embodied in perspicuity and efficiency; and that these facts not only give a lively representation of the perfect character of God, but also contain in themselves the strength of the most irresistible moral arguments that one man could address to another on any human interests.

IV. I have endeavoured to analyze some of the causes of the general indifference to or re