May Term. No person, gro act, shall to exculpate The STATE against WELCH. IN September sessions, an indictment was preferred under the ne- against the prisoner, for murdering a negro slave, the probe permitted perty of Mr. Radcliffe. On the trial, it appeared that the himself by his prisoner had taken up the negro on some pretext or other, own oath, for and afterwards carried him on board of a schooner he then killing a negro, but the commanded; where, either in attempting to tie him, or seer, or some secure him from going off, he threw a lead-line round the person having theimmediate negro's neck, and strangled him. master, over charge of such negro. After the evidence for the prosecution was closed, Pinckney, counsel for the prisoner, stated that there was no person present when the affair happened but the parties themselves, and offered the prisoner's exculpatory oath under the negro act, which enacts, "That if any slave shall "suffer in life or limb, when no white person is present, the owner or other person who shall have the care of, and in "whose possession or power such slave shall be, deemed 66 guilty of such offence, and shall be proceeded against ac"cordingly, without further proof; unless such owner or "other person do make the contrary appear by evidence, or exculpate himself by his oath," &c. Sed per Tot. Curiam. This oath in exculpation is only to be permitted or allowed to masters, overseers, or others, having the charge or care of negroes; and not to those who have not immediately the direction of them. The prisoner was found guilty of manslaughter; and the court sentenced him to pay a fine of 50%. sterling, and stand committed till paid. 1791. BREEN against INGRAM. May Term. col althoughmentioned to be CASE on attachment. This suit was brought upon an No obligation agreement from William MIntosh, of Georgia, dated 11th lateral thing, December, 1785, to Thomas Washington, by which he engaged to deliver Washington, or order, Richard Call's bond done to order, is negotiable; for 315. sterling. This agreement was afterwards nego- as the statute tiated to the plaintiff Breen, who attached the property of makes only McIntosh in the defendant Ingam's hands, to pay this ney negotia 315. But resolved per Tot. Curiam. This is only a covenant to do a collateral act, although said to be delivered to order, and not a negotiable note under the statute of Anne, which makes notes payable for money only, negotiable. 2 Burr. 764. Esp. 31. 1 Str. 609. 2 Str. 1151. 1273. of Anne notes for mo ble. HAMILTON and LAMBRIGHT, Trustees for HOLMAN, May Term. against GREENWOOD and others. fraudulent on SPECIAL action on the case, to try the property of a Every voluntary deed of negro wench Minah, and her children, settled on Mrs. settlement, made by a Holman by her husband, at a time when he was supposed husband to have been considerably in debt. Mr. Holman, the hus- his wife, not band, in October, 1775, in order to make a provision for his wife, settled the negro in question and four others, her and to her heirs for ever, &c. in the usual form. deed was recorded in 1776. At the time this settlement made. Fraud ore against on the husband ditors, though was in debt at The the time the settlementwas or not fraud, jury,under all was made, it appeared that Holman had 12 or 15 negroes, proper for the a stock of cattle, and household furniture, &c. to a con- the siderable amount. That there had been a difference be- stances. circum 1791. Hamilton and V. tween them, and in order to reconcile matters, the deed in question was made. On the part of the defendant it came out, that Holman afterwards (as his wife and himself did not live on the best and others. of terms) made a mortgage, dated 1st of April, 1777, of Greenwood this negro wench and some others, to defendants, in order to secure a debt he owed them; which mortgage was regularly recorded in May, 1777. It was also alleged and proved, that this debt due to the defendants, was contracted previous to the deed of settlement on Mrs. Holman. So that the question was Whether the deed of settlement, so made in favour of Mrs. Holman, was void against the defendants, who were creditors previous to the date of the settlement. Ward, for defendants, relied on the statute of 13th Eliz. relating to fraudulent conveyances. Twine's case, 3 Co. 80. and 1 Atk. 13. and contended that the deed was void as to the defendants; and more especially, as the debt was bona fide contracted previous to the date of the deed. Read, contra, argued, that the deed could not be void, unless it had been done for the express purpose of defrauding creditors; and there was no evidence of any such intent. That Holman had other property at the time of making this provision for his wife, and much more than would have paid off the defendants, had they pressed for their debt. That a deed made for the advancement of a man's family, was not fraudulent under 13th Eliz. merely because he happened to owe money at the time of making the deed. That the prospects of Holman then might well have warranted it, though adversity might have afterwards overtaken him and in fact, it appeared that he had made several imprudent bargains afterwards, which had reduced him to insolvency before his death. : By the Court, unanimously. Fraud or not fraud, under the whole of the circumstances, is a matter very proper for the consideration of a jury. There is no point clearer, than where a deed is made for the purpose of defrauding creditors, whatever the pretence may be, wherever such intent can be traced out, it is fraudulent, and ought to be set aside. But to say that no voluntary deed, made for the support and advancement of a part of a man's family, is good, because a man happened to be embarrassed at the time such deed was made, would be carrying the matter much further than the principles of law or justice would warrant. In the present case, the deed appears evidently to have been made for the support of the wife, especially as there had been differences between them. There is no secret trust in it; or that the property should ever revert to Holman. It is absolute and unconditional, and appears to have been recorded soon after its execution, which was notice to all the world. The statute of Elizabeth does not go to voluntary conveyances, merely because they are voluntary; but to such as are fraudulent. A fair, voluntary conveyance may be good against creditors, notwithstanding its being voluntary. The circumstance of a man's being in debt at the time of making such a deed, may be an argument of fraud; but then the grand question in every such case is, whether the act done is a bona fide transaction, or whether it is a trick to defraud creditors? If there is any trust for the use of the grantor, it is fraudulent; Cowp. 434, 5. but in this case there is none. It is also laid down by Lord Mansfield, Cowp. 436. that a settlement was not fraudulent, because there were creditors at the time it was made, if the transaction was a fair one. He also lays it down in Cowp. 710, 11. that a custom has prevailed, and leaned extremely to construe voluntary settlements fraudulent against creditors; but if the circumstances of the transaction shew that it was not fraudulent at the time, it is not within the statutes, though no money was paid. Jury found for the plaintiffs to the amount of the value of the wench and children. May term. The deprecia tion law of lina does The Executors of Fowl against TODD. ASSUMPSIT on two protested bills of exchange, drawn South-Caro- by the defendant at the island of Bermuda, on his brother Richard Todd, in South-Carolina; one dated in October, 1778, for 350% currency, and the other in October, 1779, unless for 2,400l. currency. not affect contracts made in other coun tries, there is a ment to run bills for pay ment. Interest shall ly from time special agree- The value of South-Carolina currency in Bermuda, was the risk of well known to be seven for one sterling; but when the bills such depreciation. were sent on for payment, the money had greatly depreciaA good ted in Carolina, so that the holder would not present them ground for not presenting for payment; and in fact, never did, as the money eventually perished. This action was, therefore, brought be allowed on- against the drawee for the amount of these bills and inOn the trial of the cause before a special jury, the drawer several grounds of defence were taken by the defendant. did not know First, that the defendant was not liable, as the bills had of the depreciation. never been tendered for acceptance or payment, and that the depreciation then prevailing, was not a sufficient ground to excuse the holder for keeping back the bills. Secondly, that if the defendant was liable, he was only liable for the value in depreciated money at the time. And thirdly, that of demanding terest. payment, if if interest was to be allowed, it should only be given on the value of such depreciated money, from the time of demand of payment. On hearing of the arguments, RUTLEDGE, Ch. J. delivered the opinion of the court as follows: First, that the great depreciation of money in Carolina at that time, having been reduced down to thirty for one, well excused the holder from presenting it for payment at that depreciated rate, especially as it was a tender in all cases whatever. Secondly. As the contract was made in Bermuda, with a view to the value of South-Carolina money as it stood before the depreciation, at seven for one, it ought, in good faith and conscience, to be paid at that rate. That the de |