1791. The State V. Washington. Not the party to whom the indent was transferred, because he took it with the receipts upon it, and, consequently, had no right to the interest which appeared to have been paid. That the law means a receipt, the forging of which would tend to deprive some person of his right; but this is only a relinquishment by the prisoner, of his claim on the treasury for so much interest; therefore, that the receipt could only injure himself. The forging such a receipt was compared to the case of Rex v. Knight, Salk. 375. Another ground was, that if the counts on the indent itself be not felony, (which they had before contended, on the ground of its not being a writing obligatory, within the act,) those on the re ceipts cannot be felony; for it cannot be more criminal to counterfeit the receipts, than the indent; unconnected with which, the receipt is perfectly innocent. The last ground was, that the receipts were neither for money nor goods, which the act requires they should be. But special indents are paid for the interest on general indents; therefore, the receipts must be considered for special indents only, and they are not for money. That money has no ear-mark, which special indents have; neither are they goods. The receipt, therefore, being neither for money nor goods, comes not within the act. These arguments rest on three grounds; 1. That the receipt was not given with intention to defraud. 2. That if it was not felony to counterfeit the indent, it could not be felony to forge the receipt. 3. That the receipt was not given for money or goods. Although these arguments may at first view appear ingenious and plausible, yet, on examination, they will be found altogether destitute of solidity. The only point on which we agree with the prisoner's counsel, is, that to make forgery, felony under this act, it must be done with intention to defraud. It surely must. It is the essence of the crime. But they say these receipts were not intended to defraud either the treasurers or Vale. But the jury have found that it was with intent to defraud both. They were the judges of that fact: we cannot say they were mistaken. It is of no consequence whether any person was actually defrauded or not; if the forgery was The case quoted by the prisoner's counsel, that of erasing 1791. The State Y. Washington. 1791. The State V. Washington. "makes it, or of defrauding a third person." This was the case of a good bond; of a bond made to the man himself; it was a case at common law; yet there it was said it would be forgery, if done with an intention to defraud. Leech, 189. Harrison's case. Prisoner was convicted on the statute of 2 Geo. II. c. 25. and 31 Geo. II. c. 22. (which extends the former to corporations,) for forging a receipt for money, with intention to defraud the London Assurance Company. He was accountant to the company, who kept their cash at the bank of England, where they had paid 210. which was entered by Clifford, a cashier at the bank, in their bank book thus: "1777, June 16th. Bank notes. "Clifford. 210l." The prisoner altered this entry by prefixing the figure 3, which made it read 3,2101. The question referred to the twelve judges was, whether this was a receipt within the meaning of the statute? And they were unanimously of opinion it was. I mention this case to shew, that although it might have been urged, that this could not have been done with intention to defraud the London Assurance Company, because it appeared to be for their advantage to have credit for 3,000l. more than they had paid; yet no such objection was made, or it was not regarded. They could have no right to credit for more than they had paid; and the conviction was held to be legal. From these cases, and a variety of others that might be adduced, it is clear, that in order to make forgery felony under this act, it is only necessary that it should be done mala fide, with intention to defraud some person. It is not necessary to lay or to prove, that any person was actually defrauded. And this upon good reasons; because the forgery may be discovered, and the party apprehended for prosecution, before the fraud intended could be thoroughly effected. The intention constitutes the crime. The counsel for the prisoner contended further, that if the counterfeiting the indent was not felony, counterfeiting the receipts could not be felony; for it cannot be more criminal to counterfeit the receipt, than the indent; and un connected with the indent, the receipt is perfectly innocent. But this we conceive to be false and inconclusive reasoning; and that the transactions of counterfeiting the indent, and forging the receipt, may be considered and determined upon, as totally independent of each other. The charge with respect to the receipt is for forging a receipt for money, with intention to defraud certain persons. And it is of no consequence on what those receipts were written; whether on the back of an indent, on the back of a lottery ticket, on a sheet of paper, or on the margin of a newspaper. If the receipt was for money; if it was forged; if it was forged with intention to defraud any person, that is sufficient to constitute it felony under the act. It was further alleged, that these receipts are not for money or goods, but must be considered as given for special indents, which are neither one nor the other. It is clear that the receipts are not for goods; but it is laid in the indictment that they were for money; and the fact is so found by the jury. There are two modern cases that shew, that the court have not been very strict on this head, where the intention to defraud has been manifest, always keeping that in view as the foundation of every thing. The one was the case of James ElDott, in 1777, Leech, 185. He was indicted for forging a bank note, whereby Thomas Thompson, for the governor and company of the bank of England, promised to pay Joseph Crooke, or bearer, on demand, fifty; and the indictment charged it to be a promissory note for the payment of money. It was contended for the prisoner, that the word pounds being omitted in the body of the note, it was not a note for payment of money; or if it was, it was totally uncertain what coin, whether pounds or shillings; and that on such an uncertainty in a declaration, a plaintiff would be nonsuited. The judge left it with the jury to consider, whether the word fifty imported pounds; and they found the prisoner guilty on that count which charged him with having forged a promissory note for payment of money, with intention to defraud the bank of England. And on this ob 1791. The State V. Washington. 1791. The State V. Washington. jection being renewed, by way of motion in arrest of judg ment, before the judges at Serjeants-Inn, they were unanimously of opinion the verdict was legal. The other case was that of John Taylor, 1779, Leech, 214. He was indicted for that having in his possession, a bill of exchange drawn by Thomas Harper on Joseph Cuff, for 201. he forged a receipt and acquittance for the said sum, as follows, viz. "Rec'd. William Wilson," with intent to defraud the said Joseph Cuff. He was convicted; and the twelve judges were of opinion the conviction was legal. With respect to the special indents, the tax act under which they were issued made them redeemable or exchangeable at the treasury, for gold or silver, at certain periods, &c. that the man who had them, might probably, if he kept them by him, get the full amount. But if he chose to part with them, he could at any time get money for them, though he could not dispose of them at par. However, it does not appear, that special indents were paid. They might have been, and they might not have been considered as money. The fact we suppose is, that neither money nor special indents were paid, because the receipt is charged to be forged, and found so. It is said to be for two years' interest; but it is also said to be for 861. 2s. 6d. making total two years' interest. Though the receipt is for those sums, in figures, the operation is the same as if it had been in words at length. We are, therefore, of opinion, that this objection must be overruled. It is immaterial to consider any of the other objections which have been offered; because the first and last objection being overruled, it follows, that the prisoner is lawfully convicted of having forged a receipt for money, with intention to defraud the persons mentioned in the indictment; and that such a forgery is, by the act of assembly, felony without benefit of clergy. We would not, however, be understood, as according to the doctrine laid down by the prisoner's counsel in their other objections. We have been more diffuse in delivering this opinion than is usual, or perhaps was necessary. But this be |