degree, in which such a being understands the relations of things, and is free from temptation to act contrary to them. § 4. Prop. God is a being of perfect HOLINESS, i. e. of the highest moral rectitude. § 5. Dem. 1. His infinite understanding must enable him. to discern all the relations of things as they really are. Lect. 39. § 5. § 6. 2. He is almighty, and therefore has nothing to fear. Lect. 34. § 5. §7. 3. He is perfectly happy, and therefore has nothing to hope. Lect. 43. § 6. § 8. 4. He is infinitely removed from all temptation to act contrary to moral rectitude. § 9. 5. It would be highly dishonourable to the divine being, to suppose him in any respect to deviate from the exactest rectitude in his actions. 3. § 10. 6. Without any temptation or advantage to deviate from moral rectitude, must fill the mind of being with uneasy reflections upon it. Lect. 52. § 10. § 11. 7. It would be inconsistent with the divine felicity, Valet propositio. $12. Cor. 1. It is reasonable to believe that it is the will of God, that all created beings, that are capable of virtue, should make it the great object of pursuit. 13. 2. Since God is a being of almighty power, and has the final happiness or misery of all creatures in his hands, every creature capable of virtue must be obliged in interest, as well as reason to cultivate the practice of it: (Vid. § 12.) and thus it appears, that virtue and self-love can only be perfectly reconciled by religion. See Dr. WATTS's pamphlet on the subject. § 14. 3. Whatsoever shall hereafter be proved a branch of virtue, and does not imply some degree of weakness and dependence in the being by whom it is to be practised, is undoubtedly to be found in God. § 15. 4. If we see God in fact doing any thing, we may assure ourselves that it is agreeable to the reason of things that it should be done, though we cannot shew how it agrees; and a Lett. to Dr. CLARKE, p. 15–28. SCOTT's Christ. Life, vol. ii. P: 361-364. PRICE on Mor. p. 427, 430. C CONYB. on Rev. Relig. p. 55–72. Prot. Syst. vol. ii. p. 454–465. b PRICE, ib. p. 445-149. though there may be some objections to it, which, in consequence of the imperfection of our views, we are not able to answer 1. § 16. Schol. It may perhaps be queried, whether this rectitude of the divine being be necessary, i. e. whether God can do what is morally unfit. Ans. God has a natural power to do what is most unfit for him to do, if we consider merely the action itself; v. g. to put a period to the existence of the most excellent creature, &c. but considering all the circumstances of an evil action, which cannot but be known to him, he cannot so oppose and contradict himself as to do it: for it is as impossible for a free agent, of perfect immutable rectitude, to act contrary to reason, i. e. to destroy its own rectitude, as for necessary existence to destroy its own being; and if the rectitude of God were not immutable, then he might be changed from a most benevolent to a most malevolent being, from a most faithful to a most perfidious being; which surely is as inconsistent with self-existence, as a change from knowledge to ignorance, or from power to weakness. Nevertheless God may freely chuse this or that action, out of many others equally good and fit. LECT. LV. Of God's Goodness. § 1. Def. THAT being may be said to be perfectly GOOD or BENEVOLENT, who promotes the happiness of others so far as it is fit to be promoted. § 2. God is perfectly good. § 3. Dem. 1. We see a great deal of happiness in the creation, of which God is the author; and generally speaking, those things which contain displays of art and wisdom, are calculated to promote the happiness of his creatures: under which head we are to rank the benevolent instincts, which he has implanted in the human mind. § 4. 2. We see no mixture of evil, from whence good may a BUTL. Anal. parti. c. vii. b CLARKE at BOYLE'S Lect. p. 115-119. GROVE on Wisdom, p. 30--33. PRICE on Mor. VOL. IV. 3 G MOLE'S Found. of Virt. p. 24. not proceed; and are sure that in many instances good does actually proceed from those things which have the appearance of evil. § 5. 3. The greatest part of those evils which we here observe arise from the abuse of human liberty, and therefore are not directly to be charged upon God. Prop. 16. § 6. 4. If we judge by the phenomena of nature, i. e. by the divine works of creation and providence obvious to us, it seems that God is a good being. $7. 5. God is so great, as to have no need of seeking his own happiness in the causeless misery of his creatures; nor is it a conceivable thing how he should take any pleasure in it, or how he could be happy with a supposed malignant disposition. § 8. 6. Benevolence is the great glory of a rational being, and without it, no other perfection can appear amiable and honourable. $ 9. 7. We have reason to believe that God is perfectly good. Q. E. D. Lect. 43. § 6. Lect. 29. § 12. $ 10. Schol. 1. The great objection to this, is the mixture of evil in the world, natural evil, i. e. pain, and moral evil, i. e. vice: (Vid. Lect. 52. § 12.) and it is questioned, how far the existence and prevalence of it in so great a degree can be reconcileable with what has been said of the divine goodness, since God has already been proved an almighty being. 11. Ans. 1. We cannot possibly judge as to the proportion there is between the quantity of happiness and misery in the creation, merely from what we observe in this part of it, which is our own abode. There may perhaps be regions incomparably more extensive and populous, in which neither natural nor moral evil are known, at least by experience. $ 12. 2. It is possible there is no evil of any kind, from which a degree of good may not proceed, more than sufficient to counterbalance it. § 13. 3. When moral evil has been introduced, (which, as was observed above, gr. 3.) might be by the abuse of liberty in a WILK. Nat. Rel. p. 135-139. CLARKE at BOYLE's Lect. p. 113. COLLIE. Ing. p. 68-71. Ed. 3. p. 81-84. HARILEY on Man, vol. ii. prop. ir. RAMS. Princ. vol. i. Prop. 24, 25. HUTCH. Syst. vol.i. c. ix. 5-14. CLARKE'S Posth. Works, vol. i. p. 321-327, 337 -341. Oct. BAYES on Div. Benev. p. 20-29. ABERN. Serm. vol. ii. No. 2*. *For a curious and valuable tract on this subject, see Dr. THOMAS BALGUY'S Divine Benevolence asserted and vindicated. K. free creatures, then penal evil is on the whole, good, and well suited to a state of discipline, which may possibly in those circumstances be intended as a proper introduction to a state of enjoyment. § 14. 4. The scheme of things which we now see may perhaps be continually growing better and better; not to say, that for aught certainly appears by the light of nature, the time may come, when all natural and moral evil may cease". LECT. LVI. Of the Permission of Moral Evil. § 1. Schol. 2. IT will still be demanded, why was moral evil permitted? To this it is generally answered, that it was the result of natural liberty; and it was fit, that among all the other classes and orders of being, some should be formed possessed of this, as it conduces to the harmony of the universe, and to the beautiful variety of beings in it. § 2. Yet still it is replied, why did not God prevent this abuse of liberty*? One would not willingly say, that he is not able to do it, without violating the nature of his creatures; nor is it possible that any should prove this. It is commonly said, that he permitted it, in order to extract from thence greater a Rel. of Nat. p. 71, 72. BAXT. Works, vol. ii. p. 37-39, 90, 91. Travels of Cyrus, p. 248-258. 12mo. CLARKE on the Orig. of Nat. Evil, præs. p. BONET'S Contemplation of Nature. *The continued perfection of any creature must be owing to such continued acts of God as cannot be claimed in equity. For though no creature be impelled to sin, he is not sufficient of himself, without God's immediate and gratuitous assistance, to preserve his happy state one moment. The question, in fact, returns to this, Are the attributes of strict equity and sovereign mercy to be MANIFESTED, or are they not? The latter cannot be displayed but to a creature who is brought, through the "abuse of liberty," into a state of sin; nor could sin take place but by the exercise of the former; not as the cause, but the innocent occasion. The true cause is the creature's passive power, a term which I am constrained to use for want of a better, notwithstanding Dr. REID's objection to it. This tendency to defection, inseparable from the essence of a created nature, becomes the actual cause of sin only when employed by liberty, and that employed by equity. But sovereign favour alone, o direct supernatural influence, can counteract passive power, and thereby prevent the abuse of liberty, and produce moral good. W. 424 LECTURES ON ETHICS. good. But it may be further queried, could he not have produced that greater good without such a means? Could he not have secured among all his creatures universal good and universal happiness, in full consistency with the liberty he had given them? I acknowledge I see no way of answering this question, but by saying, he had indeed a natural power of doing it, but which that he saw it better not to do it, though the reasons upon it appeared preferable to him are entirely unknown to us2. § 3. 3. Some have thought it more for the honour of the divine being to say, that the nature of things is such, that the happiness of the whole system will be more effectually promoted by the misery of some part of it; and therefore, that perfect benevolence would induce the creator to chuse such a mixed scheme, rather than another in which there should have been unmixed virtue and happiness.—But granting that there is no evil, from which an equal or greater degree of good may not proceed, (Schol. 1. gr. 2.) yet it may justly be asked, what is here meant by the nature of things, or how can it possibly be imagined or believed, that a greater sum of happiness should arise from the mixture of evil, than omnipotence could have produced some other way; or how can the view or experience of misery be necessary to give a virtuous being a more exquisite relish of happiness +? b § 4. 4. If we still remain dissatisfied with the reply given to the objection, Lect. 55. § 10. it seems that the chief reason is, that we are apt to go on the mistaken principle, that God must needs raise the happiness of the universe to the highest possible *To the writers here referred to may be added BONET's "Contemplation of Nature." Among the works which exaggerate the evils of mankind in order to promote atheistical purposes, may be reckoned the "Systeme de la Nature," ascribed to MIRABEAU the Father. On the question, Why God did not prevent the abuse of liberty? no one is more sceptically copious than BAYLE in several articles of his Historical Dictionary, and particularly under the heads of Manichæans and Paulicians. K. The inquisitive reader is referred further, on this profound subject, to Dr. BELLAMY on "The Wisdom of God in the Permission of Sin ;" and Mr. JOHN PYE SMITH ON "The divine Glory displayed by the Permission of Sin," lately published. See Dr. HOPKINS's Theory on the Causation of Sin, seems highly exceptionable. his "System of Doctrines contained in Divine Revelation," explained and defended, vol. 1. p. 156-217. W. For the writers who maintain that both the natural and moral evil existing in the world are essential parts of the best possible system, recourse may be had to HARTLEY, &c. K. |