on the last day of September, in the 27th of Elizabeth, to
Edward Green, and the said John Green, and to each of
them, the office of furveyor of all his manors in the county of
Dorfet- and elsewhere in the kingdom of England, to be
exercised by them and their deputies, for whom they
should answer, to have and to hold to them, for the term
of their lives; and further, that the faid bishop by the fame
deed granted to them a rent of twenty nobles a year iffuing
out of the faid manor of Sherborne, with a clause of distress;
and that the grant was confirmed by the dean and chapter,
on the 5th of September, in the 28 of El. in the life of the
faid John, bishop of Salisbury; and he averred, that the
faid office was an ancient office, and that the faid office, to-
gether with the aforesaid fee of 6l. 135. 4d. had been granted
by the faid John bishop of Salisbury, and his prede-
ceffors," to fuch perfon or perfons as they pleased."
He then fhewed the death of Edward Green, alledged that
he demanded the rent, and in default of payment, dif-
ftrained. In bar of this avowry the plaintiff pleaded
the ftatute of El. c. 19; and, "that neither the office
aforefaid, nor the annual rent aforefaid, before the grant
aforesaid, were ever granted by the said bishop nor by any
of his predeceffors for any longer time than for one life, by
which the grant aforefaid, by the aforefaid John, late bishop
of Salisbury, by force of the act aforefaid, was void." On
which the avowant demurred.

AFTER ftating feveral objections to the pleadings, the reporter goes at full length into the merits of the question, the substance of which having been given on feveral former occafions, it is not intended to repeat here; the chief purpofe for which the cafe is here introduced, is merely to fhew that the question of the neceffity of the office, or of the reasonableness of the fee, was not before the court, although

in the course of the argument much matter is introduced concerning both.-By the fifth resolution (a), in this case, it was declared, "that the grant of an ancient office to one with the ancient fee, by a bishop, fhall not bind his fucceffor, unless it be confirmed by the dean and chapter, for that fuch grants are not reftrained by the ftatute of the first of Elizabeth, and therefore remaining at common law, ought to be confirmed by the dean and chapter."

As this was a grant for more than one life, contrary to the ufage stated in the bar to the avowry, judgment was given for the plaintiffs.

THE bishop of Chichester was feifed in fee of a park in right of his bishopric, and had the office of park-keeper, which he granted by deed in the 44th of Elizabeth, to one Freedland for life, and also granted him, for the execution of the office, an annual rent of 31. 6s. 8d. together with a livery of 13s. 4d. by the year, with pafturage for two horfes in the park yearly, and the windfalls in the park, with a claufe of distress for the rent of 31. 6s. 8d. and the livery of 13s. 4d. and this grant was confirmed by the dean and chapter: for non-payment of the rent of 31. 6s. 8d. Freeland took a diftrefs, and in avowry averred, that the office and fee of 31. 6s. 8d. were ancient, but made no averment for the refidue. The plaintiff, the fucceeding bishop, in bar of the avowry, confeffed the grant, but pleaded the statute of 1 El. c. 19, and averred that the pasturage was never granted before, and entitled himself as fucceffor to the grantor-to which the defendant demurred -and it seemed to be agreed by all the judges, that if the new additional fees had been in another claufe diftinct from the grant of the office and the fee 31. 6s. 8d. or had been granted for another confideration; or if the bishop (a) Id, 62 a.

I

had

had granted the office and 31. 6s. 8d. for him and his fucceffors, and had granted the pafturage and other additional fees during his own life only; the grant, in either of these cafes, would have been good for the ancient office and fee, but not for the additional fees: they agreed too, that if the grant of the office had been with a fee of 51. where the ancient fee was but five merks; there the grant being intire would have been void in the whole against the fucceffor.-But the court was divided on the point whether these clauses were two diftinct grants or only made one intire grant; two judges held that they were several and diftinct, and two that they were intire and depending on each other, and therefore void in the whole against the fucceffor (a).

IN replevin, the defendant avowed on a grant made to him by a dean and chapter of the office of catership of the church for life, with an annuity of 61. per annum, for exercifing the office, and a clause of distress; and averred that it was an ancient office pertaining to the dean and chapter, but did not aver that the annuity was an ancient annuity: the plaintiff in bar of the the avowry pleaded the 13 El. c. 10, and fhewed the death of the dean grantor, and the election of another; and on demurrer the grant was adjudged to be void (b).

In an action on the cafe for difturbing the plaintiff in the exercise of the office of register to the bishop of Rochester, it was alledged that the office was an ancient office, and grantable as well in reverfion as in poffeffion; and that in the year 1622 it was granted to the plaintiff by the then bishop of Chefter, to be held after the death or furrender of J. S. who held it for life, to be exercised by

(a) Gee Bishop of Chichester v. Freedland, Cro, Car. 47.
(b) Humphrey v. Parfel, Brownl. 182.

himself

himself or his fufficient deputy; on not guilty pleaded, a trial at bar was had, and the plaintiff, to prove that it was an ancient office, and grantable in reversion, shewed a grant of the fourth of Edward the fixth to one Robinson, in reverfion after the death of Bufhfield and Bufhfield, which was confirmed by the dean and chapter, and was fubfifting in the firft of Elizabeth; and that in the seventh of Elizabeth he furrendered and took a new grant to him and another. It was held by all the court that this was good evidence to fhew that the office was anciently grantable in reverfion, but that as it was matter of fact, it was to be left to the jury; but they conceived, that if it had not been usually and anciently granted in reverfion, yet being granted before the ftatute of the first of Elizabeth, and subsisting at the time of that statute, and having been confirmed by the dean and chapter, it was a good grant: and the court faid the jury might find the matter specially if they would, but they gave a general verdict for the plaintiff (a). About fix years after this (b), the fame plaintiff brought another action on the case for disturbing him in the execution of the fame office, in which, on a plea of not guilty, a fpecial verdict was found, to this effect:- -That from time immemorial, the bishop of Rochester for the time being had used to grant the office of the register for all caufes within the diocese of Rochefter, as well in reverfion as in poffeffion, for life, to be held and exercised when the office came in poffeffion, by the grantee or his fufficient deputy. The ftatute of the firft of Elizabeth was found, and the facts with refpect to the grant to the plaintiff to the fame purpofe as had been fhewn in evidence on the trial in the former cafe, except that there was fome variation in the

(a) Young v. Stowel. Cro. Car. 279, M. 8. Car. (b) Young v. Fowler, H. 14 Car. Cro. Car. 555.

dates.

dates. It was further found that the plaintiff, at the time of the grant, was an infant of the age of eleven years and fix weeks, and not more; but that he attained his full age in the life-time of the bishop and of the tenant for life; and that the defendant disturbed him in the exercise of his office.

HERE two queftions were made. 1. Whether this grant to an infant, to be exercised by himself, or his deputy, in reverfion after the death of the tenant for life, was good or not; and, 2. Whether an office for life, usually granted in poffeffion or reverfion, being granted in reverfion, and confirmed by the dean and chapter, was good to bind his fucceffors.

As to the first, the court held that the infancy at the time of the grant, was no cause to avoid it; because at the time it fell into poffeffion, he was of fufficient age to execute the office, and that, if it had become vacant during his minority, yet the grant would have been good, because it was to be exercised by himself or his fufficient deputy, and was a minifterial not a judicial office (a).

As to the second point, they held that the office being found to have been usually granted in poffeffion for life, or in reverfion for life, every bishop for his time might grant the office, because it was a necessary office, and ought always to be full; fo that when one died, there might always be another officer immediately to execute the office for the benefit of the King's fubjects; and that when it had been usually granted for life in reverfion, there was not any prejudice to the fucceffor, because no matter of profit was taken from him, and he had an officer who was necessary, and that this was well warranted by the case of the bishop of Salisbury.

(a) Vid. the report, where an opinion of Co. Lit. 3 b. is examined.