v. 35). To some extent therefore the grammar and syntax of the New Testament authors are loose. They were not careful of constructions and phrases. With the exception of Paul and Luke, they were not educated men. Writing was not their main occupation. They were speakers and preachers, heralds of the cross, not biographers or letterwriters. Theirs was a higher mission than that of ordinary authors. They were not so familiar with Greek as to write it with precision, besides being under the necessity of adapting it to new ideas, or making new words. Hence grammarians should beware of seeking conscious reasons for peculiarities of diction in the New Testament; studied refinements expressive of shades of thought. Here sound judgment will prevent the expositor from going to an extreme; though scholars trained in classical Greek are too ready to carry into the Hellenistic dialect the precision they are accustomed to look for or find in the former.

Amid all the modifications of exactness and uniformity, it is still desirable to observe the varieties of the writers, and to reproduce them in a translation. The same words and phrases should have identical representatives as far as allowable. It is undesirable to translate the same word in the same verse differently, as in John xix. 12, where release him and let him go represent the same Greek word; or in epistles of the same author, as I certify, Galatians i. 11, and I declare, 1 Corinthians xv. 1. For the sake of uniformity we have rendered xonoròs in Matthew xi. 30 "good," as it is done in some other places in the received version, believing that it is universally suitable. Similarly μɛvovvλɛ is translated throughout "nay rather," or with ảλλà in Philippians iii. 8, "nay but rather." So ἐφ ̓ ὦ has been uniformly rendered inasmuch as, which suits the different passages it occurs in-Romans v. 12; Philippians iii. 12; 2 Corinthians v. 4-though we are aware that Rothe and Baur argue in favour of the meaning, on the supposition that, on the condition that.

Sometimes uniformity is unavoidable where it is not desirable. Necessity constrains us to render different Greek

words by the same equivalents. In this case the mere English reader loses the full effect of the original, and possibly an argument bearing on diversity of authorship. For example, Christ is called the Lamb in the Apocalypse and fourth gospel; but the Greek word is not the same in both. So κpious and кpīμa are rendered by the same word judgment; though they are not synonymous. The latter is used but once in the fourth gospel; the former often. ̓Αληθὴς and ἀληθινὸς both mean true, and we are obliged to be satisfied with that adjective for them as applied to God in the fourth gospel and Apocalypse, though they have a different sense in the two works, as Lücke has shown. The English parable must also stand for Tapaßoλǹ and παροιμία Taрoquía; the latter occurring only in the fourth gospel, in this sense, and different from the former. Thus distinctions are concealed from the English reader.

Whatever circumspection may be used by a translator; whatever knowledge of the Greek Testament he may have; though his acquaintance with its language and critical expositors be extensive and his judgment mature, he meets with difficulties which he cannot resolve with certainty. Obscure passages exercise his ingenuity. Ambiguous constructions perplex his mind. Though he examine cautiously and carefully he will not feel confident that he has arrived at the right translation. And this confidence will be lessened by seeing the discordant opinions of those who have gone before him; different renderings of the same words by the ablest critics and lexicographers. The present writer, like his predecessors, has often hesitated and lingered over passages, perceiving their difficulty and unable to attain certainty respecting them. He has weighed the respective values of the views entertained about them by the most critical expositors, without satisfaction, or help towards a safe conclusion. In such instances he could do no more than use his best judgment, leaving others to decide how far he has succeeded. One thing he can say with truth that he did not allow any theological bias to influence his translations. Such as they are, dogmatic prepossessions did

not shape them.

The sacred writers have been allowed as far as possible to state in English their own ideas, not any that may be peculiar to the translator. Avoidance of dogmatic partiality has been a paramount duty with the author. When he sees that in some Greek Testaments of considerable pretensions, the very citation of critical authorities is tinged with unfairness in the interest of a creed, he is all the more on his guard against such influences, dishonouring as they are to the God of truth.

We shall now direct the reader's attention to a few passages where peculiar embarrassment was felt, and conclusions were arrived at very slowly.

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John viii. 44, ὅταν λαλῇ τὸ ψεῦδος, ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων λαλεῖ, ὅτι ψεύστης ἐστὶ καὶ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ, “When he speaketh a lie, he speaketh of his own: for he is a liar, and the father of it." Here avrou is understood to refer to feudos, the lie, and this perhaps is the most usual construction, which, having been adopted by Origen, Euthymius, and Theophylact, is followed by Lücke and De Wette. Another explanation refers aurou to the liar vorns, so that the translation is, "his (the liar's) father." This is followed by Meyer, and by Späth in the Protestanten-Bibel neuen Testamentes. Scholten's explanation is not clear or satisfactory. The two leading expositions are harsh and unnatural. They may perhaps be justified on philological grounds; but neither is the obvious and natural translation. It seems to us that any scholar looking at the Greek for the first time, and not thinking how it affects theological beliefs, would render it as we have done, "and so is his father." Such is the natural sense of the original words; and Lachmann assents without hesitation. What then? Should we resort to conjecture and change őrav into ös av, as has been suggested? The text of the New Testament hardly needs or admits of conjecture. Such remedy is unnecessary. The words intimate that the father of the devil was a liar as well as himself. But Meyer objects that this is an old heretical explanation; and that a father of the devil is foreign to the New Testament. Both statements have little weight. A

heretical explanation may sometimes be right; and there are in the fourth gospel both ideas and phrases which do not occur in other parts of the New Testament. This late gospel has its own peculiarities. Several of the Fathers intimate that Gnostic sects held the demiurge to be the devil's father. Nor was such belief peculiar to Gnostics; some orthodox Christians appear to have had it also. Jerome's language implies that the opinion about the devil's father existing in the words was widely spread. Cyril of Alexandria understood καὶ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ as we have translated; though his interpretation is peculiar. According to Epiphanius, the Archontici supposed the demiurge to be the devil's father, which Augustine calls a detestable error of the Manicheans. Hilgenfeld persistently follows the interpretation we have adopted; and Bishop Middleton advocates it also.

The important passage in the Epistle to the Philippians ii. 6-8, "Who, being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God: but made himself of no reputation, and took upon him the form of a servant, and was made in the likeness of men: and being found in fashion as a man, he humbled himself, and became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross," we have endeavoured to translate according to the Greek words* employed in it, apart from theological questions. The immediate object of ἡγήσατο is τὸ εἶναι ἴσα Θεῷ ; “ he did not think the being equal with God," a áρπayμòs, a thing to be eagerly grasped at. Equality with God was not an object of ambitious self-exaltation. It is generally admitted that the received version is erroneous; and the rectifications of it are various. Our present purpose precludes a full discussion of the meaning. Those who wish to see how the whole has been interpreted may consult the commentaries of De Wette and Meyer, where different results are arrived at; or the "Entwickelung des Paulinischen Lehrbegriffes of Usteri, where the passage is also discussed. In England the words will continue to be explained in accordance with the views of Christ's person previously entertained by the

persons commenting on it. They will be considered in a controversial aspect avowed or assumed, instead of a purely scientific view. The main points are, whether iv uoppy Oto refers to Christ's precarnate or incarnate state; and whether μορφή is equivalent to φύσις or ουσία, or at least implies púois. We do not think that μoppʼn (form) is here used in the sense of specific character, in whatever way Plato and Aristotle may have explained the word. That it is the same with φύσις or οὐσία, as Schleusner explains it, cannot be rightly maintained. The expression is nearly equivalent to sikóv, image, in Colossians i. 15 referring to the fulness of divine power and perfection belonging to Christ, which was neither displayed to the utmost nor ambitiously paraded. He did not therefore catch at equality with God, but humbled Himself. The whole passage probably refers to the historical Christ. If the meaning be assigned, "though he pre-existed in the form of God, yet he looked upon equality with God as a prize which must not slip from his hand, but he emptied himself," etc., etc., something is put into the words which the sacred writer did not think of. The apπayμòç is not "a prize he is supposed to have," but a thing he is supposed to grasp at and therefore has not. Wilke says correctly, "non rem sibi cupide arripiendam duxit." We object to the meaning "prize" given to the word in question; and still more to the rendering "he did not treat his equality with God as a prize to be greedily clutched and ostentatiously displayed." The sacred writer had not the conception of the nature of Christ which this paraphrase introduces into his epistle. Modern belief educes its own ideas out of a passage cast in a different mould. The English translation, "thought it not robbery to be equal with God," seems to have been taken from Luther's, "hielt er's nicht für einen Raub, Gott gleich sein;" which again follows the Vulgate, "non rapinam arbitratus est esse se aequalem Deo."

Another passage which caused the writer considerable perplexity is Luke xviii. 14, where Von Tischendorf reads ἢ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος. Had he put the mark of interrogation at the