A nominal Christian may pray; a nominal Christian may fast; a nominal Christian may give alms. It may even happen that men may embrace religion on base principles. Religion commands a subject to obey his king; a king may embrace religion on this account, and he may place his supreme happiness in the obedience of his subjects. Religion discovers to us a merciful God; a wicked man may embrace religion on this account, for the sake of calming those fears which his vicious practices excite, by ideas of divine mercy. The same may be said of other men. A man cannot conclude then, that he is a believer from his performance of virtuous actions, common to believers and unbelievers. He must have peculiar light into the deep depravity of his own heart; he must be placed, at least in design, in circumstances that distinguish a good from a bad man. Again when we say a believer can never cease to believe, we do not mean to say, a Christian attached to religion only by external performances, and by appearances of piety, can never cast off his profession. The finest appearances of piety, the greatest knowledge, the most liberal alms-deeds, the most profound humiliations, may be succeeded by foul and fatal practices. God "divided against himself," Matt. xii. 26, and so a destroyer of his own kingdom; it is to make his testimony in the heart contradict his testimony in Scripture. In Scripture he declares, "No man can serve two masters," chap. vi. 24; in your hearts he declares, A man may serve two masters. In Scripture he attests, There is no concord between Christ and Belial," 2 Cor. vi. 15; in your hearts he attests, There is concord between Christ and Belial. In Scripture he affirms, "Neither fornicators, nor covetous, nor revilers, shall inherit the kingdom of God," 1 Cor. vi. 9, 10; in your hearts he affirms, Such shall inherit the kingdom of God. Thus the four arguments, that prove the doctrine of assurance in favour of true believers, destroy the security of a mere nominal Christian. 66 The consolations which arise from the doctrine of assurance, are not then for all Christians indifferently. They are only for those who continually study obedience; they are for those only who have seen into a "heart deceitful above all things, and desperately wicked," Jer. xvii. 9, and have found even there marks of regeneration; they are for those only, who, by a life entirely devoted to the service of God, have demonstrated that they bear the characters of his children. Is this your condition? The sophisms of sin that we have endeavoured to refute, these portraits of rash confidence, these false titles of virtue and regeneration, these images that we have traced, whence have we taken them? Have we gathered them from books? have we invented them in our closets? have we derived them from the study of theology? have we drawn them from monuments of ancient history? No, no, we have learnt them in the world, in the church, in your families, in your sick beds, where nothing is so common as this false peace, nothing so rare as the true. Moreover, great knowledge, generous charity, profound humiliation, will aggravate the condemnation of those who cease to proceed in virtue, and to purify their motives of action; because the performance of these virtues, and the acquisition of this great knowledge, suppose greater aid, and more resistance. Hear St. Peter: "It had been better for them not to have known the way of righteousness, than after they have known it to turn from the holy commandment," 2 Epist. ii. 21. The case of those who commit the unpardonable sin, attests the same. Hear these thundering words: "If we sin wilfully after that we have received the Whence the evil comes, I know not: but the knowledge of the truth, there remaineth no fact is certain. Of all the churches in the more sacrifice for sins, but a certain fearful world, there are none which abuse the doctrine looking for of judgment and fiery indignation, of Christian assurance, and which draw consewhich shall devour the adversaries," Heb. x. 26. quences from it directly contrary to those which Finally, The argument from the testimony ought to be drawn, like some of ours. We of the Spirit of God for the assurance of a true lull ourselves into a fanciful confidence: we believer, ought to trouble the security of a place on imaginary systems an assurance which nominal Christian. In effect, how does the ought to be founded only on the rock of ages; Holy Spirit work in our hearts? Does he we scruple, even while we are engaged in the operate by magic? Does he present phantoms most criminal habits, to say, we doubt of our to our view? Does he inculcate propositions salvation; and, as if a persuasion of being contrary to truth? This is all enthusiasm. saved, dispensed with the necessity of working The Holy Spirit bears witness in us in a man-out our salvation, we consider an assurance of ner conformabie to our state and to the nature of things in general. If then the Spirit of God testify in your hearts while you are unregenerate, he will testify that you are unregenerate. If he bear witness while you are nominally Christians, he will bear witness that you are nominal Christians. If he bear witness while your faith is doubtful, he will bear witness to the doubtfulness of your faith. Such a testimony may be ascribed to the Spirit of God. But an assurance of salvation, which exceeds your evidences of Christianity, must be a vision, a fancy, a dream; and to suppose the Holy Spirit the author of such an assurance, is to suppose in the same Spirit testimony against testimony; it is to make the Spirit of arriving at heavenly felicity as a privilege, that supplies the want of every virtue. Certainly nothing is more great and happy than the disposition of a man who courageousexpects to enjoy a glory to which he has a just title. A man who knows the misery of sin; a man who groans under the weight of his own depravity, and enters into the sentiment, while he utters the language of the apostle, "O wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me from the body of this death?" Rom. vii. 24; a man, who, after he had experienced the terrible agitations of a conscience distressed on account of sin, has been freed from all his sins at the foot of the cross, has put on the yoke of Christ his Lord; a man, who having seen in himself the true characters of a Christian, and the never failing graces annexed to evangelical mercy, has learned at length to pierce through all the clouds which Satan uses to conceal heaven from the Christian eye, to lay all the ghosts, that the enemy of souls raises to haunt mankind into terror; a man who rests on that "word of God, which standeth for ever, even when heaven and earth pass away," may say with St. Paul, "I am persuaded;" such a man may assure himself that only glorified spirits enjoy a happiness superior to his; he is arrived at the highest degree of felicity, to which in this valley of tears men can come. But to consider religion always on the comfortable side; to congratulate one's self for having obtained the end before we have made use of the means; to stretch the hands to receive the crown of righteousness, before they have been employed to fight the battle; to be content with a false peace, and to use no efforts to obtain the graces, to which true consolation is annexed; this is a dreadful calm, like that which some voyagers describe, and which is a very singular forerunner of a very terrible event. All on a sudden, in the wide ocean, the sea becomes calm, the surface of the water clear as crystal, smooth as glass, the air serene; the unskilled passenger becomes tranquil and happy; but the old mariner trembles. In an instant the waves froth, the winds murmur, the heavens kindle, a thousand gulfs open, a frightful light inflames the air, and every wave threatens sudden death. This is an image of most men's assurance of salvation. So then, instead of applying the words of our text to a great number of you, we are obliged to shed tears of compassion over you. Yes, we must lament your misery. You live under an economy in which the most transporting joys are set before you, and you wilfully deprive yourselves of them. Yes, we must adopt the language of a prophet, "O that my people had hearkened unto me!" We must say with Jesus Christ, "If thou hadst known, even thou, at least in this thy day, the things which belong unto thy peace!" Ps. lxxx. 13; Luke xix. 42. What can be happier, amidst the numberless vanities and vexations which accompany worldly pleasures, than to be able to derive from an assurance of our salvation pleasures suitable to intelligent creatures, immortal souls? What can be happier, amidst all the pains, labours, and miseries, with which life abounds, than to enjoy the plentiful consolations, that issue from a well-grounded hope of eternal felicity? Above all, what can be more capable of supporting us against the fear of death? Mortal and dying as we are, in a state, where the smallest alteration in the body reminds us of death, what can we wish for more conformable to our wants than to find, in a firm hope of eternal felicity, a shield to secure us against the enemy, and a sword to destroy him? let us strive, let us pray, let us venture all, my brethren, to arrive at this happy state. And if, after we have believingly and sincerely laboured in this good work, there remain any doubt and suspicion, let us assure ourselves, that even our suspicions and fears shall contribute to our VOL. I.-41 ་་ 321 confirmation. They will not be accounted crimes, they will at most be only frailties; they will be infirmities productive of motives to go on in virtue, and to establish peace in the conscience. So be it. To God be honour and glory. Amen. SERMON XXXVIII. JUDGMENT. HEBREWS ix. 27. It is appointed unto men once to die: but after this the judgment. THE second proposition in my text conveys terror into the first. Judgment to come makes death terrible. I own, it is natural to love life. The Creator, it should seem, has supplied the want of satisfactory pleasures in the world, by giving us, I know not what, attachment to it. But when reason rises out of nature, when the good and evil of life are weighed, evil seems to outweigh good, and we can hardly help exclaiming with the wise man, death is better than the day of one's birth! I The day of hate life because of the work that is wrought under the sun!" Eccles. vii. 1, and ii. 17. But to go from a bed of infirmity to a tribu nal of justice; to look through the languors of a mortal malady to torments that have no end; and, after we have heard this sentence, "Return to destruction, ye children of men,' Ps. xc. 3, to hear this other, "Give an account of thy stewardship," Luke xvi. 2, these are just causes for intelligent beings to fear death. Let us, however, acknowledge, although this fear is just, yet it may be excessive; and, though it be madness to resist the thought, yet it would be weakness to be overwhelmed with it. I would prove this to-day, while in this point of light I endeavour to exhibit to your view the judgment that follows death. We will not divert your attention from the chief design. We will only hint, that the proposition in the text is incidental, and not im mediately connected with the principal subject, which the apostle was discussing. His design was to show the pre-eminence of the sacrifice of the cross over all those of the Levitical economy. One article, which argues the superiority of the first, is, that it was offered but once, whereas the Jewish sacrifices were reiterated. Christ does "not offer himself often, as the high-priest entereth into the holy place every year with the blood of other sacrifices: but once in the end of the world hath he appeared to put away sin by the sacrifice of himself." For," as it is appointed unto men once to die, and after this the judgment; so Christ was once offered to bear the sins of many." Nor will we detain you longer by inquiring whether St. Paul speaks here of the particular judgment that each man undergoes immediately after death, or of that general judgment day, of which Scripture says, "God hath appointed a day, in the which he will judge the world in righteousness," Acts xvii. 31. Whatever difference there may seem to be between these two hypotheses, it is easy to harmonize them. The general judgment will be a confirmation and a consummation of each particular judgment, and we ought to consider both as different parts of one whole. is properly proposed, yet such examples as we Once more, I repeat it, we will not divert your attention from the principal design of this discourse. I am going first, not to allege arguments in proof of a judgment to come, I suppose them known to you, and that I am not preaching to novices: but I am going to assist Have human laws ever been made against you to carry them farther than you usually do, hypocrites? see that man artfully covering himand so to guard you against skepticism and self with the veil of religion, that hypocrite, infidelity, the pest of our days, and the infamy who excels in his art! behold his eyes, what of our age. In a second article, we will in-seraphical looks they roll towards heaven! obquire, what will be the destiny of this assem- serve his features, made up, if I may venture bly in that great day, in which God will declare to say so, of those of Moses, Ezra, Daniel, and the doom of all mankind. We discuss this Nehemiah! see his vivacity, or his flaming zeal question, not to indulge a vain curiosity: but shall I call it? to maintain the doctrines of reto derive practical inferences, and particularly ligion, to forge thunderbolts, and to pour out to moderate the excessive fear, that an object anathemas against heretics! Not one grain of so very terrible produces in some minds, and at religion, not the least shadow of piety, in all the same time to trouble the extravagant secu- his whole conversation. It is a party spirit, rity in which some sleep, in spite of sounds so or a sordid interest, or a barbarous disposition proper to awake them. to revenge, which animates him, and produces all his pretended piety. And yet I hear every body exclaim, He is a miracle of religion! he is a pillar of the church! I see altars every where erecting to this man; panegyrists, I see, are composing his encomium; flowers are gathering to be strewed over his tomb. And the justice of God, what is it doing? My text tells you, "After death comes judgment." I. We have three directions to give you. The first regards the arguments for judgment taken from the disorders of society. The second regards that which is taken from conscience. The third that which is taken from revelation. 1. Our first direction regards the argument taken from the disorders of society. Do not confine your attention to those disorders which strike the senses, astonish reason, and subvert faith itself. Reflect on other irregularities, which, although they are less shocking to sense, and seemingly of much less consequence, are yet no less deserving the attention of the Judge of the whole earth, and require, no less than the first, a future judgment. who shall punish this black crime? I answer again, "After death comes judgment." Have human laws ever been made against the ungrateful? While I was in prosperity, I studied to procure happiness to a man, who seemed entirely devoted to me; I was happier in imparting my abundance to him than in enjoying it myself; during that delightful period of my life he was faithful to me: but when forI grant, those notorious disorders, which hu- tune abandoned me, and adopted him, he turnman laws cannot repress, afford proof of a ed his back on me; now he suffers me to lanfuture judgment. A tyrant executes on a gib-guish in poverty; and, far from relieving my bet a poor unhappy man, whom the pain of wants, he does not deign so much as to examhunger, and the frightful apprehension of sud-ine them. And divine justice, where is it? den death, forced to break open a house. Here, if you will, disorder is punished, and society is satisfied. But who shall satisfy the just vengeance of society on this mad tyrant? This very tyrant, at the head of a hundred thousand thieves, ravages the whole world; he pillages on the right and on the left; he violates the most sacred rights, the most solemn treaties; he knows neither religion nor good faith. Go, see, follow his steps, countries desolated, plains covered with the bodies of the dead, palaces reduced to ashes, and people run mad with despair. Inquire for the author of all these miseries. Will you find him, think you, confined in a dark dungeon, or expiring on a wheel? Lo! he sits on a throne, in a superb royal palace; nature and art contribute to his pleasures; a circle of courtiers minister to his passions, and erect altars to him, whose equals in iniquity, yea, if I may be allowed to say so, whose inferiors in vice, have justly suffered the most infamous punishments. And where is divine justice all this time? what is it doing? I answer with my text, "After death comes judgment. So speak ye, and so do, as they that shall be judged by the law of liberty," James i. 12. But, though the argument taken from the disorders of society is full and clear when it Have men made laws against cowards I do not mean cowardice in war; the infamy that follows this crime, is a just punishment of it. I speak of that mean cowardice of soul, which makes a man forsake an oppressed innocent sufferer, and keep a criminal silence in regard to the oppressor. Pursue this train of thought, and you will every where find arguments for a future judgment; because there will every where appear disorders, which establish the necessity of it. Our second direction regards the argument taken from conscience. Let not your faith be shaken by the examples of those pretended superior geniuses, who boast of having freed themselves from this restraint. Tell them, if they have no conscience, they ought to have; and affirm, the truer their pretensions, the stronger your reason for taxing them with rage and extravagance. There is no better mode of destroying an objection than by proving, that he who proposes and admits it is a fool for admitting and proposing it. If, then, I prove that a man, who, to demonstrate that conscience is a fancy, declares, he is entirely exempt from it; if I prove, that such a man is a fool for proposing and admitting this proposi tion, shall I not subvert his whole system? Now I think I am able to prove such a man a fool, and you will admit the truth of what I say, if you will give a little attention to the nature of conscience, a little closer attention, I mean, than is usually given to sermons. What is conscience? It is difficult to include an adequate idea of it in a definition. This appears to me at once the most general and the most exact: conscience is that faculty of our minds, by which we are able to distinguish right from wrong, and to know whether we neglect our duties, or discharge them. There are, I grant, some operations of conscience, which seem to be rather instinct and sentiment than cool judgment arising from a train of reflections. Yet, we believe, all the operations of conscience proceed from judgment and reflection. But it sometimes happens, that the judgment of the mind is so ready, and its reflections so rapid, that it hardly sees what it judges, and reflects on, so that it seems to act by instinct and sentiment only. Thus when the mind compares two simple numbers together, the comparison is so easily made, that we think we know the difference by a kind of instinct belonging to our nature; whereas when we compare complex numbers, we feel, so to speak, that our minds inquire, examine, and labour. In like manner in morality. There are some duties, the right of which is so clear and palpable; and there are some conditions, in which we, ourselves, are in regard to these duties which are so easy to be known, that the mind instantly perceives them without examination and discussion. But there are some duties, the right of which is so enveloped in obscurity; and there are some stations, which are so very doubtful, that the mind requires great efforts of meditation before it can determine itself. For example, Ought a subject to obey his lawful sovereign? On this question, the mind instantly takes the affirmative side, on account of the clearness of the duty, and it seems to act by instinct, and without reflection. But here is another question, Is it lawful for subjects to dethrone a tyrant? Here the mind pauses, and before it determines enters into long discussions, and here we perceive, it acts by judgment and reflection. In both cases reflection and judgment are the ground of its operations. In the first case judgment is more rapid, reflection less slow: but it is reflection however. We have, then, rightly defined conscience, that faculty of our souls, by which we are capable of distinguishing right from wrong, and of knowing whether we neglect our duties, or discharge them. But this is too vague, we must go farther. We must examine the principles on which we ground our judgment of ourselves in regard to right and wrong. We must prove, by the nature of these principles, the truth of what we have affirmed; that is, that a man, who calls conscience a fancy, and who boasts of an entire freedom from it, is a fool for admitting and proposing this objection. probable. The judgment that constitutes the nature of conscience, is founded on three principles, either fully demonstrable or bast First, I am in a state of dep Second, There is a supreme 1 ce. or what is the same thing, there is something right, and something wrong. Third, I am either innocent or guilty. On these three principles an intelligent spirit grounds a judgment, whether it deserves to be happy or miserable; it rejoices, if it deserves to be happy; it mourns, if it deserves to be miserable; and this judgment, and this joy, or sorrow, which results from it, constitutes what we call conscience. But that which deserves particular regard, and in which partly consists the force of our reasoning, is, that it is not necessary to be able to demonstrate these principles, in order to prove, that conscience is not a fancy; if they be probable, it is sufficient. We cannot reasonably free ourselves from conscience, till we have demonstrated the falsehood of these principles, and proved that the consequences drawn from them are chimerical. For, if these principles be only probable; if it be probable I may be happy, I have some reason to rejoice; as I have some reason for uneasiness if my misery be probable. If the enjoyment of a great benefit be probable, I have some reason for great pleasure; and I have some reason for extreme distress, if it be probable, that I shall fall into extreme misery. It is not necessary, therefore, in order to establish the empire of conscience, that the principles on which it is founded should be demonstrable; it is sufficient that they are probable. Now I affirm, that every man who maintains the improbability of these principles, and the vanity of the consequences that are drawn from them, is a fool and a madman, whose obstinate attachment to vice has blinded his eyes, and turned his brain. Consequently I affirm, that every man who maintains that conscience is a fancy, and who boasts of having shaken off the restraint of it, is a fool and a madman. Take the first principle. I am in a state of dependance. I am subject to a Supreme Being, to whom I owe my existence, and who holds my destiny in his mighty hands. Do we exceed the truth when we say, a man who ventures to affirm this principle neither demonstrable nor probable, is a madman and a fool? I told you at the beginning of this discourse, that I intended to speak to you, not as scholars and novices: but as well-informed Christians, who have made some considerable progress in the knowledge of those truths which equally support natural and revealed religion. But if you have any just notion of these truths, how can you form any other opinion of these men, of whom I am speaking, than that which ĺ have formed? A man who pretends that arguments drawn from the order of the seasons, from the arrangements of the various parts of the universe, from the harmony of the members of our bodies, and all the other works of nature, by which we have so often established the doctrine of the being and attributes of God; a man who affirms, that all these demonstrate nothing; what am I saying? a man who affirms that all these prove nothing; what am I saying again? a man who affirms that all these do not afford the least degree of probability in favour of the existence and perfections of a Supreme Being; who for his part is sure, for he has evidence to a demonstration that all these originated in chance, and were not formed by the intervention of any intelligent cause; such a man, what is he but a madman and a fool? and consequently, is it not madness and folly to deny this first principle, I am in a state of dependance? Try the second principle, There is a supreme law, or, what comes to the same, there is something just, and something unjust. Whether this just and right be founded in the nature of things, or whether it proceeds from the will of a superior Being, is not needful to examine now; be it as it may, there is a supreme law, there is something right and something wrong. A man who pretends that this proposition is evidently false; a man who affirms, that all arguments brought in favour of this proposition are evidently false; a man who forms such an idea of all arguments drawn from the nature of intelligent beings, from the perfections of a first cause, from the laws that he has given, and which constitute the body of religion; a man who pretends, that all these arguments do not afford the least degree of probability, that a wise man ought to infer nothing from them to direct his life: and that for his part, it is clear to a demonstration to him, that what is called just and unjust, right and wrong, is indifferent in itself, and indifferent to the first cause: that it is perfectly indifferent in itself whether we love a benefactor, or betray him, whether we be faithful to a friend or perfidious, whether we be tender parents or cruel, whether we nourish our children or smother them in the cradle; and that all these things at the most, relate only to a present interest; a man who advances such propositions, what is he but a fool and a madman? Is it necessary to reason to discover the extravagance and madness of these positions? Is it not sufficient to name them? rewards is not contained in the formal terms, but in the general design of this promise, “I am the God of Abraham," Matt. xxii. 32. However splendid the condition of Abraham might have been, however abundant his riches, however numerous his servants, this promise proceeding from the mouth of God, "I am the God of Abraham," could not have accom→ plished in the temporal prosperity of a man who was dead, when the words were spoken, and whom death should retain in durance. As God declared himself" the God of Abraham," and as Abraham was dead, when he declared it, Abraham must necessarily rise again. And this is our Saviour's reasoning. "God is not the God of the dead: but of the living." Let us say the same of those punishments, which God has denounced against sin, in regard to those ancient sinners, of whom God declared himself the judge; "God is not the judge of the dead: but of the living." The wicked, during this life, are often free from adversity: but were they even miserable all the time of their abiding on earth, their miseries would not sufficiently express God's hatred of sin. Asaph renders to divine justice only one part of its deserved homage when he says, in order to justify it for tolerating some criminals, "surely thou didst set them in slippery places. thou castedst them down into destruction.How are they brought into desolation as in a moment! they are utterly consumed with terrors! As a dream, when one awaketh, so, O Lord, thou shalt despise their image," Ps. lxxiii. 18-20. No! the unexpected vicissitudes that sometimes confound the devices of the wicked, the fatal catastrophes in which we sometimes see them enveloped, the signal reverses of fortune, by which they are often precipitated from the highest elevation to the deepest distress; all these are too imperfect to verify those reiterated threatenings which the Judge of mankind denounced against primitive criminals, to teach them that he was a just avenger of sin. To display this fully there must be a resurrection and a judgment. Let us pass then to our third direction. It In this manner, even supposing there were no concerns the proof taken from revelation. Do formal passages in proof of future judgment not rest the arguments drawn from this source (which we do not allow:) the genius, the drift on any particular passages, which, although and scope of religion would be sufficient to they may be very full and explicit, may yet be convince us of the truth of it. subject to some sophistical exception: but rest them on the general design and scope of religion; this method is above all objections, and free from every difficulty. If this way be adopted, it will presently appear, that the doctrine of a future judgment is contained in a manner clear and convincing, not only in the writings of the apostles and evangelists, but also in the revelations, with which God honoured the patriarchs, many ages before he gave a written law. Take the third principle. . . . But, it is enough to have pointed out the most proper method of answering the objections of a man who pretends conscience is a fancy, and who boasts of having none. Yea, were we to allow that we have no formal passage to produce, in which this truth was taught the ancient servants of God (which we are very far from allowing,) we might still maintain, that it was included in the genius of those revelations, which were addressed to them. Jesus Christ taught us to reason thus on the doctrine of future rewards, and we may fairly apply the same method to the doctrine of future punishments. The doctrine of future II. What has been said shall suffice for proof of this truth, after death comes judgment. But what shall be the destiny of this audience? What sentence will the judge of the world pronounce on us in that formidable day, when he shall judge the world in righteousness? Will it be a sentence of mercy? will he pronounce our absolution? will he say to us, "Depart ye cursed into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels?" or will he say to us, “Come ye blessed of my Father, inherit the kingdom?" Matt. xxv. 41. 34. This is a difficult question: however, it is not so difficult as some of us may imagine. St. Paul lays down a principle that casts light on the inquiry; that is, that men will be judged according to the economies under which they lived. "As many as have sinned without law, shall many as h by the law, perish without law; and as ned in the law, shall be judged om. ii. 12; that is to say, as having |