and wild attributing all knowledge to the ancients alone, or to the moderns. This raving upon antiquity in matter of poetry, Horace has wittily described and exposed in one of his Satires. The same sort of madness may be found in reference to all the other sciences. Some will not admit an opinion not authorized by men of old, who were then all giants in knowledge. Nothing is to be put into the treasury of truth or knowledge, which has not the stamp of Greece or Rome upon it: and since their days will scarce allow that men have been able to see, think, or write. Others, with a like extravagancy, contemn all that the ancients have left us, and being taken with the modern inventions and discoveries, lay by all that went before, as if whatever is called old must have the decay of time upon it, and truth too were liable to mould and rottenness. Men, I think, have been much the same for natural endowments in all times. Fashion, discipline, and education, have put eminent differences in the ages of several countries, and made one generation much differ from another in arts and sciences, But truth is always the same; time alters it not, nor is it the better or worse for being of ancient or modern tradition. Many were eminent in former ages of the world for their discovery and delivery of it; but though the knowledge they have left us be worth our study, yet they exhausted not all its treasure; they left a great deal for the industry and sagacity of after-ages, and so shall we.

That was once new to them which any one now receives with veneration for its antiquity; nor was it the worse for appearing as a novelty; and that

which is now embraced for its newness, will, to posterity, be old, but not thereby be less true or less genuine. There is no occasion on this ac. count to oppose the ancients and the moderns to one another, or to be squeamish on either side. He that wisely conducts his mind in the pursuit of knowledge, will gather what lights, and get what helps he can from either of them, from whom they are best to be had, without adoring the errors, or rejecting the truths which he may find mingled in them.

Another partiality may be observed, in some to vulgar, in others to heterodox tenets: Some are apt to conclude, that what is the common opinion cannot but be true; so many men's eyes they think cannot but see right; so many men's understandings of all sorts cannot be deceived; and therefore will not venture to look beyond the received notions of the place and age, nor have so presumptuous a thought as to be wiser than their neighbours. They are content to go with the crowd, and go so easily, which they think is going right, or at least serves them as well. But however "vox populi vox Dei" bas prevailed as a maxim, yet I do not remember wherever God delivered his oracles by the multitude, or nature truths by the herd. On the other side, some fly all common opinions as either false or frivolous. The title of many-headed beast is a sufficient reason to them to conclude, that no truths of weigh, or consequence can be lodged there. Vulgar opinions are suited to vulgar ca pacities, and adapted to the ends of those that govern. He that will know the truth of things, must leave the common and beaten track, which none

but weak and servile minds are satisfied to trudge along continually in. Such nice palates relish nothing but strange notions quite out of the way; whatever is commonly received, has the mark of the beast on it, and they think it a lessening to them to harken to it, or receive it; their mind runs only after paradoxes; these they seek, these they embrace, these alone they vent, and so as they think, distinguish themselves from the vulgar. But common or uncommon are not the marks to distinguish truth or falshood, and therefore should not be any bias to us in our enquiries. We should not judge of things by men's opinions, but of opinions by things. The multitude reason but ill, and therefore may be well suspected, and cannot be relied on, nor should be followed as a sure guide; but philosophers who have quitted the orthodoxy of the community, aud the popular doctrines of their countries, have fallen into just as extravagant and as absurd opinions as ever common reception countenanced. It would be madness to refuse to breathe common air, or quench one's thirst with water because the rabble use them to these purposes; and if there are conveniences of life which common use reaches not, it is not reason to reject them, because they are not grown into the ordinary fashion of the country, and every villager doth not know them.

Truth, whether in or out of fashion, is the measure of knowledge, and the business of the understanding; whatsoever is besides that, however authorized by consent, or recommended by rarity, is nothing but ignorance, or something worse.

Another sort of partiality there is, whereby men impose upon themselves, and by it make their read

ing little useful to themselves; I mean the making use of the opinions of writers, and laying stress upon their authorities, wherever they find them favour their own opinions.

There is nothing almost has done more harm to men dedicated to letters, than giving the name of study to reading, and making a man of great reading to be the same with a man of great knowledge, or at least to be a title of honour. All that can be recorded in writing, are only facts or reasonings. Facts are of three sorts:

1. Merely of natural agents, observable in the ordinary operations of bodies one upon another, whether in the visible course of things left to themselves, or in experiments made by men applying agents and patients to one another, after a peculiar and artificial manner.

2. Of voluntary agents, more especially the actions of men in society, which makes civil and moral history.

3. Of opinions.

In these three consists, as it seems to me, that which commonly has the name of learning; to which perhaps some may add a distinct head of eritical writings, which indeed at bottom is nothing but matter of fact, and resolves itself into this, that such a man, or set of men, used such a word of phrase is such a sense, i. e. that they made such sounds the marks of such ideas.

Under reasonings I comprehend all the discoveries of general truths made by human reason, whether found by intuition, demonstration, or probable deductions. And this is that which is, if not alone knowledge, (because the truth or probability

of particular propositions may be known too,) yet it is, as may be supposed, most properlythe business of those who pretend to improve their understandings, and make themselves knowing by reading.

Books and reading are looked upon to be the great helps of the understanding, and instruments of knowledge, as it must be allowed that they are; and yet I beg leave to question whether these do not prove an hindrance to many, and keep several bookish men from attaining to solid and true knowledge. This, I think, I may be permitted to say, that there is no part wherein the understanding needs a more careful and wary conduct, than in the use of books: without which they will prove rather innocent amusements than profitable employments of our time, and bring but small additions to our knowledge.

There is not seldom to be found even amongst those who aim at knowledge, who with an un wearied industry, employ their whole time in books, who scarce allow themselves time to eat or sleep, but read, and read, and read on, but yet make no great advances in real knowledge, though there be no defect in their intellectual faculties, to which their little progress can be imputed. The mistake here is, that it is usually supposed, that by reading, the author's knowledge is transfused into the reader's understanding; and so it is, but not by bare reading, but by reading and understanding what he writ. Whereby I mean, not barely comprehending what is affirmed or denied in each proposition, (though that great readers do not think themselves concerned precisely to do,) but to see and follow the train of his reasonings, observe the strength and