good cause, that is, in effect, for themselves, their own persuasion, or party: for to those in their turns the several sects of men, especially in matters of religion, entitle God and a good cause.— But God requires not men to wrong or misuse their faculties for him, nor to lie to others or themselves for his sake; which they purposely do who will not suffer their understandings to have right conceptions of the things proposed to them, and designedly restrain themselves from having just thoughts of every thing, as far as they are concerned to enquire. And as for a good cause, that needs not such ill helps; if it be good, truth will support it, and it has no need of fallacy or falshood.

SECT. XV.

ARGUMENTS.

VERY much of kin to this is the hunting after arguments to make good one side of a question, and wholly to neglect and refuse those which favour the other side. What is this but wilfully to misguide the understanding, and is so far from giving truth its due value, that it wholly debases it espouse opinions that best comport with their power, profit, or credit, and then seek arguments to support them. Truth light upon this way, is of no more avail to us than error; for what is so taken up by us, may be false as well as true, and he has not done his duty who has thus stumbled upon truth in his way to preferment.

There is another, but more innocent way of collecting arguments, very familiar amongst bookish men, which is to furnish themselves with the arguments they meet with pro and con in the questions they study. This helps them not to judge right, nor argue strongly, but only to talk copiously on either side, without being steady and settled in their own judgments: for such arguments gathered from other men's thoughts, floating only in the memory, are there ready indeed to supply copious talk with some appearance of reason, but are far from helping us to judge right. Such variety of arguments only distract the understanding that relies on them, unless it has gone farther than such a superficial way of examining; this is to quit truth for appearance, only to serve our vanity. The sure and only way to get true knowledge, is to form in our minds clear settled notions of things, with names annexed to those determined ideas. These we are to consider, and with their several relations and habitudes, and not amuse ourselves with floating names, and words of indetermined signification, which we can use in several senses to serve a turn. It is in the perception of the habitudes and respects our ideas have one to another, that real knowledge consists; and when a man once perceives how far they agree or disagree one with another, he will be able to judge of what other people say, and will not need to be led by the ar guments of others, which are many of them nothing but plausible sophistry. This will teach him to state the question right, and see whereon it turns; and thus he will stand upon his own legs, and know by his own understanding. Whereas, by

collecting and learning arguments by heart, he will not be but a retainer to others; and when any one questions the foundations they are built upon, he will be at a nonplus, and be fain to give up his im. plicit knowledge.

SECT. XVI.

HASTE.

LABOUR for labour's sake is against nature.→ The understanding, as well as all the other faculties, chooses always the shortest way to its end, would presently obtain the knowledge it is about, and then set upon some new enquiry. But this, whether laziness or haste, often misleads it and makes it content itself with improper ways of search, and such as will not serve the turn. Sometimes it rests upon testimony, when testimony of right has nothing to do, because it is easier to believe than to be scientifically instructed. Sometimes it contents itself with one argument, and rests satisfied with that, as it were a demonstration; whereas the thing under proof is not capable of demonstration, and therefore must be submitted to the trial of probabilities, and all the material arguments pro and con be examined and brought to a balance. In some cases the mind is determined by probable topics in enquiries where demonstration may be had. All these, and several others, which laziness, impatience, custom, and want of use and attention lead men into, are misapplications of the understanding in the search of truth. In every question the nature and manner of the proof it is capable of

should first be considered, to make our enquiry such as it should be. This would save a great deal of frequently misemployed pains, and lead us sooner to that discovery and possession of truth we are capable of. The multiplying variety of arguments, especially frivolous ones, such as all that are merely verbal, is not only lost labour, but cumbers the memory to no purpose, and serves only to hinder it from seizing and holding of the truth in all those cases which are capable of demonstration. In such a way of proof the truth and certainty is seen, and the mind fully possesses himself of it; when in the other way of assent it only hovers about it, is amused with uncertainties. In this superficial way indeed the mind is capable of more variety of plausible talk, but is not enlarged as it should be in its knowledge. It is to this same haste and impatience of the mind also, that a not due tracing of the arguments to their true foundation, is owing; men see a little, presume a great deal, and so jump to the conclusion. This is a short way to fancy and conceit, and (if firmly embraced) to opiniatretry, but is certainly the farthest way about to knowledge. For he that will know, must, by the connection of the proofs, see the truth, and the ground it stands on: and therefore, it has for haste skipt over what he should have examined, he must begin and go over all again, or else he will never come to knowledge.

SECT. XVII.

DESULTORY.

ANOTHER fault of as ill consequence as this, which proceeds also from laziness with a mixture of vanity, is the skipping from one sort of knowledge to another. Some men's tempers are quickly weary of any one thing. Constancy and assi duity is what they cannot bear the same study long continued in, is as intolerable to them as the appearing long in the same cloths or fashion is to a court lady.

SECT. XVIII.

SMATTERING.

OTHERS, that they may seem universally knowing, get a little smattering in every thing. Both these may fill their heads with superficial notions of things, but are very much out of the way of attaining truth or knowledge.

SECT. XIX.

UNIVERSALITY.

I Do not here speak against the taking a taste of every sort of knowledge; it is certainly very useful and necessary to form the mind, but then it must be done in a different way, and to a different end.

Not for talk and vanity to fill the head with