Armstrong, E., The French Wars of Religion, 110, 18. Creighton (Mandell, Bishop of Peterborough), Persecution and History of the Papacy, 110. Cunningham (William), History of English Industry and Dicey, A. V., Law of the Constitution, 201. Freeman, E. A., The Norman Conquest, 20, 42. Gairdner and Spedding, Studies in English History, 1, 15. Preface to Letters and Papers illustrative of Gardiner, Samuel Rawson, History of England, 39, 89, 139, 201, 230. History of the Commonwealth and Kitchin (G. W.), History of France, 110. Lecky (W. H.), History of England, 170. Early History of Institutions, 14, 31, 230. Maitland (Professor F. W.), Select Pleas of Manorial Courts, 31, see Pollock. Mill (J. S.), On Liberty, 213. Nineteenth Century, 104. Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law, 13, 21-5, 33. Pollock (Sir Frederick), History of the Science of Politics, 17. Oxford Lectures, 21. Poole (R. L.), Illustrations of the History of Medieval Right, 47, 61, 70. Wycliffe and Movements of Reform, 61, 70. Round, J. H., Geoffrey de Mandeville, 20. Stubbs (William, Bishop of Oxford), Constitutional History of England, 21, 2, 7. Lectures on Medieval and Modern History, 85, 90. 110,last line of Latin note, for florentissime read florentissimi. 180, note 1, 1. 3, for de Institution read de la Institucion. CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTORY. Kings as absurd. A MODERN essayist has said with truth, that The never has there been a doctrine better written the Divine Theory of against than the Divine Right of Kings1." But Right of those, who have exhausted their powers of satire commonly in pouring scorn upon the theory, have commonly condemned been at little pains to understand it. That the doctrine is absurd, when judged from the standpoint of modern political thought, is a statement that requires neither proof nor exposition. But the modern standpoint is not the only one, and the absurdity of the doctrine in our eyes is the least interesting or important fact about it, except as driving us to seek further for its real meaning and value. Nor is "The Divine Right of Kings” But differentiated by reason of its absurdity from other theories of political theories of the seventeenth century. The the time rival doctrine of an original compact was no whit absurd. less ridiculous in theory, and (if we consider its 1 Gairdner and Spedding, Studies in English History, 245. Cf. also Mr Gairdner's remarks in the preface to Letters and Papers Illustrative of the Reigns of Richard III. and Henry VII. XI—XIII. 20 F. 1 other also The causes of the prevalence of the doctrine more im influence upon Rousseau) infinitely more pernicious in practice than the notions of Indefeasible Right and Passive Obedience. It is noteworthy, that, while Macaulay has nothing but contempt for the supporters of Divine Right, he does not find it needful to mention that its opponents would make no better figure among political thinkers of to-day. Instead of stating a fact, which is common to all obsolete doctrines, it were surely better to enquire into the notions of those, to whom the doctrine seemed natural, and to set it in relation to the conditions which produced it. Large numbers of men may embrace a belief without good reason, but assuagainst its validity. redly they will not do so without adequate cause. And it is commonly of far greater importance towards the right understanding of a doctrine to know the causes, which lead to its prevalence or decay, than it is to be able to criticize the reasoning, by which men think to support it, while it is popular or to demolish it, as it grows obsolete1. portant than the reasons Its import probably different Further, although the theory may seem absurd, when framed into a set of bald propositions, it is not from what wise therefore to infer that it had no other meaning it appears. to its supporters, than that which it bears to us. It may prove to have been in the main a countertheory to some other notion of Divine Right, more ridiculous and less useful. Judged in relation to the circumstances which produced it, and to the rival 1 Mr Balfour takes these two theories as offering the most salient illustration of the fact that the causes of belief are widely different from the reasons for it, Foundations of Belief, 216– |