countries can the people be admitted to share the sovereignty, even with the consent of the king'. He denies the validity of Henry the Eighth's testamentary devolution of the crown; for the succession descends by an immutable law to the next of kin, not as his father's heir, but as the legitimate ruler of the kingdom'. Blackwood's theory of sovereignty is complete with this exception. Monarchy may not be divided or shared in any way. Yet he regards force as the origin of kingship, a view curiously unlike that of other writers, while Nimrod is of course the first king. He is so anxious to assert that the king is above the law, that unlike Justice Berkeley he denies that he is lex loquens. He declares that all laws only retain their force through the tacit assent of the sovereign at his accession, while in regard to local laws and customs he approaches the Austinian maxim, "Whatever the sovereign permits, he commands "."

4 Ibid. ch. XI.

3 Ibid. ch. VII. 5 "Neque tamen eam vim ac firmitatem habent, ut a principe mutari non queant, cuius tum in leges, tum in homines potestas nulla ratione definiri potest" (Ibid. 110). Buchanan desired a mixed form of government, in which the king should have the supreme executive, the judges interpretative, the people legislative power. Blackwood ridicules this, and pertinently asks, "Non attendis legis interpretationem legis vim obtinere?" (ch. XIII.). He shews that there could be no supreme power in Buchanan's ideal state with its three ultimate authorities independent of one another. Regem populo subesse iubes, quem populo vis inuito legem imponere. Populo summam rerum attribuis, quem reluctantem et inuitum regis imperio subiicis. Sed qui fieri potest ut idem

Previous enquiry necessary

to the un

derstanding of

seven

teenth century

controversy.

This long preliminary investigation has shewn the causes at work in medieval England, in the conflicts within the Holy Roman Empire, in the French Wars of Religion, and in the circumstances of the English Reformation, which contributed in various ways to the development of a theory of kingship more uncompromising, narrow, and absolutist than had yet been prevalent in England.

It is now possible to approach the political controversies of the seventeenth century, with some prospect of understanding why they took the shape they did. The ideas have arisen of Divine Right, of a ‘fundamental law' of succession, of sovereignty, and on the other hand of the original compact, and of the duty of resistance at the bidding of the Church. It remains to view these notions welded into harmonious theories, to trace the process by which they were superseded, and to estimate the practical effect upon later ages of their once having been prevalent.

patiatur et agat? idem dominatur et serviat?" (295) The whole of Chapter XXXIII. is an argument in favour of monarchy as the expression of the principle of unity in all States. It is noteworthy that he regards this as the supreme effort of art, not nature; he apparently regards the family as an artificial organization. He finds it necessary to point out to his opponent that all states contain some supreme authority, that the Roman or Athenian democracy or the Venetian oligarchy ruled with exactly that 'regal,' i.e. sovereign power which Buchanan thinks it possible to eliminate from the commonwealth (193).

CHAPTER VII.

FROM JAMES I. TO THE JACOBITES.

and the

in Theory of

of

Divine
Right.

THERE were many reasons why James I. should James I. hold the doctrine of the Divine Right of kings its strictest form. His claim to the throne England rested upon descent alone; barred by two Acts of Parliament, it could only be successfully maintained by means of the legitimist principle. Further, it was disputed by the Roman controversialists who had not sufficient hope of converting James to make them love his title. Doleman's attack on the hereditary principle is written from the Papalist standpoint. But it was not only from the Roman side that the position of James was threatened. Presbyterianism in Scotland, as expounded by Knox or Buchanan, and inwoven with politics by Murray and Morton, was a system of clericalism as much more irritating and meddlesome, as it was stronger and more popular in its basis than that of the Papal sovereignty. Even had there been no question of the English throne, there was enough

1598.

in the position of a king, thwarted and insulted on all hands by the ministers of an upstart and narrow communion, to bring him into approval of a theory, which asserted against Papist and Presbyterian alike that every soul without benefit of clergy is subject to the royal authority, for the secular power is ordained by God alone and may not be controlled by Pope or minister. Nor could the influences at work also in England and France, which led to the theoretical exaltation of monarchy, have been devoid of effect upon the mind of James. Thus it is no matter for surprise, that at a time, when the sons of Zeruiah were too strong for him, and he felt his authority a mockery before the insolent representatives of ecclesiastical bigotry, James should promulgate with logical completeness and grasp with the tenacity of a narrow but clear-sighted intellect the theory of the Divine Right of kings. In the True Law of Free Monarchies, which saw the light five years before the death of Elizabeth, is to be found the doctrine of Divine Right complete in every detail. On his accession Parliament passed a statute which purported not to give James a title, but merely to declare his inherent right'. This would seem evidence that the theory of Divine Right was by this time generally prevalent. Yet though, as was shewn above, approaches had been made to it in more ways than one, it does not appear as yet to have taken

1 1 Jas. I., c. 1. See Appendix A. Cf. also Coke's Reports, VII. 10 b: "The king holdeth the kingdom of England by birthright inherent, by descent from the blood royal, whereupon succession doth attend."

much hold of the popular imagination or even to Inconhave been fully grasped by those who professed to believe it.

sistency of popular opinion.

Evidence of this is to be found in Overall's Convocation Book. This was avowedly intended to be an authoritative exposition of the doctrine, but it exhibits a curious inability to understand, what it L actually involved, and is very different from the perfectly harmonious system of the royalists of the Restoration or of James himself. The Canons are emphatic on the divine authority of de facto governments1. The language of the book on this point so alarmed the king that he wrote irritably to Archbishop Abbot, bidding him not to meddle in matters too high for him2. James was perfectly justified in declaring that, should Philip of Spain succeed in conquering the country, his right to the throne would be Divine on the principles of the Convocation Book, and Englishmen would be precluded from ousting the usurper in favour of the lawful king. The compilers were so imbued with the root idea of the theory of Divine Right, that secular government is lawful without Papal or clerical confirmation, that they were unable to attach due importance to the 'organic details' of the

1 Canons XXVIII—XXXIII,

The letter is printed in the edition of the Convocation Book in the Library of Anglo-Catholic theology. The book was, on account of this, not published until 1690. There is a strange inconsistency in the letter of James; for he complains of the Canons as not affording a justification of England in assisting the United Provinces.