11. Names of substances of doubtful signification.

12. Names of substances referred, first, to real essences, that

cannot be known.

13, 14. Secondly, to co-existing qualities, which are known but

imperfectly.

15. With this imperfection they may serve for civil, but not

well for philosophical use.

16. Instance, liquor of the nerves.

17. Instance, gold.

18. The names of simple ideas the least doubtful.

19. And, next to them, simple modes.

20. The most doubtful are the names of very compounded

mixed modes and substances.

21. Why this imperfection charged upon words.

22, 23. This should teach us moderation in imposing our own sense

of old authors.

CHAPTER X.

OF THE ABUSE OF WORDS.

SECT.

1. Abuse of words.

2, 3. First, words without any, or without clear ideas.
4. Occasioned by learning names, before the ideas they be-

long to.
5. Secondly, a steady application of them.
6. Thirdly, affected obscurity, by wrong application.
7. Logic and dispute have much contributed to this.
8. Calling it subtilty.
9. This learning very little benefits society.

10. But destroys the instruments of knowledge and com-

munication.

11. As useful as to confound the sound of the letters.

12. This art has perplexed religion and justice.

13. And ought not to pass for learning.

14. Fourthly, taking them for things.

15. Instance in matter.

16. This makes’errors lasting.

17. Fifthly, setting them for what they cannot signify.

18. V. g. putting them for the real essences of substances.

19. Hence we think every change of our idea in substances,

not to change the species.

20. The cause of this abuse, a supposition of nature's working

always regularly.
21. This abuse contains two false suppositions.
22. Sixthly, a supposition that words have a certain and evi-

dent signification.
23. The ends of language: first, to convey our ideas.

24. Secondly, to do it with quickness.

25. Thirdly, therewith to convey the knowledge of things.
26-31. How men's words fail in all these.

32. How in substances.
33. How in modes and relations.
34. Seventhly, figurative speech also an abuse of language.

CHAPTER XI.

OF THE REMEDIES OF THE FOREGOING IMPERFECTIONS AND

ABUSES,

SECT.

1. They are worth seeking.

2. Are not easy.

3. But yet necessary to philosophy.

4. Misuse of words, the ause of great errors.

5. Obstinacy.

6. And wrangling.

7. Instance, bat and bird.

8. First remedy, to use no word without an idea.

9. Secondly, to have distinct ideas annexed to them in modes.

10. And distinct and conformable in substances.

11. Thirdly, propriety.

12. Fourthly, to make known their meaning.

13. And that three ways.

14. First, in simple ideas by synonymous terms, or showing.

15. Secondly, in mixed modes by definition.

16. Morality capable of demonstration.

17. Definitions can make moral discourses clear.

18. And is the only way.

19. Thirdly, in substances, by showing and defining.

20, 21. Ideas of the leading qualities of substances are best got by

showing.

22. The ideas of their powers, best by definition.

23. A reflection on the knowledge of spirits.

24. Ideas also of substances must be conformable to things.

25. Not easy to be made so.

26. Fifthly, by constancy in their signification.

27. When the variation is to be explained.

!

BOOK IV.

.

OF KNOWLEDGE AND OPINION.

CHAPTER I.

OF KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL.

SECT.

1. Our knowledge conversant about our ideas.

2. Knowledge is the perception of the agreement or disagree-

ment of two ideas.

3. This agreement fourfold.

4. First, of identity, or diversity.

5. Secondly, relation.

6. Thirdly, of co-existence.

7. Fourthly, of real existence.

8. Knowledge actual or habitual.

9. Habitual knowledge, twofold.

CHAPTER II.

OF THE DEGREES OF OUR KNOWLEDGE.

SECT.

1. Intuitive.

2. Demonstrative.

3. Depends on proofs.

4. But not so easy.

5. Not without precedent doubt.

6. Not so clear.

7. Each step must have intuitive evidence.
8. Hence the mistake ex præcognitis et præconcessis.

9. Demonstration not limited to quantity.
10-13. Why it has been so thought.

14. Sensitive knowledge of particular existence.
15. Knowledge not always clear, where the ideas are so.

CHAPTER III.

OF THE EXTENT OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE.

SECT.

1. First, no farther than we have ideas.

2. Secondly, no farther than we can perceive their agreement

or disagreement.

3. Thirdly, intuitive knowledge extends itself not to all the

relations of all our ideas.
4. Fourthly, not demonstrative knowledge.

5. Fifthly, sensitive knowledge narrower than either.

6. Sixthly, our knowledge, therefore, narrower than our ideas.

7. How far our knowledge reaches.

8. First, our knowledge of identity and diversity, as far as our

ideas.

9. Secondly, of co-existence, a very little way.

10. Because the connexion between most simple ideas is un-

known.

11. Especially of secondary qualities.

12–14. And farther, because all connexion between any secondary

and primary qualities is undiscoverable.

15. Of repugnancy to co-exist, larger.

16. Of the co-existence of powers, a very

little

way.

17. Of spirits yet narrower.

18. Thirdly, of other relations, it is not easy to say how far.

Morality capable of demonstration.

19. Two things have made moral ideas thought incapable of

demonstration. Their complexedness, and want of sen-

sible representations.

20. Remedies of those difficulties.

21. Fourthly, of real existence; we have an intuitive know-

ledge of our own, demonstrative of God's, sensitive of

some few other things.

22. Our ignorance great.

23. First, one cause of it, want of ideas, either such as we have

no conception of, or such as particularly we have not.

24. Because of their remoteness, or,

25. Because of their minuteness.

26. Hence no science of bodies.

27. Much less of spirits.

28. Secondly, want of a discoverable connexion between ideas

we have.

29. Instances.

30. Thirdly, want of tracing our ideas.

31. Extent in respect of universality.

CHAPTER IV. .

OF THE REALITY OF OUR KNOWLEDGE.

SECT.

1. Objection, knowledge placed in ideas, may be all bare

vision.

2, 3. Answer, not so, where ideas agree with things.

4. As, first, all simple ideas do.

5. Secondly, all complex ideas, except of substances.

6. Hence the reality of mathematical knowledge.

7. And of moral.

8. Existence not required to make it real.

9. Nor will it be less true, or certain, because moral ideas are

of our own making and naming.

10. Misnaming disturbs not the certainty of the knowledge.

11. Ideas of substances have their archetypes without us.

12. So far as they agree with these, so far our knowledge con-

cerning them is real.

13. In our inquiries about substances, we must consider ideas,

and not confine our thoughts to names, or species sup-

posed set out by names.

14, 15. Objection against a changeling being something between

man and beast answered.

16. Monsters.

17. Words and species.

18. Recapitulation.