time, will break through all mists, and gloriously expand itself, to the confusion of its most sly opposers.

Such are the natural and obvious effects of this practice; the consideration whereof (together with the causes producing it, and the essential adjuncts which it did involve) will, I should think, suffice to deter us from it.

I shall only adjoin one consideration, which our text suggesteth: Speak not evil of one another, brethren,' saith the Apostle brethren ;' that appellation doth imply a strong argument enforcing the precept: brethren, with especial tenderness of affection, should love one another, and delight in each other's good; they should tender the interest and honor of each other as their own; they should therefore by all means cherish and countenance virtue in one another, as that which promoteth the common welfare, which adorneth and illustrateth the dignity of their family. We should rejoice in the good qualities and worthy deeds of any Christian, as glorifying our common Father, as gracing our common profession, as edifying the common body, whereof we are members. Members we are one of another,' and as such should find complacence in the health and vigor of any part, from whence the whole doth receive benefit and comfort: for one brother to repine at the welfare, to malign the prosperity, to decry the merit, to destroy the reputation of another, is very unnatural; for one Christian anywise to wrong or prejudice another is highly impious.

To conclude it is our duty (which equity, which ingenuity, which charity, which piety do all concurrently oblige us to,) whenever we do see any good person, or worthy deed, to yield hearty esteem, to pay due respect, gladly to congratulate the person, and willingly to commend the work; rendering withal thanks and praise for them to the donor of all good gifts:' unto whom, for all the good things bestowed on us, and on all his creatures, be for ever all glory and praise. Amen.

SUMMARY OF SERMON XX.

3

MATTHEW, CHAP. VII.-VERSE 1.

PREVIOUS remarks on the precept in the text, its use and consequences: endeavor to describe the nature of the practice thus forbidden; declaration of its iniquity and folly.

Judge not. As to the word, though according to its primitive sense it is of a middle and indifferent signification, yet it is frequently used in Scripture in the worst sense, so as to import those acts or effects of judgment, which are to the disadvantage of those that are subjected to it: this sense may be given to the word here, though without excluding somewhat of the larger meaning. But for the clearer understanding of the matter, it must be observed that there are divers sorts of judging, or acts resembling judgment, which do not belong to this precept: these enumerated; as, 1. public judgment, or the administration of justice, is not here prohibited, without which society could not subsist: 2. neither trial and censure, although out of court, which superiors exercise over inferiors committed to their care: 3. nor paternal correption and friendly reproof, with charitable design and on clear grounds: 4. nor all observation and reflexion on our neighbor's actions, and expression of our opinion about them: 5. we are not hence obliged to think so well of all men, as without competent knowledge to rely on their pretences, and intrust our interest in their hands: 6. nor are we hence obliged, in contradiction to plain sense, to judge well of men, accounting him a good man whom we see living contrary to the rules of piety, justice, or sobriety.

These sorts of allowable judgment being excepted, it is pri

vate, needless, groundless and harsh censure of persons or actions that is interdicted: nor can we perhaps better understand our duty in this matter, than by considering what are the properties and obligations of a judge, and comparing our prac tice thereto.

1. No judge should intrude himself into the office, or assume a judicial power without competent authority; in which condition we fail, when, without warrant from God, or special reason exacting it from us, we pry into and tax the actions of our neighbor topic enlarged on.

2. A judge should be free from all prejudices and partial affections, especially such as incline him to condemnation: and if this rule were copied, there would be but little censuring, since few blame others without some preoccupation or disaffection towards them.

3. A judge should never proceed in judgment without a careful examination of the cause: this caution, as it excludes all rash judgment, would quietly diminish the practice pointed

at in the text.

4. A judge should never pronounce final sentence but on good grounds, after certain proof, and on full conviction. If this rule were regarded, how many censures would be prevented?

5. Hence it is plainly consequent, that there are divers causes wholly exempted from our judgment, such as are the secret thoughts and purposes of men, not declared by words or overt acts; and this would prevent innumerable rash judgments.

6. Hence also it is not commonly allowable to judge concerning the state, present or final, of our neighbor in regard to God; and this, if duly considered, would cut off many hard thoughts and harsh words.

7. A judge should not undertake to proceed against any man, without warning and citing him to appear, nor without affording him competent liberty and opportunity to defend

himself: this would prevent many harsh judgments; for seldom do censurers charge men to their faces.

8. Moreover a judge is obliged to conform all his determinations to the settled rules of judgment, not according to his own private fancy or affection: the observing of which condition would smother many censures from those who reprehend persons for practices blameless, and perhaps commendable.

9. It is also to be supposed that a judge should be a person of good knowlege and ability, well skilled in the laws, endued with good measure of reason, &c.: the observation of this point therefore would draw many down from their usurped seats of judicature.

10. Again, it is proper for a judge not to make himself an accuser; and this also would diminish the trade of censuring.

11. He that pretends to judge others should himself be innocent, under no indictment, and not liable to condemnation : but we are all guilty of heinous crimes before God, and lie under the sentence of his law.

12. Lastly, it is the property of a good judge to proceed with great moderation, equity, candor, and mildness, as a friend not only to the public, but to the party accused. If this course were observed, innumerable causes, which now are severely judged, would never be mentioned or come under trial.

So much for the part explicative and directive: now for the persuasive; and to induce men to eschew this practice, its depravity and vanity is declared.

1. Censuring is an impious practice in regard to God, whose office we thus invade, and whose perfections we proudly arrogate to ourselves: moreover we are guilty of ingratitude towards him for his mercy, when we judge unfavorably of our brethren.

2. It is an unjust practice towards our neighbor, inasmuch as we meddle in affairs which do not belong to us, and draw

those under our jurisdiction who are not subject to it, who have their own master to whom they must stand or fall, &c.

3. It is an uncharitable practice, and so contrary to the principal duty of our religion: this topic enlarged on.

4. It is also a very foolish and vain practice, as arguing great ignorance and inconsiderateness, as producing great inconveniences and mischiefs.

5. Moreover this practice will produce many great inconveniences and mischiefs to ourselves.

1. We thereby provoke, and in some sort authorise others to requite us in the same kind: 2. we not only expose ourselves to censure, but implicitly pass it on ourselves: 3. we do by censuring others aggravate our own faults and deprive them of excuse or pardon: 4. indeed censuring others is an argument that we little mind our own case, or consider to what a dreadful judgment we are exposed: 5. nothing in fact causes us more to neglect our own case, nothing more engages us to leave our own faults unobserved and uncorrected than this humor: 6. hence it is that commonly the best men are the most candid and gentle, and they are most apt to blame others who deserve worse themselves: 7. in fine, the censorious humor, as it argues ill nature to be predominant, and as it signifies bad conscience, so it breeds and fosters such ill dispositions; it debauches the minds of men, rendering them dim and sluggish in apprehending their own faults, apt to please and comfort themselves in the evils, real or imaginary, of their neighbors. Conclusion.