all things, who hath their hearts in his hands, and fashioneth them as he thinks good. Farther,

12. If we would live peaceably with all men, it behoves us not to engage ourselves so deeply in any singular friendship, or in devotion to any one party of men, as to be intirely partial to their interests, and 'prejudiced in their behalf, without distinct consideration of the truth and equity of their pretences in the particular matters of difference; not to approve, favor, or applaud that which is bad in some; to dislike, discountenance, or disparage that which is good in others: not, out of excessive kindness to some, to give just cause of distaste to others: not, for the sake of a fortuitous agreement in disposition, opinion, interest, or relation, to violate the duties of justice or humanity. For he that on such terms is a friend to any one man, or party of men, as to be resolved, with an implicit faith, or blind obedience, to maintain whatever he or they shall affirm to be true, and whatever they shall do to be good, doth in a manner undertake enmity against all men beside, and as it may happen, doth oblige himself to contradict plain truth, to deviate from the rules of virtue, and to offend Almighty God himself. This unlimited partiality we owe only to truth and goodness, and to God, (the fountain of them,) in no case to swerve from their dictates and prescriptions. He that followed Tiberius Gracchus in his seditious practices, on the bare account of friendship, and alleges in his excuse, that, if his friend had required it of him, he should as readily have put fire to the Capitol, was much more abominable for his disloyalty to his country, and horrible impiety against God, than commendable for his constant fidelity to his friend. And that soldier which is said to have told Cæsar, (in his first expedition against Rome,) that in obedience to his commands he would not refuse to sheath his sword in the breast of his brother, or in the throat of his aged father, or in the bowels of his pregnant mother, was for his unnatural barbarity rather to be abhorred, than to be esteemed for his loyal affection to his general. And in like manner, he that, to please or gratify the humor of his friend, can be either injurious, or treacherous, or notably discourteous to any man else, is very blameable, and renders himself deservedly odious to all others. Lælius, who

incomparably well both understood and practised the rules of friendship, is by Cicero reported to have made this the first and chief law thereof; Ut neque rogemus res turpes, nec faciamus rogati: That we neither require of our friends the performance of base and naughty things; nor, being requested of them, perform such ourselves.' And in the heraldry, or comparison of duties, as all others must give place to those of piety, verity, and virtue, so after them the duties of humanity justly challenge the next place of respect, even above those which belong to the highest degree of friendship, (due to our nearest relations, yea to our country itself,) precisely taken, abstracted and distinguished from those of humanity. For the world is in nature the first, the most comprehensive and dearest country of us all; and our general obligations to mankind are more ancient, more fundamental, and more indispensable, than those particular ones superadded to, or superstructed on them. The peace therefore of the world, and the general welfare of men its citizens, ought to be more dear to us, and the means conducing thereto more carefully regarded by us in our actions, than either the love, favor, or satisfaction of any particular persons is to be valued or pursued. And the not observing this rule may reasonably be esteemed to have a great influence on the continuance of those implacable feuds and dissensions, wherewith the world is so miserably torn and shattered. Men's being peremptorily resolved to extol, countenance, or excuse promiscuously all the principles and proceedings of the party to which they have addicted themselves, and to see no error, fault, or abuse in them; but by all means to depress, vilify, and condemn (if not to reproach, calumniate, and persecute) the opinions and practices of others, and not to acknowlege in them any thing considerably good or commendable; whence commonly all apprehend their adversaries extremely unjust and disingenuous towards them, and are alienated from all thoughts (or however discouraged from all hopes) of friendly accommodation and reconcilement. But he that would live peaceably with all men, must be free in his judgment, impartial in his dealing, and ingenuous in his carriage toward all: not θαυμάζων πρόσωπα, admiring or wondering at some men, (as if they were impeccable, or infallible,) nor having the truth in respect of persons, abetting in

his friends only what is just and true, and allowing the same in others, but in neither by signal approbation countenancing any thing false or evil; for so demeaning himself, he giveth no man just occasion of displeasure or enmity against him.

13. If we would live peaceably ourselves, we should endeavor to preserve peace, and prevent differences, and reconcile dissensions among others, by doing good offices, and making fair representations of intercurrent passages between them; by concealing causes of future disgust, and removing present misunderstandings, and excusing past mistakes; by allaying their passions, and rightly informing their minds, by friendly intercessions, and pacific advices. For the fire that devoureth our neighbor's house threateneth and endangereth ours; and it is hard to approach contention without being engaged therein. 'Tis not easy to keep ourselves indifferent or neutral; and doing so we shall in likelihood be maligned and persecuted by both the contending parties. Blessed are the peace-makers,' saith our Saviour, for they shall be called the sons of God;' that is, they shall be highly esteemed and reverenced for this divine quality, wherein they so nearly resemble the God of peace, and his blessed Son the great Mediator. But farther, without respect to other recompense, and from the nature of their employment, such are immediately happy, and in this their virtuous practice rewards itself, that by appeasing others' quarrels, they save themselves from trouble, and enjoy themselves that tranquillity which they procure to others. But those informing sycophants, those internuncios of pestilent tales, and incendiaries of discord, that (from bad nature, or on base design) by the still breath of clandestine whispers, or by the more violent blasts of impudent calumnies, kindle the flames of dissension, or foment them among others; that, by disseminating infamous rumors, and by malicious suggestions, instil jealousies into, and nourish malevolent surmises in the minds of men, 'separating,' as it is in the Proverbs, between chief friends,' and widening the distance between others: these, I say, from the seeds of variance they scatter among others, reap in the end mischief and disturbance to themselves; nor can expect to enjoy the benefit of that quiet, which they labor to deprive others of. The beginning of strife,' saith Solomon, is as when one let

teth out water' and he that, to the intent his neighbor's lands should be overflown with a torrent of dissension, doth unloose the dams, and cut the banks of former friendship, may (if he be wise) expect the merciless flood should at length reach himself, and that his own habitation should be at last surrounded therewith. For when men at length begin to be weary, and to repent of their needless quarrels, and the mischievous consequences attending them, and to be inquisitive into the causes and instruments of their vexation, they will certainly find out, detest, and invert the edge of their displeasure on these wretched makebates; and so the poison they mingled for others they themselves drink up; the catastrophe of the tragedy (begun by them) is acted on themselves; they sink down into the pit they made for others, and in the net which they hid is their own foot taken: Et delator habet quod dedit exitium.

Lastly, if we would effectually observe this precept, we must readily comply with the innocent customs, and obey the established laws of the places where we live. I say first comply with the customs; which also are in effect inferior laws enacted by the tacit agreement of the generality of men; the non-observation of which is on many accounts very prejudicial to peaceable life. For to those concerned in it, it will always seem to intimate a squeamish niceness, a froward perverseness, an arrogant self-conceitedness, a manifest despising other men's judgments, and a virtual condemning their practices of fault or folly, and consequently a monopolising all goodness, and appropriating all wisdom to himself; qualities intolerably odious to men, and productive of enmity. It incenses the people (hugely susceptive of provocation) with a sense of notable injury done, and contempt cast on it. For the only authority, which the commonalty can lay claim to, consists in prescribing rules of decency in language, habit, gesture, ceremony, and other circumstances of action, declared and ratified by ordinary practice; nonconformity to which is by them adjudged a marvellous irregularity, contumacy, and rebellion against the majesty of the people, and is infallibly revenged and punished by them.

There is no preserving peace, nor preventing broils and stirs,.

but by punctually observing that ordinary rule of equity, that in cases of doubtful debate, and points of controverted practice, the fewest should yield to the most, the weakest bend to the strongest, and that to the greatest number should be allowed at least the greatest appearance of reason. To which purpose we may observe that the best and wisest men (not to displease those with whom they conversed, as far as their duty to God, and their conscience would permit) have commonly in their manners of life followed not what in their retired judgment they most approved, but what suited to the customs of their times and places, avoiding a morose singularity, as offensive to others. and productive of disquiet to themselves. You know how Cicero censured Cato for endeavoring, against the grain and predominant genius of those times, to reduce things to a strict agreement with his private notions: Ille optimo animo utens, et summa fide, nocet interdum reipublicæ. Dicit enim tanquam in Platonis woλɩreiq, non tanquam in Romuli fæce sententiam. But a more clear and pertinent instance we have in St. Paul, who thus represents his own practice: I have made myself a servant to all: unto the Jews I became as a Jew; to them that are without law, as without law to the weak became I as weak: I am made all things to all men, that I might by all means save some.' St. Paul wisely knew that, by a prudent compliance with men's customs, and condescension to their capacities, he engaged to him, or at least did not alienate from him, their affections; and thereby became more capable of infusing good doctrine into their minds, and promoting their spiritual good. And the same course was generally taken by the primitive Christians, who in all things (not inconsistent with the rules and principles of their religion) did industriously conform their conversation to the usual practices of men; thereby shunning those scandalous imputations of pride and perverseness, which then rendered the Jews so odious to the world, as appears by divers passages in the ancient apologists for Christian religion particularly Justin Martyr (in his Epistle to Diognetus) hath these words: Χριστιανοὶ γὰρ οὔτε γῇ, οὔτε φωνῇ, οὔτε ἔθεσι διακεκριμένοι τῶν λοιπῶν εἰσὶν ἀνθρώπων· οὔτε γάρ που πόλεις

Epist. ad Att. lib. ii. Ep. i,