Nothing in this busy and licentious age is more usual than for private men to invade the office, to exercise the duties, to canvass and control the actions of their superiors; discussing what they ought to do, and prescribing laws to them; taxing what is done by them; murmuring at their decrees, and inveighing against their proceedings: every one is finding holes in the state, and picking quarrels with the conduct of political affairs: every one is reforming and settling the public according to models framed in his own conceit. Things, saith one, are out of order; the constitution is very defective, and ought to be corrected; such a law in all reason should be repealed, and such an one enacted; here our statesmen were out of their politics, and there our lawgivers failed in point of equity or prudence. No, clamors another no less eagerly, all things stand as well as can be; nothing can be amended, or ought to be altered; our establishment in all respects is more perfect than Plato's commonwealth, or the state of Utopia. Thus doth each man appoint himself counsellor of state, and turns legislator without any call from the king, or choice of the country every one snatcheth at the sceptre, and invests himself with the senator's robe: every one acteth a prince and a bishop, or indeed is rather a censor and controller of both orders; not considering the wrong he committeth, nor the arrogance he practiseth, nor the mischiefs which naturally ensue on such demeanor: for to direct or to check governors is in effect to exauctorate or depose them, substituting ourselves in their room and what greater injury can we do them or the public? To fix or reverse laws belongeth to the highest authority and deepest wisdom, which it is enormous presumption for us to arrogate to ourselves: by attempting such things we confound the ranks of men, and course of things; we ruffle the world, we supplant public tranquillity; and what greater mischief than this can we do among men ?

It is the business and duty of those whom God hath constituted his representatives and ministers to deliberate and conclude what is to be done; and for the due performance of their charge they are accountable to their master, not to us: nobis obsequii gloria relicta est; our duty and our privilege (for so it is, if we could understand it, it being far more easy and safe)

BAR.

VOL. II.

E

it is to submit and obey with quiet and patience; if we do more, we are therein irregular, and no less undutiful to God than to our superiors; we forget those divine rules and precepts; Where the word of a king is, there is power; and who may say to him, What doest thou?' Submit yourselves to every ordinance of man for the Lord's sake.' 'Do all things without murmurings and disputings.' We consider not what judgments are denounced on those whose character it is 'to despise government, to be presumptuous and self-willed, not to be afraid to speak evil of dignities.'

We do not weigh the nature of the things we meddle with, nor the advantages of the persons whom we tax, nor our own incapacity to judge rightly about them. There is a kind of sacredness in the mysteries of state: as the mysteries of faith do surpass natural reason, so do those of state transcend vulgar capacity as priests by special grace are qualified best to understand the one, so are princes by like peculiar assistance enabled to penetrate the former. He that employeth them in that great work of governing the world, and maketh them instruments of his providence, is not wanting in affording to them direction and aid needful for the discharge of their duty; whence their judgments of things are somewhat more than human, and their words with us pass may for oracular; A divine sentence,' the wise king said, is in the lips of the king; his mouth transgresseth not in judgment.' According to the ordinary reason of things, they are best able to judge of such things, being, by reason of their eminent station, able to discern more and farther than others; having by experience and constant practice acquired a truer insight into things, and a better skill to manage them whereas we being placed beneath in a valley, can have no good prospect on the grounds and causes of their resolutions and proceedings: we, for want of sufficient use and exercise, cannot skill to balance the contrary weights and reasons of things; to surmount the difficulties and rubs, to unfold the knots and intrigues, which occur in affairs of that kind; we cannot expect those special influences of light and strength from heaven towards judging of affairs, which do not properly concern us: wherefore we are altogether incompetent judges, and impertinent dealers about those things; it is great odds, that in

doing so we shall mistake and misbehave ourselves; we consequently do vainly and naughtily to meddle with them. If the love of public good doth transport us, let us restrain ourselves.

3. We should not indeed so much as meddle with the affairs of our equals, (those I mean not who do equal us in dignity or worth, but all such who are not subject to our command or charge, however otherwise inferior to us; those, I say, we should not meddle with,) so as to control or cross them; to direet, or check, or censure their proceedings against their will, or without special reason engaging us thereto : for this is also to usurp an undue authority, this argueth self-conceit, this containeth immodesty and arrogance.

4. We should not, without the desire or leave of parties concerned, intermeddle in the smaller temporal interests of others, on pretence to further them, or with design to cross them; for every man should be left to himself to choose and to manage his own business, prosecuting it in the method he best liketh, (consistent with law and justice toward others,) without interruption or control: every man hath a right to do so, every man desireth it, every man commonly hath a capacity sufficient for it; for each man is apt to study his own business, to weigh his case, to poise his abilities with the circumstances in which he standeth; and thence is likely to get righter notions concerning the state of his affairs, to descry better ways of accomplishing them, than others less regarding them can do: every man is best acquainted with his own humor and temper, and thence can pick his business, and wind the management of it, so that it shall comply with them, or not grate on them. However, as every man in point of interest and honor is most concerned in the success, and suffereth most by frustration of his endeavors, so it is equal that a free choice of his proceedings should be allowed him, without impediment or disturbance; which enjoying, he will more contentedly bear any disappointment that shall happen. This especially we say, in respect to matters of lesser consequence, (such as most worldly interests are,) by the ill success whereof our neighbor is not extremely damaged or hurt; for in such cases the immodesty and arrogancy of meddling, with the vexation and trouble it is apt to work, do com

monly much outweigh any benefit we can presume by our meddling to procure.

5. We should not indeed ever in matters of indifferent and innocent nature so far meddle, as, without considerable reason or need, to infringe any man's liberty, to cross his humor, to obstruct his pleasure, however discordant these may be to our judgment and palate. Every man hath a particular gust for diet, for garb, for divertisements and disports, (arising from particular complexion, or other unaccountable causes,) and fit it is that he should satisfy it; it is enough that what he doeth seemeth good, and relisheth to himself: if we check him therein, we shall seem impertinent and troublesome, and therefore we shall really be so; for it is not our office to be tasters, to be dressers, to be masters of the sports to all men we in such matters would please our own fancy, and therefore we should not about them offend others; it is incivility, it is injustice to do it.

6. We should never offer to put a force on any man's inclination, or strive to bend it unto a compliance with ours; in attempting that we shall commonly be disappointed, and we shall never come fairly off: for some are so tough, they will never yield to us; none will comply against the grain, without regret and displeasure: if you extort a compliance with your desire, you thereby do lose their good opinion and good will; for no man liketh to be overborne with violence or importunity.

7. We should not in conversation meddle so as to impose our opinions and conceits on others in conversation with our equals, we have a liberty to propound our judgment, and declare our reasons for it; but if our judgment doth not take, nor our reasons persuade, we should have done; to press farther is rude, to be displeased for it is vain, to be angry or violent is unjust; for by the law of conversation every man taketh himself to have an absolute right to use and follow his own reason; and he that affects to deprive any man thereof, will pass for a petty tyrant, a clown, or an idiot. To retain the satisfaction which our own persuasion affordeth, is enough to content a just and sober mind, without triumphing over the understandings of others.

8. We should not ordinarily in converse affect or undertake

to teach; for this implies a pretence to a kind of superiority, and a preferring ourselves to others in wisdom; which argueth vanity, and is offensive to those with whom we converse, who care not to be dealt with as disciples or underlings. We may with our equals modestly dispute the case on even ground, as fellow-students of knowlege, or advocates of truth; but we must not peremptorily dictate, or pronounce with authority, like masters or judges.

9. We should indeed be cautious of interrupting any man's discourse, or of taking his words out of his mouth; for this is a rude way of dispossessing men of that which by common law of society they suppose themselves to enjoy, speaking their mind through, and perfecting their discourse; it is an implicit accusation of impertinency or weakness in their speech; it is an argument that we deem ourselves wiser than they, or able to speak more to the purpose: it is therefore an unsociable and distasteful practice.

10. We should be careful of intrenching on any man's modesty in any way, either of commendation or dispraise, so as to put him to the blush, or to expose him unto scorn. Sober men

care not to be the subjects of talk; no man can endure to be the object of sport: we should not therefore thrust any man on the stage; it is vexatious, and therefore always discourteous, sometimes very injurious.

11. It is good to be very staunch and cautious of talking about other men and their concernments, in way of passing characters on them, or descanting on their proceedings for want of other discourse: this is the common refuge of idleness, and the practice of fiddling gossips, who, because they will do nothing themselves, must be reflecting on the doings of others; and that they may not say nothing, will talk impertinently; pλúapoɩ kai Tepieрyou, St. Paul well coupleth together, that is, frivolous tatlers and busy-bodies;'' and withal,' saith he of such gossiping women, 1 Tim. v. 13. they learn to be idle, wandering about from house to house; and not only idle, but tattlers also, and busy-bodies, speaking things which they ought not.' To affect talking about others is indeed a great temptation to speaking things which we ought not to speak, words of unjust and uncharitable obloquy.