the worse for it. What notion can a man have of himself, who acts thus: what notion of his maker, to hope it can ever end well? We are accustomed to it indeed; and therefore may be tempted to look on it as a flight matter. But our Maker will determine at last, not according to the prejudices of men, but the truth of things. We are disposed to entertain very favourable opinions of our own behaviour: and even when we fee it to be wrong, if we are of low degree, we hope to be pafsed over as inconfiderable; if of high, to be treated hereafter with fome peculiar tenderness and deference. But God is no refpecter of persons *: the meanest is not beneath his notice; the greatest is not above his power; the difference between them is as nothing in his eyes; and both shall be punished or rewarded according to their deeds. May he therefore grant us all to take immediately the only method of shunning his wrath, and fecuring his favour, by confidering our ways impartially, for elfe we may believe things to be allowable, nay commendable, which are highly criminal: by holding fast our integrity, fo far as we have hitherto preserved it: by ceasing to do evil and learning to do well, in whatever respects we are faulty or deficient: by faith in his mercy for pardon, and his grace for strength, through the merits and mediation of our blessed redeemer: to whom, &c.

• Αts x. 34.

SER

SERMON VIII.

ON EQUITY.

MATT. vii. 12.

Therefore all things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even fo to them: for this is the law and the prophets.

THE largest number of particular directions can never poffibly equal the infinite variety of circumstances, in which human creatures are concerned to act : nor can the memories of most retain any confiderable part of these, which might be given. And therefore, though the utmost care were taken to specify to us our several obligations, we must be left after all to find out many of them ourselves, by deducing them from general rules, and these, (when they carry in them the evidence of their own truth and rightness) at the fame time that they extend our knowledge to cafes, which have not been distinctly mentioned to us, afford us also a clearer conviction of our duty in fuch as have: by shewing us, that the different commands, to which we are subjected, flow from the same source, and carry the fame reasonableness along with them.

Our bleffed Saviour, therefore, after delivering separately, in his fermon on the mount, all the chief precepts of the most exalted and refined morality, takes care, just before the conclufion of it, to comprehend the whole, both of what he had faid and what he had omitted, concerning the ties of men to each other, in one universal law of life. Whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, even fo do ye unto them. Not that he was the first who made any use of this admirable maxim. God forbid the world should have been ignorant of so necessary and so plain a direction for their behaviour, till that time. Both Jews and heathens had seen its equity, and felt its force, in VOL. I.

L

fome

some degree. But still more was wanting to complete its ufefulness: and that our Lord supplied. Most, if not all, other teachers, had expressed it in the negative form: as Tobit, for instance, do that to no man, which thou hatest *. And fo it ferved only to restrain mutual injuries. But he laid it down in the affirmative, as an injunction also of proper kindnesses. They spoke of it no otherwise than incidentally, and without afcribing any fingular prerogative to it. But he recommended it, as taking in the entire compass of social virtue. They could fupport it only by argument: but he hath added the fanction of divine authority. In these respects therefore it is peculiarly the law of our gracious Redeemer. But whether we confider it as a precept of his religion, or as one of the primitive dictates of reason and nature: in either view we are bound to pay it a con scientious regard. And the right manner of shewing this regard is,

I. To form a just notion of its meaning.

II. To fix in our hearts a due sense of its obligation.

III. To confider its importance well.

IV. To regulate our practice by it in the various relations and occurrences of life.

On the three former of these points I shall difcourse now: on the laft, God willing, the next opportunity.

I. I shall endeavour to assist you in forming a just notion of this rule. Not that it wants explanation, as being obfcure and difficult: but that mankind, in order to excuse their difobedience to it, are very apt to put false interpretations upon it; and so either pervert it into a wrong direction, or perplex it till it becomes none at all.

Some men, if we may judge by their conduct, apprehend themselves bound only to behave towards others, as they are willing others should behave towards them in their present condition. The rich and great, for example, have perhaps no favours to afk of a confiderable part of their inferiors: and therefore too often seem to think, they need not beftow any favours upon them. They agree, they say, to the reasonableness of doing as they would be done by: and therefore, if they defire no service from such and such persons, they owe no service to them. But the rule is, (and they know it is) not, "Treat others as you would with them to treat you, circumstances

i

being what they are"; but, " as you would with them to treat you, circumstances being changed on each fide." This makes a great alteration.

Perhaps they will reply, that they are content, if circumstances ever should change, to receive the treatment, which they give. Therefore they will overlook the poor and needy now; and they allow the world to overlook them, when they become fuch. They will revenge themselves of their enemies, while they have power; and let them, if ever it comes to their turn, repay the vengeance. But here again, they know in their confciences the rule means, not, that they shall act as they may think, or rather say, they shall be willing to have others act towards them, supposing circumstances should change, which they trust they never will: but as they would have them act, fuppofing circumstances were changed. And in that cafe they would wish for the very kindest behaviour, whatever they may beforehand either pretend or imagine.

But even on the supposition of an actual change, there are people, who can misinterpret this rule in such a manner, as would make the application of it fometimes a most pernicious thing.. Every magistrate, were he in the place of the criminal, who appears before him, would wish not to be punished. Every virtuous man, were he a vicious one, would wish to be indulged and assisted in his vices. Every one of us perhaps would be glad, if he could, to have his will on all occafions. Ought we therefore to gratify all the inclinations of others, because we should like to have all our own gratified? Or if not, is not the rule an erroneous one, as implying this? Why according to their different ways of thinking, some will be apt to prefer the former of these opinions, and some the latter. But neither is well grounded. For though indeed a magistrate, were he in the place of the offender, would wish to escape with impunity, yet this is not the only supposition he hath to make. Let him suppose himself also in the place of fuch; as may be then or afterwards injured by the offender, if he escapes punishment: or of fuch, as the precedent of his impunity may tempt others to injure: let him reflect, how the rule before us enjoins him to act with regard to these innocent persons, and he will never be misled by whatever tenderness it may seem to enjoin him with regard to the guilty. Again, though if we were in the place of any of our vicious acquaintance, we should be glad to be affifted in our vices; yet suppose we were in the place of

those whom their vices corrupt, or impoverish, or grieve, or make any way miferable; should we then be glad, that other people should affist in bringing this mifery upon us? if not, the precept of doing as we would be done by, far from requiring us to give fuch assistance ourselves, absolutely prohibits it. Serving our friends, when they ought not to be served; and raising those in the world, from partial fondness, who ought not to be raised, passes, I am afraid, too commonly for great good-nature: and is defended, or excused, because it is treating them as we should defire to be treated by them. But then it is treating their worthier competitors, and all fuch as may fuffer by the faults or incapacity of these favourites, which perhaps many, perhaps the public may, it is treating them as we should abhor to be treated. We must therefore understand this rule to mean that we take into our confideration, not barely the parties who appear and press for the benefit of it, but whoever else is concerned, if any be and do, not to one or fome only, but to all men, as we would that they should do

to us.

But here it may possibly be objected again, that if we imagine ourselves to be successively in the fituation of different perfons, we shall of confequence defire different and contrary things in reference to the fame affair: so that behaving towards every one interested in it, as we should, in their circumstances, defire, that they would behave towards us, is impracticable: that therefore on fuch occafions, which are not rare, the rule is in effect no rule: and that farther, on several others it is a very bad one. For suppose any one to defire of us, what would be hurtful to no third person, but to himself, or to us: muft we comply with his defire, because if we were exactly in his stead, we should have the fame defire? Certainly not. then, fuch cafes as these, not only happen in comparison, but feldom, and therefore cannot miflead, or even perplex us often: but when they do happen, instead of overturning the rule, they point out to us a very important limitation of it, which was doubtless originally intended in it, and will secure it from ever being overturned. And this is, that the phrafe, whatsoever ye would, must not be extended to mean whatever we can possibly wish, but whatever we can equitably and allowably wish. It is to be understood of proper, not of unfit inclinations; for what

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