of all kinds, which, if known, might deject or disturb them; for that not only fuch deceit is useful, but they, upon whom it is practifed, will, when recovered, approve it, and be thankful for it; nay, perhaps have already approved it, and set the example of it on former like occafions, and therefore have in effect confented to it now. But, plaufible as this plea may appear, the need and the benefit of employing falfehood, even in these circumstances, for the most part at least, cometh of evil*. It is because people will not in the time of their health become virtuous and reasonable, pious and refigned, that they want the wretched support of untruths in the time of fickness. And if they, who are about them, fcruple to support them thus, as they well may, then they are void of all confolation. But even fuppofing the lies, which they wish for, are told them; they will feldom be told so, as neither to be found out, nor fufpected: and fufpicions will often disturb fick persons more fatally, than knowing the worst would. Or, let prevarications of this kind work ever so happy effects on some particular occafions, yet there follows a most dreadful general inconvenience from them that because some must needs be told their condition is hopeful and fafe, though it be not; others are told in vain, that theirs is so, though it be; for their friends, they think, will affirm any thing, to please them. And thus, no more may recover by being deceived, than may be loft by the impoffibility, arifing from hence, of knowing that they are not deceived. Their lives may depend on the composedness of their spirits: their fpirits would have been composed, if they could have believed those who attend them: but being fenfible what liberties they will take in these matters, they cannot believe them; and therefore can have no relief or comfort from their afsurances.

However, it must be owned, that in most or all of the abovementioned cafes, there are sometimes difficulties, with which we have much more caufe to pray God we may never be tried, than to be confident that we shall judge and act rightly, if we

And therefore, though adhering strictly to truth, as the rule, which our Maker hath given us, and trusting Him with the confequences, evidently appears to be the securest way: yet, if any one ventures to deviate from it with a visibly good intention, we should not, I think, pronounce a fevere fentence upon him, confidering how prone the best of us is to err in plainer

plainer things; always provided, that the liberties, which he takes, be few and modeft, and almost extorted from him; and confcientioufly restrained to things in themselves the least exceptionable. But if persons, because something may be colourably faid for making a little free with truth on very uncommon occafions, where no one feems injured by it, will indulge themselves in whatever falsities they please on almost any occafion: if, because it hath been apprehended, that malefactors, and those with whom we are at war, have no right to veracity; and that such, as are incapable of judging at all for themselves, may be deceived for their advantage by others; if, I say, upon this, they will imagine they are allowed to treat one part of mankind as villains and enemies, with whom no faith is to be kept, and another as children and fools, upon whom they may freely impose any way this must proceed from a bad heart; and the tendency of it is, to dissolve intirely the bonds of human fociety, and open a high road to all poffible wickedness and universal confufion. The arguments, were they ever so specious, for the lawfulness of fraud in feemingly harmless cafes, can never prove it lawful in others of a nature quite contrary. But, I beg it may be observed, the extreme danger, which there is notwithstanding, of mens proceeding in falfehood to very pernicious lengths, if once they begin, is a most unanswerable objection against its being permitted in any degree at all.

A confideration so interesting must be urged more at large: and shall, God willing, the next opportunity. But I hope you have already seen very great reason to follow the fon of Sirach's wife counsel. Ufe not to make any manner of lie: for the cuf tom thereof is not good *.

SERMON XXVI.

ON LYING.

PROV. xii. 22.

Lying lips are abomination to the Lord: but they, that deal truly, are bis delight.

AS the advantages, derived to mankind from the fuperior power, which we enjoy, of communicating our thoughts one to another, are very great; so the perversion of it to wrong uses is very pernicious. And no perverfion of it can be fo complete, as when we employ it, instead of informing others, to deceive them. Now, of the more importance it is, that we should not be guilty of this crime, the more neceffary it must be, that we should know, wherein it confifts, and how infufficient the pleas are, which in some circumstances have been made in its favour. Therefore I began to difcourse on the fubject of our obligation to truth, by shewing,

I. What things are, and are not, breaches of it.

II. What breaches are unwarrantably by fome persons thought juftifiable.

And under this latter head, I first proved, that scripture enjoins veracity, without authorizing any exceptions, and that indeed it is, in its own nature, a duty, independently of consequences: then I confuted or counterbalanced the good effects ascribed to the violation of it in several particular cases: and Iastly, intimated the general danger, to which they who depart from it, expose themselves, and tempt others, of running on from one liberty to another, till at length they venture to say, and afterwards to do, any thing, which they imagine will contribute to a good end: a practice productive of fuch dreadful evils, that I must enlarge upon it fomewhat further.

Things, Things, which every one allows to be good, no one needs to be cheated into. And where opinions differ, neither God nor man hath given us a right to bring over others into our own by falsehood: and on what foundation then can we take fuch a step? I may think perhaps, that this or that thing would be for the benefit of the world, or of fuch a part of it, or individual in it. But this no more empowers me to use fraud, than to use force, for accomplishing it. Another person may think, at the fame time, a different or a contrary thing beneficial : and may have as high an esteem of his own judgement as I have of mine. If then I may employ deceit to serve my purpose, why not he to serve his? Now what can this end in, but the ruin of all integrity, and all confidence, amongst men? And what good can there be in view, that bears any propoгtion to such a calamity?

But fome argue: our opposers will certainly use falsehood for their bad ends: if therefore we do not use it for our good ones, they have a plain advantage over us; and we shall be undone, for want of turning their own weapons against them. Now if this were the case; it would only be the case of fuffering for truth, which is fuffering for God and hereafter, at least, no one will be a loser by that. But indeed, at present, upon the whole, the contrary is the cafe. If your oppofers have recourse to unfair arts, detect those arts in them, and abftain from them yourselves: and, whatever difficulties you may be under for a time, in the conclufion all will come out well. A lying tongue is but for a moment: but the lip of truth fhall be established for ever *. Uprightness, with only common prudence, will not fail to get the better at length: and the reason, why we experience it no oftener, is indeed that we try it so seldom. In the midst of our complaints, we do the very things of which we complain. This is no combat of fair dealing against unfair, but of craft against craft: and perhaps our own artificés contribute more, than those of our adverfaries, towards the lofs of our cause. For the surest way of missing our aim is to fink in our credit. Therefore let the end, that we propose, be ever fo good, it is neither right nor wife to use falsehoods for attaining it.

But, in fact, the ends proposed to be ferved by this method, fall fall usually very far short of being near so good as they are pretended to be. Some blameable gratification, some worldly interest, some party point, the promotion of fome bad or doubtful cause, is the thing, which people, on fuch occafions, have at heart, however studioufly they disguise their aims to others, and, if possible, to themselves. These are the purposes, for which truth is to be depressed, imposture countenanced; fome confidered as too weak, others as too wicked, to be treated with common honesty. And thus every one, who can but think hardly enough of those from whom he differs, sets himself at liberty to speak to them, or of them, as infincerely as ever he will. And if he may venture upon false assertions, he will be apt to think, why not upon false oaths? And, if for the service of the public or his friends, why not for his own? How shocking a state of things would this introduce! Hear the prophet's description of it: They bond their tongues, like their bow, for lies; but they are not valiant for the truth upon the earth : for they proceed from evil to evil, and they know not me, faith the Lord. Take ye beed every one of his neighbour; and trust ye not in any brother : for every brother will utterly supplant, and every neighbour will walk with flanders. And they will deceive every one bis neighbour, and will not speak the truth: they have taught their tongue to speak lies, they weary themselves to commit iniquity. Thine habitation is in the midst of deceit : through deceit they refuse to know me, faith the Lord *.

Nay, further yet, if persons may falfify and perjure, where shall they stop? It will be faid, why not purloin, why not rob, why not murder, to serve a good purpose, that is, a convenient one, for others, or themselves! Each liberty taken leads on, by a plain high road, to a greater: and observe, I intreat you, what a figure they make together in the word of God. By fwearing, and lying, and killing, and stealing, and committing adultery, they break out, and blood toucheth blood. Therefore Shall the land mourn, and every one that dwelleth therein shall languish t

But could we restrain the advocates for falsehood, and their difciples, to this offence only, and even to the feemingly more innocent forts of it: yet real religion, real virtue, the real happiness of mankind, I believe have never on the whole been