ever, as I affirm, will happen to you. 22 Thus much, however, I beg of Your accusers will be more numer- them. Punish my sons, when they ous, whom I have now restrained, grow up, O judges! paining them as though you did not perceive it; and I have pained you, if they appear to they will be more severe, inasmuch you to care for riches or any thing as they are younger: and you will else before virtue; and if they think be more indignant. themselves to be something when 21 For, if you think that by put- they are nothing, reproach them as ting men to death you will restrain I have done you, for not attending any one from upbraiding you because to what they ought, and for conceivyou do not live well, you are much ing themselves to be something mistaken. For this method of escape when they are worth nothing. If is neither possible nor honorable, but ye do this, both I and my sons shall that other is most honorable and have met with just treatment at your most easy, not to put a check upon hands. others; but for a man to take heed to himself, how he may be most perfect. Having predicted thus much to those of you who have condemned state is unknown to every one but me, I take my leave of you.*

23 But it is now time to depart,for me to die, for you to live. But which of us is going to a better

God.

THE WRITINGS OF PLUTARCH.

SELECTION I.

Fragmentary selections from Plutarch's discourse on Moral Virtue, in which he shows that the soul and body are at the beginning antagonistic, the one to the other; and that virtue consists in the

gradual but complete mastery of the body

by the soul.

ALL

itself, when it consents to what it ought, and is firm and immutable.

2 And they do likewise think, that that part of the soul which is the seat of the passions, and is called brutal or irrational, is not at all distinct by any physical difference from that which is rational. For passion, according to them, is nothing else but depraved and intemperate reason, that through a perverse and vicious judgment is grown overvehement and headstrong.

LL do commonly agree in this one thing, in supposing virtue to be a certain disposition and faculty of the governing and directive part of the soul, of which reason is 3 Now, it seems to me, all these the cause; or rather to be reason were perfect strangers to the clear

*That this prediction was fulfilled in various ways, history records; but especially with reference to the immediate accusers, of whom Plutarch writes the following:-"The Athenians had so utter an abhorrence of those who accused Socrates, that they would neither lend them fire, nor answer them any question, nor wash with them in the same water, but commanded the servants to pour it out as polluted; till these sycophants, no longer able to bear up under the pressure of this hatred, put an end to their own lives.

ness and truth of this point, that less it happen to be utterly corwe every one of us are in reality rupted and vitiated by pleasure twofold and compound. (which is deaf to all instruction) and by a luxurious way of living.

4 The soul of man, being a part or portion of that of the universe, 8 As for those who wonder how and framed upon reasons and pro- it should come to pass, that that portions answerable to it, cannot be which is irrational in itself should yet simple and all of the same nature; become obsequious to the dictates but must have one part that is intel- of right reason, they seem to me not ligent and rational, which naturally to have duly considered the force ought to have dominion over a man, and power of reason: how great and another which, being subject to and extensive it is, and how far it passion, irrational, extravagant, and is able to carry and extend its unbounded, stands in need of direc- authority and command,—not so tion and restraint. much by harsh and arbitrary methods, as by soft and gentle means: which persuade more and gain obedience sooner than all the severities and violences in the world.

5 These principles Aristotle seems most to have relied upon, as plainly enough appears from what he has written. To the last he constantly maintained that the sensual and irrational was wholly distinct from the intellectual and rational part of the soul.

6 Not that it is so absolutely devoid of reason as those faculties of the soul which are sensitive, nutritive, and vegetative, and are common to us with brute beasts and plants; for these are always deaf to the voice of reason and incapable of it; and may in some sort be said to derive themselves from flesh and blood, and to be inseparably attached to the body and devoted to the service thereof.

9 For even the spirits, the nerves, bones, and other parts of the body are destitute of reason; but yet no sooner do they feel the least motion of the will, reason shaking (as it were), though never so gently, the reins, but all of them observe their proper order, agree together, and pay a ready obedience. As, for instance, the feet, if the impulse of the mind be to run, immediately betake themselves to their office; or if the motion of the will be for the throwing or lifting up of any thing, the hands in a moment fall to their business.

7 But the other sensual part, sub- 10 But to let these things pass, I ject to the sudden efforts of the pas- would gladly know of them, whether, sions, and destitute of any reason of when they see domestic animals (as its own, is yet nevertheless naturally dogs, horses, or birds), by use, feedadapted to hear and obey the intel- ing, and teaching, brought to so high lect and judgment; to have regard a degree of perfection as that they to it, and to submit itself to be shall utter articulately some senseful regulated and ordered according to words, and by their motions, gestthe rules and precepts thereof,-un-ures, and all their actions, shall ap

prove themselves governable, and passions, but in the well-ordering of become useful to us; and when also passions and keeping them within they find Achilles in Homer encour-measure; which she effects by wisaging horses, as well as men, to bat- dom and prudence, bringing the factle; whether, I say, after all this, |ulties of that part of the soul where they can yet make any wonder or our affections and appetite are seatdoubt, whether those faculties of the ed, to a good habit. mind to which we owe our anger, our desires, our joys, and our sorrows, be of such a nature that they are capable of being obedient to reason, and so affected by it as to consent and become entirely subject to it.

II And these faculties are not seated without us, or separated from us, or formed by any thing which is not in us, or hammered out by force and violence: but as they have by nature their entire dependence upon the soul, so they are ever conversant and bred up with it; and also receive their final complement and perfection from use, custom, and practice.

14 The business, therefore, of practical reason, governing our actions according to the order of Nature, is to correct the excesses as well as the defects of the passions, by reducing them to a true mediocrity.

15 For as, when through infirmity of the mind, effeminacy, fear, or indolence, the vehemence and keenness of the appetites are so abated that they are ready to sink and fall short of the good at which they are aimed and directed, there is then this practical reason at hand, exciting and rousing and pushing them onward; so, on the other hand, when it lashes out too far, and is hurried beyond all measure, there also is the same reason ready to bring it again within compass, and put a stop to its career.

12 For this reason the Greeks very properly called manners, custom: for they are nothing else, in short, but certain qualities of the irrational and brutal part of the mind (and hence by them are so named), in 16 And thus, prescribing bounds that this brutal and irrational part and giving law to the tendency of of the mind being formed and the passions, it produces in the irmoulded by right reason, by long custom and use, has these qualities or differences stamped upon it.

rational part of the soul these moral virtues (of which we now treat), which are nothing else but the mean between excess and defect.

13 Not that reason so much as attempts to eradicate our passions and 17 Now temperance is that whereaffections, which is neither possible by reason governs and manages that nor expedient; but only to keep part of the soul which is subject to them within due bounds, reduce the passions (as it were some wild them into good order, and so direct creature brought up by hand, and them to a good end. Thus, reason made quite tame and gentle), having seeks to generate moral virtue,- gained an absolute victory over all which consists, not in a kind of in- its appetites, and brought them ensensibility, or entire freedom from tirely under the dominion of it.

18 Whereas we call it continence, one cannot but call to mind that of when reason has indeed gained the the poet:

mastery over the appetites and Swift the command ran through the raging deep; prevailed against them, (though not Th' obedient waves compose themselves to sleep; without great pains and trouble,)

affections.

they being perverse and continuing reason having quite deadened and to struggle, as not having wholly repressed the vehement raging, and submitted themselves: so that it is furious motions of the passions and not without great difficulty able to preserve its government over them, being forced to retain and hold them in, and keep them within compass, as it were, with stripes, with the bit and bridle, while the mind all the time is full of nothing but agony, contentions, and confusion.

19 All of which Plato endeavors to illustrate by a similitude of the chariot-horses of the soul: the one whereof, being more unruly, not only kicks and flings at him that is more gentle and tractable, but also thereby so troubles and disorders the driver himself, that he is forced sometimes to hold him hard in, and sometimes again to give him his head,

"Lest from his hands the purple reins should slip."

20 And from hence we may see why continence is not thought worthy to be placed in the number of perfect virtues but is taken to be a degree under virtue.

22 In fine, throughout the whole world, all things are governed and directed, some by a certain habit; some by Nature; others by a brutal or irrational soul; and some again by that which has reason and understanding. Of all which things man does in some measure participate, and is concerned in all the abovementioned differences.

23 For he is contained by habit, and nourished by nature; he makes use of reason and understanding; he wants not his share of the irrational soul. He has also in him a native source and inbred principle of the passions; not as accidental, but essential to him, which ought not therefore to be utterly rooted out, but only pruned and cultivated.

24 For it is not the method and custom of reason—in imitation either of the manner of the Thracians or of what Lycurgus ordered to be done to the vines to destroy and tear up 21 A wise man is not continent, all the passions and affections indifbut temperate. For remorse, grief, ferently, good and bad, useful and and indignation do always accompa- hurtful together. But rather—like ny continence; whereas, in the mind some kind and careful Deity who of a temperate person there is all over has a tender regard to the growth such an evenness, calmness, and firm- and improvement of fruit-trees and ness, that, seeing with what wonder-plants-to cut away and clip off that ful easiness and tranquillity the which grows wild and rank, and to irrational faculties go along with dress and manage the rest that it reason and submit to its directions, may serve for use and profit.

25 And therefore he that in pleas- and removing others, he advanced ures and delights can prescribe to the aggregate perfection of virtue. bounds to his passions and desires, 2 Now if (as they affirm) the and in punishing offences can moder-change from bad to good were either ate his rage and hatred to the offend- so quick and sudden, as that he that ers, shall in one case get the reputa- was extremely vicious in the morntion not of an insensible, but tem- ing may become eminently virtuous perate person, and in the other be at night; or that any one going to accounted a man of justice without bed wicked might chance to rise a cruelty or bitterness. Whereas, if virtuous man next morning, do you all the passions, if that were possible, were clean rooted out, reason in most men would grow sensibly more dull and inactive than the pilot of a ship in a calm.

26 Agreeably hereunto the Lacedæmonian instructor of youth was in the right, when he professed that he would bring it to pass that youths under his care should take a pleasure and satisfaction in good and have an abhorrence for evil; than which there cannot be a greater and nobler end of the liberal education of youth proposed or assigned.

SELECTION II.

think that any one in the world could be ignorant of so extraordinary a conversion, and perfectly shut his eyes upon the beams of virtue and wisdom so fully and manifestly breaking in upon his soul?

3 In my opinion, if any person should have Cæneus' foolish wish, and be changed (as it is reported he was) from one sex to the other, it is more probable that such a one should be altogether ignorant of the metamorphosis, than that any should, from an indolent, unthinking, debauched fellow, become suddenly a wise, prudent, and valiant hero; or from a sottish bestiality advance to

Fragmentary selections from Plutarch's the perfection of divine life, and discourse on Progress in Virtue, in which yet know nothing at all of the he condemns the doctrines of those who change. claim that there is such a thing as instantaneous or supernatural changes from vice to virtue; and shows that virtue is always a growth, never an im

mediate transition.

4 On the contrary, I may be bold to affirm that the change from bad to good is very easily and manifestly discernible; not as if one were drawn out of a pit on a sudden, and could give no account of the degrees of the ascent, but so plain. that the several steps and advances may be computed.

OU know very well how much trouble those give themselves who raise and maintain this strange question, Why a wise virtuous man should never perceive how he be- 5 The first argument that comes came such; but should either be in my mind is this, by way of simile; quite ignorant, or at least doubt, pray examine it. You know the art that ever by little and little, now of navigation; when the seamen adding something, now subtracting hoist sail for the main ocean, they