does not, necessarily, seek to do this, for there is always the same chance that some unseen cause may modify the physical effect, as that some unknown motive may affect the evidence. For instance, a coal placed upon the naked skin of the tongue, burns it; we learn this effect to follow that cause from experience. Once learnt, we believe it will always follow, and no proof could make us believe that, all things being the same, it did not, in some particular case; but evidence can, and does lead us to believe, that some new and counteracting cause may come in, unknown to us, and prevent the tongue from being burned by the coal: the evidence of our eyes, which see the fire-eater, or the evidence of a friend that has seen him, satisfies us. It is not true, then, as Mr. Bailey states, that it follows from the belief in constant causation, that no possible evidence can make us believe that a piece of ice was exposed to a temperature of 200° for an hour, without melting; if we saw it, we should believe it, nor yet doubt at all that like effects followed like causes; for we should certainly think some new cause at work; and if our senses can satisfy us of this, the evidence of others can. And this, as we think Mr. B. must have seen, makes the principle of constant causation of no effect, as regards miracles. We think he was aware of this; for here it is, that he has left the subject, after suggesting the likelihood of new, but unknown causes or motives coming in to affect evidence, but leaving entirely out of view, that strong evidence to a seemingly new effect following a well-known cause, makes it quite as probable that a new and unseen cause is producing the new effect, as that a new and unseen motive is affecting the testimony.

Let this be applied to miracles; no one ever supposed the miraculous effect to result from the old causes alone, but from a new, and, to us, mysterious cause. When the water changes to wine, no one supposes either the speaking of the words, the filling of the vessels, or the drawing from them, to have been the cause of the change; from these causes, the same effects followed as ever; the servants did the bidding of Jesus as told by his mother to do; the jars were filled with liquid, and the liquid in them flowed out again; but from a new cause followed a new effect. And in every miracle a new power, unknown to common experience, comes in as a new cause to produce new consequences.

The true philosophical course, then, under the principle of

constant causation, is, when evidence is offered of a miracle or a new phenomenon, (such as Jane Ryder's power of seeing in the dark, &c.,) to ask whether there is most reason to think a new cause acting on the witness sufficient to produce mistake or falsehood, or a new cause acting on the subject-matter, as to which he testifies, sufficient to produce the phenomenon in question; and as we see reason one way or the other, we shall believe or not.

We do not, then, think that from the doctrine of uniform. causation, as taught in the essay before us, can be drawn any logical argument against the credibility of miracles; though from the mode in which the argument is developed to a certain point, and then left, we fear it has answered all the ends of a direct attack.

The truth is, that before miracles can be argued against, as impossible, the existence of God, and of all power more than human and natural, must be denied, for if there be such power, it may come in to neutralize the operation of the common laws of nature, as the power of life, in every living being, neutralizes the laws of chemical decomposition, gravity, and the transmission of heat; not that these laws are suspended, but they are overpowered. That Lazarus, living, should walk, be warm, and resist the laws of decomposition, was as much a miracle, so far as the existence of some power superior to the usual laws of nature is concerned, as that Lazarus should rise from the dead.

Miracles, to him that believes in a God, then, are possible, and may be proved. With the arguments as to the probability of their use, we have now no concern; our sole purpose being to speak of the tendency of an essay, which has been much admired, quoted, and read; which is close, clear, unimpassioned, and, we trust, meant to serve the cause of truth in all fairness, but has, in fact, blinded many eyes by its very excess of light.

J. H. P.

VOL. XXIII. -3D S. VOL. V. NO. I.

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ART. VI. — 1. Essai Politique sur l'Isle de Cuba; par ALEXANDRE DE HUMBOLDT. Avec une Carte, et un Supplement qui renferme des Considérations sur la Population, la Richesse territoriale et le Commerce de l'Archipel des Antilles et de Colombia. 2 Tomes, 8vo. Paris. Gide Fils. 1826. pp. 364–408.

2. Historia Economico-Politica y Estadistica de la Isla de Cuba, ó sea de sus Progresos en la Poblacion, la Agricultura, el Commercio y las Rentas. Por DoN RAMON DE LA SAGRA, Director del Jardin Botanico de la Habana, &c. Habana. 1831. 4to. pp. 386.

In these two works we are presented, it is believed, with the most correct and valuable information which the general reader can obtain concerning the population and wealth of the noble island of Cuba. The Spanish work is considered as somewhat more trustworthy in its details, than the other, and its facts are of more recent date; but as it consists almost entirely of facts and figures, it is deficient in that moral and literary charm which distinguishes the volumes of Humboldt, and in those reasonings and inferences from facts and figures, which cannot fail to interest the reader, whether he agrees to them or not.

Every thing relating to Cuba, by far the largest island of the West Indies, and nearly as large as England proper; an island communicating readily with the other Antilles, with South America, and with our own coast, and lying across the very mouth of our Mississippi; an island enjoying a heavenblest climate, capable of producing almost all the known fruits of the globe, and of sustaining in comfort ten times its present population,- must needs be interesting. But there is one topic which is especially so at the present time, and in no country so much so as in our own. This is the topic of domestic slavery, which is treated of in both the works before us, in the one statistically, in the other both statistically and feelingly, under the head of Population. It is a topic which is not only interesting, but agitating our country to its depths, and engaging the thoughts, and dividing the sentiments of many of our best and wisest men. It is, therefore, impossible to speak of slavery in Cuba, without drawing attention to slavery in the Southern States of our Union; and the

facts which may be substantiated concerning that condition or institution in the one country, cannot fail to have some bearing upon it as it exists in the other.

With slavery in Cuba, the writer of this article has had some opportunity to be acquainted, during a late visit to the south-eastern part of the island. What he is to say of it, though he will speak in the usual style of reviewers, he will say from his own observation and on his own responsibility; not as a partisan, but, he trusts, as a lover of truth, liberty, and peace.

We are fully aware that the subject of slavery, in any of its aspects, is an exciting one, but it is not our purpose to produce excitement, and we do not believe that our remarks will have that tendency. We believe that the path of our duty lies in an opposite direction, and that we should do all the little that is in our power to assuage, rather than promote the angry feeling which has pervaded the community, and threatened the stability of our internal relations. But though our earnest desire is conciliation, we cannot deviate from our own convictions, to gratify the slaveholder on the one side, or the abolitionist on the other.

In order to prevent misapprehensions, however, which may arise from taking insulated portions of our remarks, apart from their proper connexions, we may as well state beforehand, and in brief, what our convictions are with regard to slavery. They coincide, we believe, substantially, with what may be called the great northern opinion and feeling on the subject; the opinion and feeling entertained by the great majority of the people of the free states. We say, then, that we are no friends, defenders, or excusers of slavery, and that we would not willingly live where it exists. We believe it to be contrary to the natural and inalienable rights of man. We believe it to be unpropitious to the character, mental development, and moral well-being, both of the enslaved, and of those who hold them in slavery. Believing this, and consequently believing that the abolition of slavery is desirable, we also believe that in countries where it has long existed, its removal must be a work of time, of preparation, of care, commenced and carried on with the utmost judgment and discretion; that in this country especially, it behooves us to avoid as far as possible, all sectional conflict on the subject; that slavery is not, and cannot fairly be called a national insti

tution, but only an institution of some of the states composing the nation, with which the other states have engaged by original compact, implied if not expressed, not to interfere; and that it is neither the right, the duty, nor the interest of those other states to interfere with it, even by the proffer of their advice and assistance, when the proffer is uncalled for, and found by experience to be universally disagreeable, irritating, dangerous,

and useless.

The sentiments which we have just expressed concerning slavery in general, we used to express as freely in Cuba, whenever the topic of slavery was introduced to our attention, and always without offence. We never introduced the topic ourselves; for to dispute about slavery, was not our purpose in going to the island; but when the topic was presented, and our opinion regarding it was asked, or only seemed to be expected, we gave it with candor, and with candor it was always received. We are sure that we were quite as much respected for saying what we thought, as we should have been, had we pretended that we had no objections to slavery, and that opposition to it was a mere northern prejudice. Nay, we well remember that one gentleman, a planter, and the captain of the quarter in which we were at the time residing, had the delicacy and magnanimity to take for granted, that, coming from the north as we did, slavery was not agreeable to our ideas of right, and, framing his conversation on that supposition, went on to give us such information as he thought might be valuable. This, in itself, was hospitality, of the most generous kind. Where there is moderation on both sides, and mutual respect, conversation may be easy and improving, even on the subject of slavery.

With these introductory remarks, we proceed to state some of the results of our observations, on that subject. We shall be able to state but few, and these will not be methodically arranged; but we shall produce as many as can be brought within the ordinary compass of a review in this work, and in the order in which they come to our mind.

A state may be bad in itself, and yet have its alleviations, and admit of much comfort and happiness. Such is the case with slavery; and it is of some of the alleviations of this state that we shall first speak.

How is a stranger impressed by the appearance and behavior of the colored population, when he lands in St.