they are anonymous critics, and authorized as synodical individuals' to speak of themselves plurali majestatico!"*

The "ungentle craft" have had many a lecture read to them, but we have yet seen nothing to equal the fiery wrath of this retort. The unconsciousness of the writer is admirable. In the very chapter which contains this pretty piece of denunciation, may be found the following remark. "Indignation at literary wrongs, I leave to men born under happier stars. I cannot afford it." In farther illustration of this point, we intended to adduce some of the passages, in which he vilifies the Unitarian faith; but the language is really too gross for quotation. A single sentence will suffice to exemplify his mode of thinking on political subjects. "The Roman Catholic Emancipation Act-carried in the violent, and, in fact, unprincipled manner it was-was, in effect, a Surinam toad; and the Reform Bill, the Dissenters' admission to the Universities, and the attack on the Church, are so many toadlets, one after another detaching themselves from their parent brute." †

No great sagacity is required to perceive the probable influence of the writings of Coleridge. Possessed of so marked a character, and by no means popular in their nature, the admirers of them would necessarily form a sect, and their admiration of their teacher be expressed in no measured terms. They would adopt the harshness of his manner towards opponents, imitate his enthusiastic dreams, and revel in the richness of his illustrations. Impatient of the restraints put upon their researches by the limited powers of the human mind, they would indulge in highly wrought and abstruse affirmations, in the hope that these might contain the elements of some truth, which they could not fully grasp and distinctly enunciate. Systematic inquiry would be abandoned for the piecemeal promulgation of unconnected facts and desultory reasoning. The results of immethodical research, connected by no chain in the mind even of the inquirer, would naturally be expressed in short essays and distinct aphorisms. Sanguine in their expectations, the possibility of weaving such materials into a new and satisfactory scheme of philosophy would ever be present to their minds, but the attempt to realize such a hope would still be postponed.

*

Biog. Lit. p. 30. Am. ed. † Table Talk, Vol. 2, p. 164.

But the most pernicious effect of the prose works of Coleridge must be ascribed to his fanciful and poetic mode of expression. The imagery, in which he delighted to clothe his mystic speculations, is the prominent object to the observer, who often adopts as a truth what is nothing but an ingenious illustration. The appeal is made to passion and sentiment, not to the understanding; and the result is persuasion rather than conviction. There is a fallacy in such a proceeding, which deserves to be constantly guarded against. Poetic and philosophical truth are essentially distinct. They differ in kind. The former relates to propriety in the manner, by which the emotive part of our nature is addressed, and does not aspire to accuracy either in word or thought. The latter respects strict conformity to reality and fact; absolute and entire correctness is its proper test. A painting may be true to nature, when the whole composition is ideal, and no archetype is to be found in the works of creation. We say, that Shakspeare does not violate truth in his most imaginative creations in his Calibans and Ariels, his witches, fairies, and ghosts. But the reference is to the keeping of the portraiture, to its consistency with itself. Philosophical truth, of which the subject is man and the end is action, is the exhibition of things as they are, and demands the utmost severity of expression. The value of a principle consists in its unity and entireness. An error in part vitiates the whole. Algebraic simplicity of language is therefore required in its enunciation. All truths are linked together by innumerable relations into an infinite series, the complete exhibition of which would constitute the only perfect scheme of philosophy. All hyperboles, all figures of speech, are therefore wilful departures from the only true road are the distorted, partial, or exaggerated expression of a principle, giving to it false relations, whereby its proper position and bearing cannot be ascertained. The inherent difficulties of the rigid method of philosophizing do not form the only objection to it in the minds of most inquirMen are in love with the opposite mode from its pleasant vices. Eloquence, like the fair sex, has too prevailing beauties in it to suffer itself ever to be spoken against. And it is in vain to find fault with those arts of deceiving, wherein men find pleasure to be deceived."

ers.

Undoubtedly, the artifices of rhetoric have their place among the means for the instruction and improvement of man

kind. But their office is in the enforcement of truth as a rule of conduct, not the discovery and original expression of that truth. Pure rays of light, passing a medium of fog, are refracted into a thousand gorgeous hues, that hold the spectator in mingled wonder and admiration. Yet the centre of such a cloud is hardly the best place for distinct vision, for perceiving things as they are. Objects appear enlarged, defects are hidden in the wreaths of vapor, and the general effect is grand and impressive. But there is a simple beauty in the pure sunshine without, in the clear atmosphere, and the sharp outlines of surrounding things, which one would hardly barter, after all, for the most striking illusion. This may appear too strong for an illustration, yet the heated and bewildering effect of the most brilliant passages of Transcendental writing goes far to justify the comparison. A sweeping statement is made, which, in the obvious and literal sense of the words, is a wild paradox, but in which every one fancies, that he can perceive the elements of some truth, though probably no two interpretations would be alike. There is no limit to the number of such apophthegms, except in the poverty or richness of the writer's fancy. Where positive truth is not the object of pursuit, the result will too often be nothing but a brilliant play upon words. Splendid generalizations are usually splendid follies. We are always suspicious of an Edipus, who professes to explain the secret of the universe.

"In

A fair comparison of the different modes of inquiry and instruction adopted by Bacon and Locke on the one side, and by the members of the New School on the other, must be based on a consideration of the different ends in view. a bistorical, plain method," Locke professes to "consider the discerning faculties of a man, as they are employed about the objects which they have to do with, and to give an account of the ways whereby our understandings come to attain those notions of things we have." Whatever may be thought of the importance of this object, or of the success with which he pursued it, nothing is more certain than that he rigidly adhered to his purpose. His book was the first in modern times to give an ample collection of facts, derived from observation, relating to the history of the human mind, and forming a broad basis, on which to erect a system of experimental philosophy. He was directly concerned only with the "discerning faculties"; therefore the imagination and the moral pow

He

ers are spoken of only incidentally, and, it must be admitted, with frequent mistakes. But to censure this omission is to blame Locke for leaving undone what he never proposed to accomplish. The leading proposition of his first book, which, owing to his inaccurate and unguarded use of language, has been so frequently assailed, is still one, which, couched in one form or another, expressed with greater or less caution, no philosopher since his time has ever thought of denying. Those who question the possibility of experience, who deny the reality and value of any scheme of experimental philosophy, certainly will not accept his conclusions. But do not let them assume the exclusive propriety of their own method, and then censure Locke for adopting a different course. has chosen to reason from observation and facts; they from "anticipated cognitions a priori." He limited his task, gave up the consideration of problems which he believed to be insoluble, and aimed only at plain and literal truth. Do not let them charge his philosophy with a sensualizing and degrading influence, merely because they have proposed to themselves a different and, it may be, a higher purpose. The results of his inquiries are expressed in a plain and homely garb, while they have caused poetry and eloquence to contribute to the embellishment of philosophy. Before they arrogate to themselves the superiority in this respect, let them consider the observation of Hume: 66 Nothing is more dangerous to reason, than the flights of the imagination, and nothing has been the occasion of more mistakes among philosophers. Men of bright fancies may in this respect be compared to those angels, whom the Scripture represents as covering their eyes with their wings."

Originality has become the cant of the day-the magic sign, whose worshippers would fain pursuade themselves of the worthlessness of every thing, save that which is too strange, too wild, and fantastical, to have entered human thought before. In such a doctrine as this we have no share. There is that in Truth, which presents the labors of the humblest of her admirers from becoming degrading or useless to himself or mankind. It is a maxim, which men are ever ready to acknowledge as true, but never to act upon, that the faithful instructer in virtue stands as high as the successful searcher after truth. He who lends one incitement to the cultivation of a single branch of knowledge, though that VOL. XXIII. 3D S. VOL. V. NO. II.

25

branch be as old as the creation, does as much good to society, as much honor to himself, as if he had been the author of any novel hypothesis, that has been framed since the time of Aristotle. If those who are most enthusiastic with regard to the progress of knowledge, would have their own dreams realized, they must learn to place a higher value upon humility as a philosophical virtue. There are mysteries in nature, which human power cannot penetrate; there are problems which the philosopher cannot solve. He may form theories, but his theories will be mere dreams the futile attempts of human intellect to scan the designs of that Being, "whose judgments are unsearchable, and His ways past finding out." Even in that field of discovery, which is open to the philosopher, he must seek to gratify his thirst for further knowledge only by persevering labor and humble trust. That eager self-confidence, which would fain grasp at conclusions, without first examining the premises, which would reach the pinnacle without the previous toil of ascending the steps, must be restrained. Truth would lose its proper estimation, if it were a pearl that could be obtained without price. It can be purchased only by patient observation, by deep and thorough reflection. In the words of Bacon, "Homo, naturæ minister et interpres, tantum facit et intelligit, quantum de naturæ ordine re vel mente observaverit; nil amplius scit aut potest."

F. B.

ART. III. Transactions of the Annual Meetings of the Western Literary Institute and College of Professional Teachers, held in Cincinnati, October, 1834, 1835, 1836. Cincinnati Published by the Executive Committee. Three Volumes. 8vo. pp. 324, 263, and 269.

No class of men more need the good influences of association, than teachers. They need the mutual sympathy, they need the information, which such association imparts, and perhaps more than all, that professional spirit, that esprit de corps, so little prevalent among them, which seldom fails to give encouragement, dignity, and energy to those, whom it inspires. It is with great pleasure, therefore, that we have