might urge his suffering. If the universe was threatened with ruin, he could not suffer to save it, for his suffering would be interdicted by the fixed and unbending laws of his Being. And would not such incapacity to suffer, imply imperfection?" "Would reasoning pride scale the highest heavens, and standing at the entrance of the divine pavillion, proclaim in the hearing of astonished cherubim and seraphim, that Omnipotence lacks physical or moral ability to become the willing recipient of suffering prompted by its ineffable love, and sanctioned by its own unerring wisdom?"

This representation appears to me just as rational as if one should say, according to the commonly received opinion of the church, God can do no wrong. "If the universe were threatened with ruin," he cannot do wrong to save it; and would not such an incapacity to do wrong imply imperfection?

Omnipotence implies power to do any thing which is an object of power. But it is no denial of God's Omnipotence to say, that he cannot cease to be God; and consequently that he cannot disrobe himself of the essential attributes of his nature. He can no more cease to be Almighty, Omniscient and unchangeable, than he can annihilate his being. But if I mistake not, it has been shown that the theory which supposes him to be the subject of suffering, does virtually deny some of these essential attributes of his nature.

CHAPTER VII.

If Christ suffered in his divine nature, all the Persons of the Godhead must have suffered. This admitted by the reviewer in the Christian Review. This objection shown not to lie against the incarnation. Proof from scripture that God is infinitely blessed. 1 Tim. 1: 16; 1 Tim. 6: 15; Isa. 46: 10; Rev. 4: 11; Ps. 115: 3; Ps. 135: 6; Eph. 1: 11; Dan. 4: 5. Mr. G.'s opinion that God's blessedness is progressive, examined. Meaning of Heb. 12: 2: "Who for the joy that was set before him, endured the cross."

THAT Christ did not suffer in his divine nature, I argue in the second place, from the fact, that had he thus suffered, the other Persons of the Trinity must have suffered also. The Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, are one God. In what sense they are three, and at the same time one, we cannot comprehend. But that there must be a perfect harmony of views and feelings between the Persons of the Godhead, would seem to be too obvious to be questioned by any one. To each of the three Persons all the attributes of God are ascribed. They are equally Almighty, Omniscient, Omnipresent, unchangeable, and infinitely holy, just and good. Their views and feelings, must, of course, be in unison. The Omniscience of one, discerns every thing which is seen by the Omniscience of the others. All things present, past and future, are open to the view of each alike. And as their moral attributes are the same, every object of

contemplation must be viewed with the same interest by each. They must love the same things, and hate the same things, and rejoice in the same things. Those things which contribute to the happiness of one, must contribute to the happiness of all. Consequently if there is any thing which is suited to destroy the happiness of one, it is suited to destroy the happiness of all.

Our author himself says, "In that temple of the highest heavens, consecrated as the abode of the Godhead, each of its divine Persons enjoys blissful and untiring communion with his two other glorious selves. Into this holiest of temples, no discrepancy of views, no collision of sentiment, ever enters. To the most perfect unity of action, thought, and feeling, the infinite personages, who make it their dwelling place, are impelled by the elemental and immutable laws of their own being. Thus flow on, in high, and incommunicable blessedness, the successive and cloyless ages of the Triune God."

If this be so, how is it possible that suffering should ever invade "this holiest of temples" without affecting all the divine Persons alike ?

The plan of redemption was devised by infinite wisdom. All the Persons of the Godhead were equally employed in devising it, and are equally engaged in carrying it into execution; and they contemplate the glorious results with equal interest and joy. When this plan was devised, they all had a distinct view of every thing which would be necessary for its

accomplishment. The incarnation, and the whole scene of humiliation and suffering, were parts of the plan, contrived in the exercise of infinite wisdom and goodness, and contemplated with infinite satisfaction. Now is it possible that one of the divine Persons should have passed from a state of infinite blessedness to a state of infinite suffering, without affecting the happiness of the other two? What fearful sight filled the Second Person of the Trinity with dismay, and terror, and anguish, which was not equally open to the view of the other Persons of the Godhead?" "The anguish of Gethsemane," says our author, "was caused by some impending and appalling evil." He says also, "when the dismaying cup was just at hand, the resolution of the incarnate Deity, for a moment, seemed to falter." Where I ask, had the Omniscience of the Son of God slept that he had not seen this "impending and appalling evil" before? And where was the Omniscience of the Father and of the Holy Ghost, that they too did not see this "impending and appalling evil," and participate in the dismay of the Second Person of the Trinity? Is it conceivable that one of the Persons of the Godhead should be infinitely. wretched, and the others, at the same time, perfectly blessed?

The reviewer of our author in the Christin Review, who, as I have remarked, agrees with him in his main position, meets this objection by frankly admitting the fact. He says, "6 we cheerfully admit that there is a sense, not necessary either on scriptural or philosphical

grounds to be explained-for the fact is all we have to do with in which the Father participated in all the doings and sufferings of the Son. Was not the Father in the Son,' and were they not 'one,' to say nothing of essence, in the whole work of redemption? Is it not true, that he who had seen the Son, had seen the Father also? Was not the love of the Son, the love of the Father, and that too in a high and special sense? Did not the agony of the cross prove the infinite compassion, not only of Jesus, but of God? Is it not affirmed that in this was manifested the love of Godthat herein is love, not that we loved him, but that he loved us? Why moreover, should it be deemed a thing incredible that the Godhead, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, should have participated in the love and sorrow of the one great sacrifice for sin; that a mysterious sympathy profound as the depths of an infinite nature, should have thrilled the universe of being and thought, at the moment of the crucifixion? If the earth trembled, and the heavens grew black, if men and angels looked on with dismay, and the dead started from their graves, is it conceivable that the infinite Father, who was one with Jesus, as much as he was one with himself, could have been indifferent at that stupendous crisis? Nay, is it not most natural, most rational to conclude that his infinite heart felt every pang which pierced the Spirit of his only and well beloved Son, made an offering for sin ?"

How any one can avoid this conclusion, who maintains that Christ suffered in his divine nature, we certainly cannot see. But is there any evidence from the