just and justify sinners who believe in Christ. What more could we desire? Who can find it in his heart to wish that the Saviour should have endured one pang more than was necessary to accomplish the work for which he came into the world?

CHAPTER VI.

Direct arguments to prove that Christ suffered in his human nature only. Argument from the attributes of God, particularly his immutability and Omniscience. The transition from a state of blessedness to a state of suffering implies a change of views and of feelings. The question considered, whether the divine nature is capable of voluntary suffering. What is voluntary suffering?

Not the direct, but remote result of volition. The assertion of Mr. G. examined, that if the suffering of the divine nature implies mutability, the incarnation implies the same. The objection answered, that if God cannot voluntarily suffer, he is not Almighty.

I Now proceed to adduce direct proof in support of the commonly received doctrine.

That Christ did not suffer in his divine nature, I argue, in the first place, from the acknowledged attributes of God. That God is a Spirit, infinite, eternal, unchangeable, Omnipotent, Omniscient and Omnipresent, is made evident by the light of nature, explicitly and abundantly asserted in the scriptures, and universally admitted by evangelical Christians. The author of the work under review, does not, and will not deny, that these are essential attributes of the Deity. Nor will he deny that all these attributes are predicable of Christ in his divine nature.

The question now is, is the supposition that he suffered in his divine nature, consistent with these attributes? Take, for example, his immutability. If Christ as God is "the same yesterday, to-day, and for

ever," without the least "variableness or shadow of turning," can it be true, that he was at one time perfectly blessed, and at another, inconceivably wretched? Does the transition from a state of infinite blessedness, to a state of infinite suffering, imply no change? The very statement of this question, one would suppose, is sufficient to decide it. What is a transition from one state of mind to another, but a change in that mind? If my mind was filled with enmity and horror yesterday, while contemplating the perfections of God, and is filled with love and joy to-day, while contemplating the same objects, has there been no change in my mind?

If Christ suffered in his divine nature, his sufferings must have been entirely mental, and must, of course, have been produced by distressing views of certain objects. There must, of course, have been a change in his views, as well as in his feelings. It is grossly absurd to suppose that a person should pass from a state of infinite blessedness to a state of infinite suffering, and his views of every object be the same in both states. But to suppose a change in the views of the Deity, is to deny not only his immutability, but his Omniscience. What is Omniscience, if it is not a full and perfect knowledge of all things, present, past, and future?

It is admitted on all hands, that previous to the incarnation, Christ was perfectly and infinitely blessed. He was the Omniscient God, and of course, had a full and perfect view of every thing which was to transpire after his incarnation. The whole scene of his humilia

tion was distinctly before his mind, and up to the moment of his becoming incarnate, this view did not disturb his blessedness. Nay, as a part of his own glorious plan, which in infinite wisdom he had devised, he contemplated it with infinite satisfaction. And yet, we are given to understand, that in a little more than thirty years, his views were so changed, that what he had looked upon before, in the clear light of Omniscience, with infinite joy, filled him with such dismay, and agony, as was sufficient to make Omnipotence stand aghast. Can this be true? Can such a view be reconciled with the acknowledged perfections of God?

That involuntary, or coerced suffering, on the part of the Divine Being, would be inconsistent with his perfections, is admitted by Mr. G. He says, "It would be both irrational and irreverent, to imagine that the Omnipotent could be forced to suffer against his own volition. God's impassibility to coerced suffering, is a plain and palpable principle of natural religion, resulting from his attributes of infinite knowledge, infinite wisdom, and infinite power. But as we enter the sphere of voluntary suffering, the question assumes a new aspect."

What does Mr. G. mean when he speaks of the Deity as suffering voluntarily. Does he mean that suffering is the direct and immediate consequence of volition? If this could be supposed to be possible, I see not how it could be reconciled with God's immutability, any more than involuntary suffering. The mind that has passed from a state of perfect happiness,

to a state of inconceivable wretchedness, has certainly undergone a great change; whether it be voluntary or involuntary. If we could conceive it possible for God, by an act of choice, to cease for a time to be Ompipotent, or Omniscient, would it involve no change in his character? Between a state of infinite blessedness, and infinite suffering, there is an infinite difference, and the mind that has passed from the one state to the other, has experienced a momentous change, however it may have been effected, whether voluntarily or involuntarily. It cannot be said of such a mind, that it is without "variableness or shadow of turning."

But we never mean by voluntary suffering, that an individual has, by a bare act of volition, put himself out of a state of happiness into a state of suffering. We say that a person suffers voluntarily, when he freely consents to have suffering inflicted upon him; or when he voluntarily places himself in such circumstances. that he must necessarily suffer. In what sense Mr. G. supposes the sufferings of the Divine Being to be voluntary, he has not stated with sufficient clearness. Hence his reviewer, in the Christian Review, although he accords with him in his main position, makes the following remarks:

"It is true, all suffering, in itself considered, must be involuntary. That which leads to it may be chosen, but suffering itself is not a matter of volition. It is a result of circumstances, an effect of a previously existing cause. Like happiness, it has no independent existence, but flows from a certain order of things, or