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4. Secondly, when a part of any complex idea is predicated of
the whole. 5. As part of the definition of the term defined. 6. Instance, man and palfry. 7. For this teaches but the signification of words. 8. But no real knowledge. 9. General propositions, concerning substances, are often
trifling. 10. And why. 11. Thirdly, using words variously, is trifling with them. 12. Marks of verbal propositions. First, predication in abstract. 13. Secondly, a part of the definition, predicated of any term.
WLEDGE OF EXISTENCE.
1. General, certain propositions concern not existence.
OF THE EXISTENCE OF A GOD.
1. We are capable of knowing certainly that there is a God.
fore something eternal.
10. Incogitative being cannot produce a cogitative. 11, 12. Therefore there has been an eternal wisdom.
13. Whether material or no.
17. Whether in motion or at rest.
OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXISTENCE OF OTHER THINGS.
1. Is to be had only by sensation.
3. This, though not so certain as demonstration, yet may be
called knowledge, and proves the existence of things
without us. 4. First, because we cannot have them but by the inlets of
the senses. 5. Secondly, because an idea from actual sensation, and an
other from memory, are very distinct perceptions. 6. Thirdly, pleasure or pain, which accompanies actual sensa
tion, accompanies not the returning of those ideas, with
out the external objects. 7. Fourthly, our senses assist one another's testimony, of the
existence of outward things. 8. This certainty is as great as our condition needs. 9. But reaches no farther than actual sensation. 10. Folly to expect demonstration in every thing. 11. Past existence is known by memory. 12. The existence of spirits not knowable. 13. Particular propositions concerning existence, are knowable. 14. And general propositions concerning abstract ideas.
OF THE IMPROVEMENT OF OUR KNOWLEDGE.
1. Knowledge is not from maxims.
our abstract ideas.
perience. 10. This may procure us convenience, not science. 11. We are fitted for moral knowledge, and natural improve
ments. 12. But must beware of hypotheses and wrong principles. 13. The true use of hypotheses. 14. Clear and distinct ideas, with settled names, and the find
ing of those, which show their agreement or disagreement,
are the ways to enlarge our knowledge. 15. Mathematics an instance of it.
SOME OTHER CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING OUR KNOWLEDGE. SECT.
1. Our knowledge partly necessary, partly voluntary.
2. The application voluntary; but we know as things are, not
as we please.
1. Our knowledge being short, we want something else.
OF PROBABILITY. SECT. 1. Probability is the appearance of agreement, upon fallible
proofs. 2. It is to supply the want of knowledge. 3. Being that, which makes us presume things to be true,
before we know thein to be so. 4. The grounds of probability are two; conformity with our
own experience, or the testimony of others' experience. 5. In this all the arguments, pro and con, ought to be examined,
before we come to a judgment.
OF THE DEGREES OF ASSENT.
SECT. 1. Our assent ought to be regulated by the grounds of pro
bability 2. These cannot be always actually in view, and then we must
content ourselves with the remembrance, that we once
saw ground for such a degree of assent. 3. The ill consequence of this, if our former judgment were
not rightly made. 4. The right use of it, is mutual charity and forbearance. 5. Probability is either of matter of fact or speculation. 6. The concurrent experience of all other men with ours
produces assurance approaching to knowledge. 7. Unquestionable testimony and experience for the most part
produce confidence. 8. Fair testimony, and the nature of the thing indifferent, pro
duces also confident belief. 9. Experience and testimony clashing, infinitely vary the de
grees of probability,
10. Traditional testimonies, the farther removed, the less their
proof. 11. Yet history is of great use. 12. In things, which sense cannot discover, analogy is the
great rule of probability. 13. One case, where contrary experience lessens not the testi
mony. 14. The bare testimony of revelation is the highest certainty.
1. Various significations of the word reason.
judgment upon probable reasoning,
OF FAITH AND REASON, AND THEIR DISTINCT PROVINCES.
1. Necessary to know their boundaries,
knowable also by reason, but not with the same certainty
5. Revelation cannot be admitted, against the clear evidence
of reason. 6, Traditional revelation much less. 7. Things above reason. 8. Or not contrary to reason, if revealed, are matter of faith. 9. Revelation in matters where reason cannot judge, or but
probably, ought to be hearkened to. 10. In matters, where reason can afford certain knowledge,
that is to be hearkened to. 11. If the boundaries be not set between faith and reason, no
enthusiasm, or extravagancy in religion, can be contradicted.
1. Love of truth necessary.
5. Rise of enthusiasm. 6, 7. Enthusiasm. 8, 9. Enthusiasm mistaken for seeing and feeling. 10. Enthusiasm, how to be discovered. 11. Enthusiasm fails of evilence, that the proposition is from
14. Revelation must be judged of by reason. 15, 16. Belief, no proof of revelation.
OF WRONG ASSENT, OR ERROR.
1. Causes of error.
7. Fourthly, wrong measures of probability; whereof, 8-10. First, đoubtful propositions, taken from principles.
11, Secondly, received hypotheses.