صور الصفحة
PDF
النشر الإلكتروني

LONDON: PRINTED BY THOMAS DAVISON, WHITEFRIARS,

[merged small][ocr errors][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small]

OF TRUTH IN GENERAL.
SECT.

1. What truth is.
2. A right joining or separating of signs; i. e. ideas or words.
3. Which make mental or verbal propositions.
4. Mental propositions are very hard to be treated of.
5. Being nothing but joining or separating ideas, without

words.
6. When mental propositions contain real truth, and when

verbal.
7. Objection against verbal truth, that thus it may be all

chimerical.
8. Answered, real truth is about ideas agreeing to things.
9. Falsehood is the joining of names, otherwise than their
ideas

agree.
10. General propositions to be treated of more at large.
11. Moral and metaphysical truth.

CHAPTER VI.

OF UNIVERSAL PROPOSITIONS, THEIR TRUTH AND CERTAINTY.
SECT.

1. Treating of words, necessary to knowledge.
2. General truths hardly to be understood, but in verbal pro-

positions.
3. Certainty two-fold, of truth, and of knowledge.
4. No proposition can be known to be true, where the essence

of each species mentioned is not known.
5. This more particularly concerns substances.
6. The truth of few universal propositions concerning sub-

stances is to be known.

[ocr errors]

7. Because co-existence of ideas in few cases is to be known. 8, 9. Instance in gold. 10. As far as any such co-existence can be known, so far

universal propositions may be certain. But this will go

but a little way, because, 11, 12. The qualities, which make our complex ideas of substances,

depend mostly on external, remote, and unperceived

causes.

13. Judgment may reach farther, but that is not knowledge.
14. What is requisite for our knowledge of substances.
15. Whilst our ideas of substances contain not their real con-

stitutions, we can make but few general, certain pro

positions concerning them.
16. Wherein lies the general certainty of propositions.

CHAPTER VII.

OF MAXIMS. SECT.

They are self-evident. 2. Wherein that self-evidence consists. 3. Self-evidence not peculiar to received axioms. 4. First, as to identity and diversity, all propositions are

equally self-evident. 5. Secondly, in co-existence, we have few self-evident pro

positions. 6. Thirdly, in other relations we may have. 7. Fourthly, concerning real existence, we have none. 8. These axioms do not much influence our other knowledge. 9. Because they are not the truths the first known. 10. Because on them the other parts of our knowledge do not

depend.
11. What use these general maxims have.
12. Maxims, if care be not taken in the use of words, may

prove contradictions,
13. Instance in vacuum.
14. They prove not the existence of things without us.

15. Their application dangerous about coinplex ideas. 16-18. Instance in man. 19. Little use of these maxims, in proofs, where we have clear

and distinct ideas.
20. Their use dangerous, where our ideas are confused.

CHAPTER VIII.

OF TRIFLING PROPOSITIONS. SECT.

1. Some propositions bring no increase to our knowledge. 2, 3. As, first, identical propositions.

« السابقةمتابعة »