Infallible judge of controversies, i. 66, § 12.
Inference, what, iii. 94, 95, § 2, 3, 4. Infinite, why the idea of infinite not applicable to other ideas as well as those of quantity, since they can be as often repeated, i. 211, § 6. The idea of infinity of space, or number, and of space, or number infinite, must be di- stinguished, i. 212, § 7. Our idea of infinite very ob- scure, i. 213, § 8. Number furnishes us with the clearest ideas of infinite, i. 214, § 9.
The idea of infinite, a growing
idea, i. 216, § 12. Our idea of infinite, partly positive, partly compara- tive, partly negative, i. 217, 218, § 15.
Why some men think they have an idea of infinite duration, but not of infinite space, i. 221, 222, § 20. Why disputes about infinite are usually perplexed, i. 223, § 21.
Our idea of infinity has its original in sensation and reflection, i. 224, § 22. We have no positive idea of infinite, i. 216, 217, § 13, 14: i. 219, § 16. Infinity, why more commonly allowed to duration than to expansion, i. 194, § 4. How applied to God by us, i. 208, § 1.
How we get this idea, i. 209, § 2, 3.
The infinity of number, dura- tion, and space, different ways considered, i. 200, 201, § 10, 11.
Innate truths must be the first known, i. 31, § 26.
Principles to no purpose, if men can be ignorant or doubtful of them, i. 46, § 13. Principles of my lord Herbert examined, i. 47, 48, § 15, &c.
Moral rules to no purpose, if effaceable, or alterable, i. 51, § 20.
Propositions must be di- stinguished from others by their clearness and useful- ness, i. 75, 76, § 21. The doctrine of innate prin- ciples of ill consequence, i. 79, § 24.
Instant, what, i, 178, 179, § 10. And continual change, i. 180. § 13, 14, 15.
Intuitive knowledge, ii. 319, § 1. Our highest certainty, iii. 131, § 14. Invention, wherein it consists, i. 141, § 8. Joy, i. 233, § 7.
Iron, of what advantage to man- kind, iii. 87, § 11. Judgment, wrong judgments, in reference to good and evil, i. 276, § 58.
Right judgment, ii. 270, § 4. One cause of wrong judgment, iii. 102, § 3.
Wherein it consists, iii. 94, &c.
Knowledge has a great con- nexion with words, ii. 285, '§ 25. The author's definition of it explained and defended, ii. 314, note. How it differs from faith, iii. 97, § 2, 3: ii. 316, note. What, ii. 308, § 2.
How much our knowledge de- pends on our senses, ii. 302, § 23.
Actual, ii. 316, § 8. Habitual, ibid. § 8. Habitual, twofold, ii. 317, § 9. Intuitive, ii. 319, § 1. Intuitive, the clearest, ii. 320, § 1.
Intuitive, irresistible, ibid. Demonstrative, ii. 321, § 2. Of general truths, is all either intuitive or demonstrative, ii. 327, § 14.
Of particular existences, is sensitive, ibid.
Clear ideas do not always pro- duce clear knowledge, ii. 328, § 15.
What kind of knowledge we
have of nature, ii. 16, § 12. Its beginning and progress, i. 152, § 15, 16, 17: i. 21, 22, § 15, 16.
Given us, in the faculties to
attain it, i. 67, 68, § 12. Men's knowledge according to the employment of their fa- culties, i. 76, § 22. To be got only by the applica- tion of our own thought to the contemplation of things, i. 78, § 23.
Extent of human knowledge, ii. 329.
Our knowledge goes not be- yond our ideas, ibid. § 1. Nor beyond the perception of their agreement or disagree- ment, ibid. § 2.
Reaches not to all our ideas, ibid. § 3.
Much less to the reality of things, ii. 330, § 6.
Yet very improveable if right ways were taken, ibid. § 6. Of co-existence very narrow, ii. 362, 363, § 9, 10, 11. And therefore, of substances very narrow, ii. 364, &c. § 14, 15, 16.
Of other relations indetermina- ble, ii. 368, § 18. Of existence, ii. 372, § 21. Certain and universal, where to be had, ii. 380, § 29. Ill use of words, a great hin- derance of knowledge, ii. 381, § 30.
General, where to be got, ii. 383, § 31.
Lies only in our thoughts, iii. 18, § 13.
Reality of our knowledge, ii. 384.
Of mathematical truths, how real, ii. 387, § 6. Of morality, real, ii. 387, § 7. Of substances, how far real, ii. 391, § 12.
What makes our knowledge real, ii. 385, § 3: ii. 388, § 8. Considering things, and not names, the way to know- ledge, ii. 392, § 13.
Of substances, wherein it con- sists, ii. 390, § 11. What required to any tolerable knowledge of substances, iii. 19, § 14. Self-evident, iii. 22, § 2. Of identity, and diversity, as large as our ideas, ii. 362, § 8 iii. 23, § 4. Wherein it consists, ibid. Of co-existence, very scanty, iii. 25, § 5.
Of relations of modes, not so scanty, iii. 26, § 6.
Of real existence none, ibid. § 7.
Begins in particulars, ibid. § 9. Intuitive of our own existence, iii. 54, § 3.
Demonstrative of a God, iii. 55, § 1.
Improvement of knowledge, iii. 78.
Not improved by maxims, iii. 78, § 1.
Why so thought, iii. 79, § 2. Knowledge improved, only by perfecting and comparing ideas, iii. 82, § 6: iii. 89, § 14.
And finding their relations, iii. 83, § 7.
By intermediate ideas, iii. 89, § 14.
In substances, how to be im- proved, iii. 84, § 9. Partly necessary, partly vo- luntary, iii. 91, § 1: iii. 92, § 2.
Why some, and so little, ibid. § 2.
How increased, iii. 105, § 6.
Language, why it changes, i. 298, § 7.
Wherein it consists, ii. 158, § 1, 2, 3.
Its use, ii. 199, § 7.
Its imperfections, ii. 250, § 1. Double use, ibid.
The use of language destroyed by the subtilty of disput- ing, ii. 271,272, § 6, 7, 8. Ends of language, ii. 284, § 23.
Its imperfections, not easy to be cured, ii. 289, § 2: ii. 290, 291, § 4, 5, 6. The cure of them necessary to philosophy, ii. 290, § 3. To use no word without a clear and distinct idea an- nexed to it, is one remedy of the imperfections of lan- guage, ii. 293, 294, § 8, 9. Propriety in the use of words, another remedy, ii. 295, §
Law of nature generally allowed, i. 38, § 6.
There is, though not innate, i. 45, § 13.
Its inforcement, ii. 97, § 6. Learning, the ill state of learn- ing in these latter ages, ii. 250, &c.
Of the schools lies chiefly in the abuse of words, ii. 256 &c. ii. 271.
Such learning of ill conse- quence, ii. 273, § 10, &c. Liberty, what, i. 240-243, § 8,
9, 10, 11, 12 : i. 244, § 15. Belongs not to the will, i, 243, § 14.
To be determined by the re- sult of our own deliberation, is no restraint of liberty, i. 268, § 48, 49, 50. Founded in a power of sus- pending our particular de- sires, i. 267, § 47: i. 270, 271, § 51, 52. Light, its absurd definitions, ii. 189, § 10.
Light in the mind, what, iii. 155, § 13.
Logic has introduced obscurity into languages, ii. 271, 272, § 6, 7.
And hindered knowledge, ii. 272, § 7. Love, i. 232, § 4.
Madness, i. 150, § 13. Oppo- sition to reason deserves that name, ii. 149, § 4. Magisterial, the most knowing are least magisterial, iii. 104, § 4.
Making, ii. 43, § 2. Man not the product of blind chance, iii. 56, § 6.
The essence of man is placed
in his shape, ii. 395, § 16. We know not his real essence, ii. 208, § 3: ii. 221, § 22: ii. 226, § 27. The boundaries of the human species not determined, ii. 226, § 27.
What makes the same indi- vidual man, ii. 64, § 21: ii. 71, § 29.
The same man may be different persons, ii. 63, § 19. Mathematics, their methods, iii. 83, § 7. Improvement, iii. 90, § 15. Matter incomprehensible, both in its cohesion and divisi- bility, ii. 23, § 23 ii. 29, 30, § 30, 31. What, ii. 276, § 15. Whether it may think, is not to be known, ii. 331. 358, 359, § 6 ii. 341, : &c. Cannot produce motion, or any thing else, iii. 60, § 10. And motion cannot produce thought, ibid.
Not eternal, iii. 65, § 18. Maxims, iii. 22, &c.: iii. 37, § 12, 13, 14, 15.
Not alone self-evident, iii. 22, § 3.
Are not the truths first known, iii. 26, § 9.
Not the foundation of our knowledge, iii. 28, § 10. Wherein their evidence con- sists, iii. 29, § 10. Their use, iii. 30-37, §11,12: Why the most general self-
evident propositions alone, pass for maxims, iii. 37, §
11. Are commonly proofs, only where there is no need of proofs, iii. 39, § 15.
Of little use, with clear terms,
Of dangerous use, with doubt-
Neither their terms nor ideas innate, i. 27, 28, § 23. Least known to children and illiterate people, i. 31, 32, $ 27. Memory, i. 137, § 2. Attention, pleasure, and pain, settle ideas in the memory, i. 138, § 3.
And repetition, ibid. § 4: i. 140, § 6.
Difference of memory, i. 138, 139, § 4, 5.
In remembrance, the mind sometimes active, some- times passive, i. 140, § 7. Its necessity, i. 139, § 5: i. 141, § 8.
Defects, i. 141, 142, § 8, 9. In brutes, i. 142, 143, § 10. Metaphysics and school divinity filled with uninstructive pro- positions, iii. 51, § 9. Method used in mathematics, iii. 83, § 7.
Mind, the quickness of its ac- tions, i. 134, § 10. Minutes, hours, days, not ne- cessary to duration, i. 186, § 23. Miracles, the ground of assent to miracles, iii. 112, § 13. Misery, what, i. 262, § 42. Modes, mixed, i. 293, § 1.
Made by the mind, i. 294, § 2. Sometimes got by the explica- tion of their names, i. 295,
Whence a mixed mode has its
unity, i. 295, § 4. Occasion of mixed modes, i. 296, § 5.
Mixed modes, their ideas, how got, i. 298, § 9. Modes simple and complex, i. 155, § 5.
Simple modes, i. 157, § 1. Of motion, i. 225, § 2. Moral good and evil, what, ii. 97, § 5.
Three rules, whereby men judge of moral rectitude, ii. 98,7.
Beings, how founded on simple ideas of sensation and re- flection, ii. 104-106, § 14, 15.
Rules not self-evident, i. 37, § 4. Variety of opinions, concern-
ing moral rules, whence, i. 37, 38, § 5, 6. Rules, if innate, cannot with public allowance be trans- gressed, i. 42, &c. § 11, 12, 13.
Morality, capable of demonstra- tion, ii. 368, § 18 : iii. 84, § 8. The proper study of mankind, iii. 87, § 11.
Of actions, in their confor- mity to a rule, ii. 106, § 15.
Mistakes in moral notions, owing to names, ibid. § 16. Discourses in morality, if not clear, it is the fault of the speaker, ii. 299, § 17. Hinderances of demonstrative treating of morality. 1. Want of marks. 2. Com- plexedness, ii. 369, § 19. 3. Interest, ii. 371,372, § 20. Change of names in morality, changes not the nature of things, ii. 389, § 9. And mechanism, hard to be reconciled, i. 47, § 14.
Secured amidst men's wrong judgments, i. 286, 287, § 70. Motion, slow or very swift, why not perceived, i. 178, 179, § 7, 8, 9, 10, 11. Voluntary, inexplicable, iii. 67, § 19.
Its absurd definitions, ii. 188, § 8, 9.
Naming of ideas, i. 148, § 8. Names moral, established by law, are not to be varied from, ii. 390, § 10. Of substances, standing for real essences, are not ca- pable to convey certainty to the understanding, iii. 10, § 5. Standing for nominal essences, will make some, though not many certain propositions, iii. 11, § 6.
Why men substitute names for real essences, which they know not, ii. 280, § 19. Two false suppositions, in such an use of names, ii. 281, 282, § 21.
A particular name to every particular thing impossible, ii. 166, § 2.
And useless, ii. 167, § 3. Proper names, where used, ii. 167, § 4, 5.
Specific names are affixed to the nominal essence, ii. 182, § 16.
Of simple ideas and substances,
refer to things, ii. 186, § 2. What names stand for both
real and nominal essence, ii. 186, § 3.
Of simple ideas not capable of definitions, ibid. § 4. Why, ii. 187, § 7.
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