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we receive upon inducements of probabi- fact or spelity are of two sorts ; either concerning culation. some particular existence, or, as it is usually termed, matter of fact, which falling under observation, is capable of human testimony; or else concerning things which, being beyond the discovery of our senses, are not capable of any such testimony. $ 6. Concerning the first of these, viz.
The concurparticular matter of fact.
First, where any particular thing, con- rience of all sonant to the constant observation of our
other men selves and others in the like case, comes
produces asattested by the concurrent reports of all
surance apthat mention it, we receive it as easily, and proaching
to knowbuild as firmly upon it, as if it were certain knowledge; and we reason and act
ledge. thereupon with as little doubt as if it were perfect demonstration. Thus, if all Englishmen, who have occasion to mention it, should affirm that it froze in England the last winter, or that there were swallows seen there in the summer; I think a man could almost as little doubt of it as that seven and four are eleven. The first, therefore, and highest degree of probability is, when the general consent of all men, in all ages, as far as it can be known, concurs with a man's constant and never-failing experience in like cases, to. confirm the truth of any particular matter of fact attested by fair witnesses : such are all the stated constitutions and properties of bodies, and the regular proceedings of causes and effects in the ordinary course of nature. This we call an argument from the nature of things themselves. For what our own and other men's constant observation has found always to be after the same manner, that we with reason conclude to be the effect of steady and regular causes, though they come not within the reach of our knowledge. Thus, that fire warmed a man, made lead fluid, and changed the colour or consistency in wood or charcoal; that iron sunk in water, and swam in quicksilver : these
and the like propositions about particular facts, being agreeable to our constant experience, as often as we have to do with these matters,—and being generally spoke of (when mentioned by others) as things found constantly to be so, and therefore not so much as controverted by any body,—we are put past doubt, that a relation affirming any such thing to have been, or any predication that it will happen again in the same manner, is very true. These probabilities rise so near to certainty, that they govern our thoughts as absolutely, and influence all our actions as fully, as the most evident demonstration; and, in what concerns us, we make little or no difference between them and certain knowledge. Our belief, thus grounded, rises to assurance.
§ 7. Secondly, the next degree of Unquestion
bability is, when I find by my own expe
rience, and the agreement of all others that experience mention it, a thing to be, for the most for the most
part, so; and that the particular instance part produce con
of it is attested by many and undoubted fidence. witnesses, v. g. history giving us such an
account of men in all ages, and my own experience, as far as I had an opportunity to observe, confirming it, that most men prefer their private advantage to the public; if all historians that write of Tiberius say that Tiberius did so, it is extremely probable. And in this case our assent has a sufficient foundation to raise itself to a degree which we may call confidence.
$ 8. Thirdly, in things that happen inFair testi
differently, as that a bird should fly this mony, and
or that way; that it should thunder on a the nature of the thing
man's right or left hand, &c. when any indifferent, particular matter of fact is vouched by the produce also
concurrent testimony of unsuspected witconfident belief.
nesses, there our assent is also unavoidable. Thus, that there is such a city in Italy as Rome; that, about one thousand
seven hundred years ago, there lived in it a man called Julius Cæsar; that he was a general, and that he won a battle against another, called Pompey: this, though in the nature of the thing there be nothing for nor against it, yet being related by historians of credit, and contradicted by no one writer, a man cannot avoid believing it, and can as little doubt of it as he does of the being and actions of his own acquaintance, whereof he himself is a witness.
§ 9. Thus far the matter goes easy enough. Probability upon such grounds
Experiences carries so much evidence with it, that it timonies naturally determines the judgment, and clashing inleaves us as little liberty to believe or dis- finitely vary
the degrees believe, as a demonstration does whether
of probabiwe will know or be ignorant. The diffi
lity. culty is, when testimonies contradict common experience, and the reports of history and witnesses clash with the ordinary course of nature, or with one another; there it is where diligence, attention, and exactness are required, to form a right judgment, and to proportion the assent to the different evidence and probability of the thing; which rises and falls according as those two foundations of credibility, viz. common observation in like cases, and particular testimonies in that particular instance, favour or contradict it. These are liable to so great variety of contrary observations, circumstances, reports, different qualifications, tempers, designs, oversights, &c. of the reporters, that it is impossible to reduce to precise rules the various degrees wherein men give their assent. This only may be said in general, that as the arguments and proofs pro and con, upon due examination, nicely weighing every particular circumstance, shall to any one appear, upon the whole matter, in a greater or less degree to preponderate on either side; so they are fitted to produce in the mind such different entertainment as we
call belief, conjecture, guess, doubt, wavering, distrust, disbelief, &c. Traditional
§ 10. This is what concerns assent in testimonies,
matters wherein testimony is made use of: the farther concerning which, I think, it may not be removed, amiss to take notice of a rule observed in the less their proof.
the law of England; which is, that though
the attested copy of a record be good proof, yet the copy of a copy ever so well attested, and by ever so credible witnesses, will not be admitted as a proof in judicature. This is so generally approved as reasonable, and suited to the wisdom and caution to be used in our inquiry after material truths, that I never yet heard of any one that blamed it. This practice, if it be allowable in the decisions of right and wrong, carries this observation along with it, viz. that any testimony, the farther off it is from the original truth, the less force and proof it has. The being and existence of the thing itself is what I call the original truth. A credible man vouching his knowledge of it is a good proof: but if another equally credible do witness it from his report, the testimony is weaker; and a third that attests the hearsay of an hearsay, is yet less considerable. So that, in traditional truths, each remove weakens the force of the proof: and the more hands the tradition has successively passed through, the less strength and evidence does it receive from them. This I thought necessary to be taken notice of, because I find amongst some men the quite contrary commonly practised, who look on opinions to gain force by growing older; and what a thousand years since would not, to a rational man, contemporary with the first voucher, have appeared at all probable, is now urged as certain beyond all question, only because several have since, from him, said it one after another. Upon this ground, propositions, evidently false or doubtful enough in their first beginning, come, by an inverted rule of pro
is of great
bability, to pass for authentic truths; and those which found or deserved little credit from the mouths of their first authors are thought to grow venerable by age, and are urged as undeniable.
§ 11. I would not be thought here to lessen the credit and use of history : it is
Yet history all the light we have in many cases, and we receive from it a great part of the useful truths we have, with a convincing evidence. I think nothing more valuable than the records of antiquity : I wish we had more of them, and more uncorrupted. But this truth itself forces me to say, that no probability can arise higher than its first original. What has no other evidence than the single testimony of one only witness, must stand or fall by his only testimony, whether good, bad, or indifferent'; and though cited afterwards by hundreds of others, one after another, is so far from receiving any strength thereby, that it is only the weaker. Passion, interest, inadvertency, mistake of his meaning, and a thousand odd reasons, or capricios, men's minds are acted by (impossible to be discovered) may make one man quote another man's words or meaning wrong. He that has but ever so little examined the citations of writers cannot doubt how little credit the quotations deserve, where the originals are wanting; and consequently how much less quotations of quotations can be relied on. This is certain, that what in one age was affirmed upon slight grounds, can never after come to be more valid in future ages by being often repeated. But the farther still it is from the original, the less valid it is, and has always less force in the mouth or writing of him that last made use of it than in his from whom he received it.
$ 12. The probabilities we have hitherto mentioned are only such as concern matter
which sense of fact, and such things as are capable of cannot disobservation and testimony. There re