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agree or disagree with it, so is any proposition in itself more or less probable. There is another, I confess, which, though by itself it be no true ground of probability, yet is often made use of for one, by which men most commonly regulate their assent, and upon which they pin their faith more than any thing else, and that is the opinion of others: though there cannot be a more dangerous thing to rely on, nor more likely to mislead one; since there is much more falsehood and error among men than truth and knowledge. And if the opinions and persuasions of others, whom we know and think well of, be a ground of assent, men have reason to be Heathens in Japan, Mahometans in Turkey, Papists in Spain, Protestants in England, and Lutherans in Sweden. But of this wrong ground of assent I shall have occasion to speak more at large in another place.
Of the Degrees of Assent.
§ 1. The grounds of probability we Our assent
have laid down in the foregoing chapter ; 'ought to be regulated by as they are the foundations on which our the grounds assent is built, so are they also the meaof proba- sure whereby its several degrees are or bility.
ought to be regulated': only we are to take notice, that whatever grounds of probability there may be, they yet operate no farther on the mind, which searches after truth, and endeavours to judge right, than they appear ; at least, in the first judgment or search that the mind makes. I confess, in the opinions men have, and firmly stick to, in the world, their assent is not always from an actual view of the reasons that at first prevailed with them; it being in many cases almost impossible, and in most very hard,
even for those who have very admirable memories, to retain all the proofs which, upon a due examination, made them embrace that side of the question. It . suffices that they have once with care and fairness , sifted the matter as far as they could, and that they have searched into all the particulars that they could imagine to give any light to the question, and with the best of their skill cast up the account upon the whole evidence; and thus having once found on which side the probability appeared to them, after as full and exact an inquiry as they can make, they lay up the conclusion in their memories as a truth they have discovered ; and for the future they remain satisfied with the testimony of their memories, that this is the opinion that, by the proofs they have once seen of it, deserves such a degree of their assent as they afford it.
§ 2. This is all that the greatest part These canof men are capable of doing, in regulating not always their opinions and judgments; unless a be actually man will exact of them either to retain in view, and distinctly in their memories all the proofs then we concerning any probable truth, and that too in the same order and regular deduc- selves with tion of consequences in which they have
brance that formerly placed or seen them, which sometimes is enough to fill a large volume
ground for on one single question; or else they must such a de require a man, for every opinion that he gree of embraces, every day to examine the proofs assent. -both which are impossible. It is unavoidable therefore that the memory be relied on in the case, and that men be persuaded of several opinions, whereof the proofs are not actually in their thoughts ; nay, which perhaps they are not able actually to recal. Without this the greatest part of men must be either very sceptics, or change every moment, and yield themselves up to whoever, having lately studied the question, offers
must content our
we once saw
hich a che mit
s are i
them arguments, which, for want of memory, they are not able presently to answer.
$ 3. I cannot but own, that men's stickThe ill consequence of ing to their past judgment, and adhering this, if our firmly to conclusions formerly made, is formerjudg- often the cause of great obstinacy in error
and mistake. But the fault is not that they not rightly made.
rely on their memories for what they have
before well judged, but because they judged before they had well examined. May we not find a great number (not to say the greatest part) of men that think they have formed right judgments of several matters, and that for no other reason but because they never thought otherwise? who imagine themselves to have judged right only because they never questioned, never examined their own opinions? Which is indeed to think they judged right because they never judged at all : and yet these of all men hold their opinions with the greatest stiffness ; those being generally the most fierce and firm in their tenets who have least examined them. What we once know, we are certain is so; and we may be secure that there are no latent proofs undiscovered, which may overturn our knowledge or bring it in doubt. But, in matters of probability, it is not in every case we can be sure that we have all the particulars before us that any way concern the question; and that there is no evidence behind, and yet unseen, which may cast the probability on the other side, and outweigh all that at present seems to preponderate with us. Who almost is there that hath the leisure, patience, and means, to collect together all the proofs concerning most of the opinions he has, so as safely to conclude that he hath a clear and full view, and that there is no more to be alleged for his better information! And yet we are forced to determine ourselves on the one side or other. The conduct of our lives, and the management of our great concerns, will not bear de
lay: for those depend, for the most part, on the determination of our judgment in points wherein we. are not capable of certain and demonstrative know-, ledge, and wherein it is necessary for us to embrace the one side or the other.
$ 4. Since therefore it is unavoidable to the greatest part of men, if not all, to have
use of it, is several opinions without certain and in- mutual chadubitable proofs of their truth - and it rity and for
bearance, carries too great an imputation of ignorance, lightness, or folly, for men to quit and renounce their former tenets presently upon the offer of an argument which they cannot immediately answer, and show the insufficiency of,,it would methinks become all men to maintain peace, and the common offices of humanity and friendship, in the diversity of opinions; since we cannot reasonably expect that any one should readily and obsequiously quit his own opinion, and embrace ours with a blind resignation to an authority which the understanding of man acknowledges not. For however it may often mistake, it can own no other guide but reason, nor blindly submit to the will and dictates of another. If he, you would bring over to your sentiments, be one that examines before he assents, you must give him leave at his leisure to go over the account again, and, recalling what is out of his mind, examine all the particulars, to see on which side the advantage lies : and if he will not think our arguments of weight enough to engage him anew in so much pains, it is but what we often do ourselves in the like case; and we should take it amiss if others should prescribe to us what points we should study. And if he be one who takes his opinions upon trust, how can we imagine that he should renounce those tenets which time and custom have so settled in his mind, that he thinks them self-evident, and of an unquestionable certainty; or which he takes to be impressions he has received from God himself, or from men sent by him? How can we expect, I say,
ast pu, 4.
no cn ziens
in dous Terya
maria Teighi 18.7
ICETTE onclui therei natin
that opinions' thus settled should be given up to the
$ 5. But to return to the grounds of is either of assent, and the several degrees of it; we matter of
are to take notice, that the propositions