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demand than what I have in his agony and bloody sweat, his cross and passion? Mystery still there may be on a thousand questions pertaining to the Divine administration; and a thousand questions I might wish to ask even about this work, but the main inquiry is answered. I am assured there that God loved the world. I am assured that my Redeemer died, that God might show his willingness to pardon. I am assured that he tasted death for every man. I am assured that whosoever will may take the water of life freely. The agitations of my soul die away; my mind settles down into peace; my fears subside; I can look calmly up to God, calmly to the grave, calmly to the eternal future ;-for the great question in which I feel more interest than in all others is answered-whether I, a sinner, may hope in the mercy of my God!

SERMON XVII.

THE ATONEMENT AS IT REMOVES THE OBSTACLES IN THE WAY OF PARDON.

COL. i. 20.-"Having made peace through the blood of his cross.'

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In the last discourse I entered on the consideration of the atonement as an arrangement, under the Divine administration, for giving to a mind troubled with the consciousness of guilt a sound and permanent peace. I stated that the atonement is a device in the Divine government by which God designs to evince the benevolence of his nature in the pardon of the guilty, while at the same time he manifests a due regard to law, to truth, and to justice. The atonement, as then remarked, is founded primarily on the benevolence, and not on the justice of God; or it is a way by which benevolence can be manifested without impairing or endangering the interests of justice. As viewed by one who is condemned by his own conscience, and by the law of God, by one who feels that he is exposed to the Divine displeasure, and who is conscious of the need of pardon, which is the true point of view from which to contemplate the sacrifice made by the Lord Jesus Christ, the atonement has two aspects:-one, as it shows a sinner that God is willing to pardon; the other, as it removes the obstacles in the way of pardon.

The former of these points was then considered. I showed, (1,) that it is the expression of mere benevolence-guilty man having no claim to any such interposition; (2,) that it is the highest proof of benevolence which God could furnish; and, (3,) that it is benevolence shown to the whole race, and that, therefore, any and every sinner is free to avail himself of all the benefits of it. I proceed now to consider the atonement in the other aspect mentioned, as removing the obstacles to pardon. It is important to our purpose to keep in remembrance this point, that we are considering the case of a sinner conscious of guilt and danger, and inquiring whether he may be pardoned and saved. Such a man wishes the assurance that he may be forgiven; he desires to understand how it is that the atonement avails to secure his pardon. He wishes to know that God is willing to forgive; he

wishes to see how it is consistent for a God of truth and justice to do it. The former inquiry is answered by the fact of the gift of a Saviour, and by the Divine invitations; the latter is the point that now presents itself for our consideration.

In this inquiry there are two points:-I. What are the hindrances to the pardon of a sinner? and, II. How does the atonement remove those hindrances, and give peace to the mind of the guilty?

I. The first inquiry is, What are the hindrances to the pardon of a sinner?

I have already, in the former discourses, said enough to show you that those hindrances, whatever they may be, do not consist of any unwillingness on the part of God to pardon the guilty; and that, whatever may be the effect of an atonement, it is not intended to change God; or to make him a different Being from what he was before; or to buy him over to mercy; or to make a Being-before stern, inexorable, and unforgiving— mild, gentle, merciful, and kind. If any such ideas were involved in the atonement, I do not see how it would be possible for the human mind. to embrace it.

Laying all such ideas out of view in contemplating the atonement, I will proceed, in as plain and simple a manner as is possible, to state what are the real hindrances to the pardon of a sinner.

They are such as arise from the nature of moral government, and are found under all forms of administration. In all governments there are great difficulties in regard to pardon, and more embarrassment is felt in adjusting it aright, than perhaps on any other subject. It is supposed, indeed, in all governments but those of tyrants, that there would be cases where pardon would be desirable; where the law, if suffered to take its course, would seem to be severe; where the real welfare of the community would be promoted, as well as the promptings of humanity obeyed, by extending forgiveness to the guilty; and where it would be desirable to leave a discretionary power on this subject to the executive officer of the government-to the sovereign power whose law has been violated. But it has never been found practicable to adjust this satisfactorily under any human administration, or to free the subject from difficulties.

The difficulties in the case—and in stating these, I am stating what exist under all forms of government, parental, civil, and Divine-are such as I will now refer to. (1.) One is, where pardon is never exercised; where it is a settled and unchanging maxim of the law, that no offender, under any circumstances, is

ever to be forgiven. This might be, although I am ignorant that even under the darkest forms of tyranny any such principle has been avowed as the settled maxim of the administration, however it may have been practically acted on by some, as under the government of Draco, or under some forms of Oriental despotism, or by the Papal communion in the times of the Inquisition. But still it is conceivable that it might be, and such a government, without any mixture of the element of benevolence, would be severely and sternly and wholly just. But almost any form of tyranny would be less dreadful than this; for justice would establish its dominion at the expense of some of the finest feelings of our nature, and violate some of the plainest dictates of our moral being. There are cases, even cases of undoubted violation of law, where pardon is desirable; where all the benevolent feelings of a community would be gratified by forgiveness; and where all the tender feelings of humanity would be outraged if pardon were never extended. In the case of a single individual offender in Great Britain, thirty thousand signatures were easily obtained asking for the pardon of a man who had, in a single case, committed an offence against the laws of the land in all communities there are cases in which the purest and best citizens are willing to unite in such petitions. All communities, as already remarked, entrust a pardoning power to the executive or the judges. As human nature now is, no man would wish to live under a government where it was an assumed principle that pardon was never to be extended to the guilty; no man would contribute his influence to organize a government under which no guilty person might ever hope to be forgiven. This difficulty is one that would arise under a government that was severely and sternly just. (2.) A difficulty not less, but of an opposite character, would exist if it were an admitted principle that all the guilty were to be pardoned; that every offender against the laws was to be forgiven, and was to be permitted to go at large. This too might be; but all can imagine what would be the effect of such an administration. This, not less than the former, would violate deep principles of our nature; this, more than that, would endanger the welfare of a community. For, if there are principles in our nature which would make it desirable that some should be pardoned, there are principles which demand that some shall be punished. If all were pardoned, if all the guilty were suffered to go at large, what man's property would be safe-what man's reputation-what man's life? What would be the condition of things in this or in any community, if all jails and penitentiaries were thrown

open, and if all convicted and unconvicted felons were sent forth upon the community? Who would lie down calmly at night? Who would not gather up his property and flee from such a land? Law would be a bugbear; and every form of crime would be committed under the sanction of a spurious and wretched benevolence. This difficulty would arise if justice were never executed, and all the guilty were pardoned: and as a case has never occurred where it was an assumed maxim that none were to be pardoned, so in our world the case of a government has never occurred where it was an assumed maxim that pardon is to be extended indiscriminately to all. Yet, (3), there is another difficulty still. It is this: pardon in all cases does so much, even under the best arrangements that governments can make, to weaken the strong arm of the law. The influence in every case where it can be exercised is to lessen the moral power of the law; to diminish the public respect for its sanctions; to make offenders cease to dread the punishment which it threatens; and in general to produce a want of respect for the law in a community. It is of the nature of a public proclamation that crime may be committed in some cases with impunity; and as the cases are not specified, and as no one is excluded, the practical effect must be that each offender, whatever crime he may commit, will feel that he may be among the number of those who will escape the infliction of the penalty. Two things operate widely in every community to induce men to feel that the laws may be violated, and that crimes may be committed without the danger of punishment:-one is, the hope that so generally prevails among that class of men, that they will escape detection; the other, a feeling, perhaps, as effective in producing conscious security, is the hope that, if the crime is brought home to them, they may be pardoned.

What is needed in the case is, some arrangement that shall prevent this effect, and yet make pardon practicable and proper ; that is, something that shall do honour to the decisions of the law, and that shall at the same time meet the promptings of benevolence; in other words, that shall secure respect for the law and the government, and yet shall make it consistent, practicable, and safe, to pardon an offender. This effect will be secured if the sanctions of the law-considered as designed to express the views of the lawgiver as to the evil of the offence, or as designed to restrain from sin, or as designed to reform offenders, or as calculated to subserve any other purpose contemplated by the infliction of penalty-can be secured, while at the same time the government is free to indulge the promptings of

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