leave them without excuse if they do not." That it can be manifested to some, so as to oblige, i. e. cause them to receive it, is evident, because it is received. But because this seems to be spoken more in reference to those who do not receive it, as appears by these following words of yours: "then it is altogether as plain, that it may be very reasonable and necessary for some men to change their religion; and that it may be made appear to them to be so. And then, if such men will

not consider what is offered to convince them of the reasonableness and necessity of doing it, it may be very fit and reasonable," you tell me, "for any thing I have said to the contrary, in order to the bringing them to the consideration, to require them, under convenient penalties, to forsake their false religions, and embrace the true." You suppose the true religion may be so manifested by a man that is of it, to all men so far as to leave them, if they do not embrace it, without excuse. Without excuse, to whom I beseech you? To God, indeed, but not to the magistrate; who can never know whether it has been so manifested to any man, that it has been through his fault that he has not been convinced; and not through the fault of him to whom the magistrate committed the care of convincing him and it is a sufficient excuse to the magistrate, for any one to say to him, I have not neglected to consider the arguments that have been offered me by those whom you have employed to manifest it to me; but that yours is the only true religion I am not convinced. Which is so direct and sufficient an excuse to the magistrate, that had he an express commission from heaven to punish all those who did not consider, he could not yet justly punish any one whom he could not convince had not considered. But you endeavour to avoid this, by what you infer from this supposition; viz. "That then it may be very fit and reasonable, for any thing I have said to the contrary, to require men, under convenient penalties, to forsake their false religions, to embrace the true, in order to the bringing them to consideration." Whether I have said any thing to the contrary or no, the readers must

judge, and I need not repeat. But now, I say, it is neither just nor reasonable to require men, under penalties, to attain one end, in order to bring them to use the means not necessary to that, but to another end. For where is it you can say (unless you will return to your old supposition, of yours being the true religion; which you say is not necessary to your method) that men are by the law "required to forsake their false religions, and embrace the true ?" The utmost is this, in all countries where the national religion is imposed by law, men are required, under the penalties of those laws, outwardly to conform to it; which you say is in order to make them consider. So that your punishments are for the attaining one end, viz. conformity, in order to make men use consideration, which is a means not necessary to that, but another end, viz. finding out and embracing the one true religion. For however consideration may be a necessary means to find and embrace the one true religion, it is not at all a necessary means to outward conformity in the communion of any religion.

To manifest the consistency and practicableness of your method to the question, what advantage would it be to the true religion, if magistrates did every where so punish? You answer, that "by the magistrate's punishing, if I speak to the purpose, I must mean their punishing men for rejecting the true religion, (so tendered to them, as has been said) in order to the bringing them to consider and embrace it. Now before we can suppose magistrates every where so to punish, we must suppose the true religion to be every where the national religion. And if this were the case, you think it is evident enough, what advantage to the true religion it would be, if magistrates every where did so punish. For then we might reasonably hope that all false religions would soon vanish, and the true become once more the only religion in the world: whereas, if magistrates should not so punish, it were much to be feared (especially considering what has already happened) that, on the contrary, false religions and atheism, as more agreeable to the soil, would daily take deeper root, and propagate themselves, till there were no room

left for the true religion (which is but a foreign plant) in any corner of the world."

If you can make it practicable that the magistrate should punish men for rejecting the true religion, without judging which is the true religion, or if true religion could appear in person, take the magistrate's seat, and there judge all that rejected her,-something might be done. But the mischief of it is, it is a man that must condemn, men must punish; and men cannot do this but by judging who is guilty of the crime which they punish. An oracle, or an interpreter of the law of nature, who speaks as clearly, tells the magistrate, he may and ought to punish those "who reject the true religion," tendered with sufficient evidence :" the magistrate is satisfied of his authority, and believes this commission to be good. Now I would know how possibly he can execute it, without making himself the judge first what is the true religion; unless the law of nature at the same time delivered into his hands the XXXIX Articles of the one only true religion, and another book wherein all the ceremonies and outward worship of it are contained. But it being certain, that the law of nature has not done this; and as certain, that the articles, ceremonies, and discipline of this one only true religion have been often varied in several ages and countries, since the magistrate's commission by the law of nature was first given: there is no remedy left, but that the magistrate must judge what is the true religion, if he must punish them who reject it. Suppose the magistrate be commissioned to punish those who depart from right reason; the magistrate can yet never punish any one, unless he be judge what is right reason; and then judging that murder, theft, adultery, narrow cart-wheels, or want of bows and arrows in a man's house, are against right reason, he may make laws to punish men guilty of those, as rejecting right reason.

So, if the magistrate in England or France, having a commission to punish those who reject the one only true religion, judges the religion of his national church to be it; it is possible for him to lay penalties on those who reject it, pursuant to that commission; otherwise, with.

out judging that to be the one only true religion, it is wholly impracticable for him to punish those who embrace it not, as rejecters of the one only true religion.

To provide as good a salvo as the thing will bear, you say, in the following words, "Before we can suppose magistrates every where so to punish, we must suppose the true religion to be every where the national.” That is true of actual punishment, but not of laying on penalties by law; for that would be to suppose the national religion makes or chooses the magistrate, and not the magistrate the national religion. But we see the contrary; for let the national religion be what it will before, the magistrate doth not always fall into it and embrace that; but if he thinks not that, but some other the true, the first opportunity he has he changes the national religion into that which he judges the true, and then punishes the dissenters from it; where his judgment, which is the true religion, always necessarily precedes, and is that which ultimately does, and must determine who are rejecters of the true religion, and so obnoxious to punishment. This being so, I would gladly see how your method can be any way practicable to the advantage of the true religion, whereof the magistrate every where must be judge, or else he can punish nobody at all.

You tell me that whereas I say, that to justify punishment it is requisite that it be directly useful for the procuring some greater good than that which it takes away; you" wish I had told you why it must needs be directly useful for that purpose." However exact you may be in demanding reasons of what is said, I thought here you had no cause to complain; but you let slip out of your memory the foregoing words of this passage, which together stands thus: "Punishment is some evil, some inconvenience, some suffering, by taking away or abridging some good thing, which he who is punished has otherwise a right to. Now, to justify the bringing any such evil upon any man, two things are requisite; 1. That he that does it has a commission so to do. 2. That it be directly useful for the promoting some greater good." It is evident by

these words, that punishment brings direct evil upon a man, and therefore it should not be used but where it is directly useful for the procuring some greater good. In this case, the signification of the word directly, carries a manifest reason in it, to any one who understands what directly means. If the taking away any good from a man cannot be justified, but by making it a means to procure a greater; is it not plain it must be so a means as to have, in the operation of causes and effects, a natural tendency to that effect? And then it is called directly useful to such an end: and this may give you a reason " why punishment must be directly useful for that purpose." I know you are very tender of your indirect and at a distance usefulness of force, which I have in another place showed to be, in your way, only useful by accident; nor will the question you here subjoin excuse it from being so, viz. " Why penalties are not as directly useful for the bringing men to the true religion, as the rod of correction is to drive foolishness from a child, or to work wisdom in him?" Because the rod works on the will of the child, to obey the reason of the father, whilst under his tuition; and thereby makes it supple to the dictates of his own reason afterwards, and disposes him to obey the light of that, when being grown to be a man, that is to be his guide, and this is wisdom. If your penalties are so used, I have nothing to say to them.

Your way is charged to be impracticable to those ends you propose, which you endeavour to clear, p. 63. That there may be fair play on both sides, the reader shall have in the same view what we both say:

L. II. p. 125. "It remains now to examine, whether the author's argument will not hold good, even against punishments in your way. For if the magistrate's authority be, as you here say, only to procure all his subjects (mark what you say, all his sub

But

L. III. p. 63. how little to the purpose this request of yours is, will quickly appear. For if the magistrate provides sufficiently for the instruction of all his subjects in the true religion; and then re