souls, than what the Author and Finisher of our faith has directed. That so far is the magistrate, when he gives his helping hand to the furtherance of the Gospel, by laying convenient penalties upon such as reject it, or any part of it, from using any other means for the salvation of men's souls than what the Author and Finisher of our faith has directed, that he does no more than his duty for the promoting the salvation of souls. And as the means by which men may be brought into the way of salvation." Ay, but where do you say that persecution is for the salvation of souls? I thought you had been arguing against my meaning, and against the things I say, and not against my words in your meaning, which is not against me. That I used the word persecution for what you call force and penalties, you know for in p. 21, that immediately precedes this, you take notice of it, with some little kind of wonder, in these words, " persecutions, so it seems you call all punishments for religion." That I do so then, whether properly or improperly, you could not be ignorant; and then, I beseech you, apply your answer here to what I say. My words are, "If persecution, as is pretended, were for the salvation of men's souls, men that conform would be examined whether they did so upon reason and conviction." Change my word persecution into punishment for religion, and then consider the truth or ingenuity of your answer: for, in that sense of the word persecution, do you know nobody that pretends persecution is for the salvation of men's souls? So much for your ingenuity, and the arts you allow yourself to serve a good cause. What do you think of one of my pagans or Mahometans? Could he have done better? For I shall often have occasion to mind you of them. Now to your argument. I said, "That I thought those who make laws, and use force, to bring men to church-conformity in religion, seek only the compliance, but concern themselves not for the conviction of those they punish, and so never use force to convince. For pray tell me, when any dissenter conforms, and enters into the church com

munion, is he ever examined to see whether he does it upon reason and conviction, and such grounds as would become a Christian concerned for religion? If persecution, as is pretended, were for the salvation of men's souls, this would be done, and men not driven to take the sacrament to keep their places, or obtain licences to sell ale; for so low have these holy things been prostituted." To this you here reply, "As to those magistrates, who having provided sufficiently for the instruction of all under their care, in the true religion, do make laws, and use moderate penalties, to bring men to the communion of the church of God, and conformity to the rules and orders of it; I think their behaviour does plainly enough speak them to seek and concern themselves for the conviction of those whom they punish, and for their compliance only as the fruit of their conviction." If means of instruction were all that is necessary to convince people, the providing sufficiently for instruction would be an evidence, that those that did so, did seek and concern themselves for men's conviction: but if there be something as necessary for conviction as the means of instruction, and without which those means will signify nothing, and that be severe and impartial examination; and if force be, as you say, so necessary to make men thus examine, that they can by no other way but force be brought to do it if magistrates do not lay their penalties on nonexamination, as well as provide means of instruction; whatever you may say you think, few people will find reason to believe you think those magistrates seek and concern themselves much for the conviction of those they punish, when that punishment is not levelled at that, which is a hinderance to their conviction, i. e. against their aversion to severe and impartial examination. To that aversion no punishment can be pretended to be a remedy, which does not reach and combat the aversion; which it is plain no punishment does, which may be avoided without parting with, or abating the prevalency of that aversion. This is the case, where men undergo punishments for not conforming, which

they may be rid of, without severely and impartially examining matters of religion.

To show that what I mentioned was no sign of unconcernedness in the magistrate for men's conviction, you add, "Nor does the contrary appear from the not examining dissenters when they conform, to see whether they do it upon reason and conviction: for where suf ficient instruction is provided, it is ordinarily presumable that when dissenters conform, they do it upon reason and conviction." Here if ordinarily signifies any thing, (for it is a word you make much use of, whether to express or cover your sense, let the reader judge,) then you suppose there are cases wherein it is not presumable; and I ask you, whether in those, or any cases, it be examined whether dissenters, when they conform, do it upon reason and conviction? At best that it is ordinarily presumable, is but gratis dictum; especially since you suppose, that it is the corruption of their nature that hinders them from considering as they ought, so as upon reason and conviction to embrace the truth: which corruption of nature, that they may retain with conformity I think is very presumable. But be that as it will, this I am sure is ordinarily and always presumable, that if those who use force were as intent upon men's conviction as they are on their conformity, they would not wholly content themselves with the one, without ever examining and looking into the other.

Another excuse you make for this neglect is, "That as to irreligious persons, who only seek their secular advantage, how easy it is for them to pretend conviction, and to offer such grounds (if that were required) as would become a Christian concerned for religion; that is what no care of man can certainly prevent." This is an admirable justification of your hypothesis. Men are to be punished: to what end? To make them severely and impartially consider matters of religion, that they may be convinced, and thereupon sincerely embrace the truth. But what need of force or punishment for this? Because their lusts and corrup

tions will otherwise keep them both from considering as they ought, and embracing the true religion; and therefore they must lie under penalties till they have considered as they ought, which is when they have upon conviction embraced. But how shall the magistrate know when they upon conviction embrace, that he may then take off their penalties? That indeed cannot be known, and ought not to be inquired after, because irreligious persons, who only seek their secular advantage, or, in other words, all those who desire at their ease to retain their beloved lusts and corruption, may "easily pretend conviction, and offer such grounds (if it were required) as would become a Christian concerned for religion: this is what no care of man can certainly prevent." Which is reason enough, why no busy forwardness in man to disease his brother, should use force upon pretence of prevailing against men's corruptions, that hinder their considering and embracing the truth upon conviction, when it is confessed it cannot be known, whether they have considered, are convinced, or have really embraced the true religion or no. And thus you have shown us your admirable remedy, which is not, it seems, for the irreligious (for it is easy, you say, for them to pretend to conviction, and so avoid punishment), but for those who would be religious without it.

But here, in this case, as to the intention of the magistrate, how can it be said, that the force he uses is designed, by subduing men's corruptions, to make way for considering and embracing the truth; when it is so applied, that it is confessed here, that a man may get rid of the penalties without parting with the corruptions they are pretended to be used against? But you have a ready answer, "This is what no care of man can certainly prevent;" which is but in other words to proclaim the ridiculousness of your use of force, and to avow that your method can do nothing. If by not certainly you mean, it may any way or to any degree prevent; why is it not so done? If not, why is a word that signifies nothing put in, unless it be for a shelter

on occasion? a benefit you know how to draw from this way of writing: but this here, taken how you please, will only serve to lay blame on the magistrate, or your hypothesis, choose you whether. I, for my part, have a better opinion of the ability and management of the magistrate what he aimed at in his laws, that I believe he mentions in them; and, as wise men do in business, spoke out plainly what he had a mind should be done. But certainly there cannot a more ridiculous character be put on law-makers, than to tell the world they intended to make men consider, examine, &c. but yet neither required nor named any thing in their laws but conformity. Though yet when men are certainly to be punished for not really embracing the true religion, there ought to be certain matters of fact, whereby those that do, and those that do not so embrace the truth, should be distinguished; and for that you have, it is true, a clear and established criterion, i. e. conformity and non-conformity: which do very certainly distinguish the innocent from the guilty; those that really and sincerely do embrace the truth that must save them, from those that do not.

But, sir, to resolve the question, whether the conviction of men's understandings, and the salvation of their souls, be the business and aim of those who use force to bring men into the profession of the national religion; I ask, whether, if that were so, there could be so many as there are, not only in most country parishes, but, I think I may say, may be found in all parts of England, grossly ignorant in the doctrines and principles of the Christian religion, if a strict inquiry were made into it? If force be necessary to be used to bring men to salvation, certainly some part of it would find out some of the ignorant and unconsidering that are in the national church, as well as it does so diligently all the non-conformists out of it, whether they have considered, or are knowing or no. But to this you give a very ready answer: "Would you have the magistrate punish all indifferently, those who obey the law as well as them that do not?" What is the obedience the law