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not the dexterity to choose the national religion whereever you are, I doubt not but that you would think so too if you were in France, though there were none but moderate penalties laid on you, to bring you, even against your own inclination, to act according to what they there call reason and sound judgment.

That paragraph and mine, to which it is an answer, run thus:

L. II. p. 128."I do neither you nor the magistrate injury when I say that the power you give the magistrate of punishing men to make them consider reasons and arguments proper and sufficient to convince them, is to convince them of the truth of his religion, and to bring them to it. For men will never, in his opinion, act according to reason and sound judgment, which is the thing you here say men should be brought to by the magistrate, even against their own inclination, till they embrace his religion. And if you have

L. III. p. 67. "But it seems you have not done with this yet: for you say, you do neither me nor the magistrate injury, when you say that the power I give the magistrate, of punishing men to make them consider reasons and arguments proper and sufficient to convince them, is to convince them of the truth of his religion, whatever that be, and to bring them to it.' Which seems a little strange and pleasant too. and pleasant too. But thus you prove it: For men will never, in his opinion, act according to reason and sound judgment, till they embrace his religion. And if you have the brow of an honest man, you will not say the magistrate will ever punish you, to bring you to consider any other reasons and arguments but such as are proper to convince you of the truth of his religion, and to bring you to that. Which (besides the pleasant talk of such reasons and arguments as are proper and sufficient to convince men of the truth of the magistrate's religion,' though it be a false one) is just as much as to say, It is so, because in the

the brow of an honest man, you will not say the magistrate will ever punish you, to bring you to consider any other reasons and arguments, but such as are proper to convince you of the truth of his religion, and to bring you to that. Thus you shift forwards and backwards. You say, the magistrate has no power to punish men to compel them to his religion; but only to compel them to consider reasons and arguments proper to convince them of the truth of his religion; which is all one as to say, nobody has power to choose your way for you to Jerusalem; but yet the lord of the manor has power to punish you, to bring you to consider reasons and arguments proper

magistrate's opinion it is so; and because it is not to be expected that he will act against his opinion. As if the magistrate's opinion could change the nature of things, and turn a power to promote the true religion into a power to promote a false one. No, sir, the magistrate's opinion has no such virtue. such virtue. It may indeed keep him from exercising the power he has to promote the true religion; and it may lead him to abuse the pretence of it to the promoting a false one: but it can neither destroy that power, nor make it any thing but what it is. And therefore, whatever the magistrate's opinion be, his power was given him (as the apostles' power was to them) for edification only, not for destruction: and it may always be said of him (what St. Paul said of himself) that he can do nothing against the truth, but for the truth. And therefore, if the magistrate punishes me to bring me to a false religion, it is not his opinion that will excuse him, when he comes to answer for it to his Judge. For certainly men are as accountable for their opinions (those of them, I mean, which influence their practice) as they are for their actions.

"Here is, therefore, no shifting forwards and backwards, as you pretend; nor any circle, but in your own imagination. For though it be true that I say, the magi

and sufficient to convince you. Of what? that the way he goes in is the right, and so to make you join in company, and go along with him. So that, in effect, what is all your going about, but to come at last to the same place again; and put a power into the magistrate's hands, under another pretence, to compel men to his religion? which use of force the author sufficiently and

has

overthrown,

you yourself have quitted. But I am tired to follow you so often round the same circle."

strate has no power to punish men, to compel them to his religion,' yet I nowhere say, nor will it follow from any thing I do say," That he has power to compel them to consider reasons and arguments proper to convince them of the truth of his religion.' But I do not much wonder that you endeavour to put this upon me.' For I think by this time it is pretty plain, that otherwise you would have but little to say: and it is an art very much in use amongst some sort of learned men, when they cannot confute what an adversary does say, to make him say what he does not; that they may have something which they can confute.

"

The beginning of this answer is part of the old song of triumph. "What! reasons and arguments proper and sufficient to convince men of the truth of falsehood?" Yes, sir, the magistrate may use force to make men consider those reasons and arguments, which he thinks proper and sufficient to convince men of the truth of his religion, though his religion be a false one. And this is as possible for him to do, as for a man as learned as yourself to write a book, and use such arguments as he thinks proper and sufficient to convince

men of the truth of his opinion, though it be a falsehood.

As to the remaining part of your answer, the question is not, whether the "magistrate's opinion can change the nature of things, or the power he has, or excuse him to his Judge for misusing of it?" But this, that since all magistrates, in your opinion, have commission, and are obliged to promote the true religion by force, and they can be guided in the discharge of this duty by nothing but their own opinion of the true religion, what advantage can this be to the true religion, what benefit to their subjects, or whether it amounts to any more than a commission to every magistrate to use force for the promoting his own religion? To this question, therefore, you will do well to apply your answer, which a man of less skill than you will be scarce able to do.

You tell us indeed, that "whatever the magistrate's opinion be, his power was given him (as the apostles' power was to them) for edification only, and not for destruction." But if the apostles' power had been given. them for one end, and St. Paul, St. Peter, and nine other of the twelve had nothing to guide them but their own opinion, which led them to another end; I ask you whether the edification of the church could have been carried on as it was?

You tell us farther, that "it may always be said of the magistrate (what St. Paul said of himself) that he can do nothing against the truth, but for the truth.' Witness the king of France. If you say this in the same sense that St. Paul said it of himself, who, in all things requisite for edification, had the immediate direction and guidance of the unerring Spirit of God, and so was infallible, we need not go to Rome for an infallible guide; every country has one in their magistrate. If you apply these words to the magistrate in another sense than what St. Paul spoke them in of himself, sober men will be apt to think you have a great care to insinuate into others a high veneration for the magistrate; but

that you yourself have no over-great reverence for the Scripture, which you thus use; nor for truth, which you thus defend.

To deny the magistrate to have a power to compel men to his religion; but yet to say the magistrate has a power, and is bound to punish men to make them consider, till they cease to reject the true religion; of which true religion he must be judge, or else nothing can be done in discharge of this his duty; is so like going round about to come to the same place, that it will always be a circle in mine and other people's imagination, and not only there, but in your hypothesis.

All that you say turns upon the truth or falsehood of this proposition: "That whoever punishes any one in matters of religion to make him consider, takes upon him to be judge for another what is right in matters of religion." This you think plainly involves a contradiction; and so it would, if these general terms had in your use of them their ordinary and usual meaning. But, sir, be but pleased to take along with you, that whoever punishes any man your way in matters of religion, to make him consider, as you use the word consider, takes upon him to be judge for another what is right in matters of religion: and you will find it so far from a contradiction, that it is a plain truth. For your way of punishing is a peculiar way, and is this: that the magistrate, where the national religion is the true religion, should punish those who dissent from it, to make them consider as they ought, i. e. till they cease to reject, or, in other words, till they conform to it. If therefore he punishes none but those who dissent from, and punishes them till they conform to that which he judges the true religion, does he not take on him to judge for them what is the true religion?

It is true indeed what you say, there is no other reason to punish another to make him consider, but that he should judge for himself: and this will always hold true amongst those who, when they speak of considering, mean considering, and nothing else. But then these things will follow from thence: 1. That in in

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