in other places; as, "which they may call a complication of simple ideas, if they please."

"We do not envy these pretenders to reason; but methinks they should not at the same time assert the absolute necessity of these ideas to our knowledge, and declare that we may have certain knowledge without them." And all along in that page, "they." And in the very next page my words being quoted, your lordship asks, "how can that be, when the same persons say, that notwithstanding their ideas, it is impossible for matter to think?" So that I do not see how I can exempt myself from being meant to be one of those pretenders to reason, wherewith we can be certain without any foundation of reason, which your lordship, in the immediate foregoing page, does not envy for this new sort of certainty. How can it be understood but that I am one of those persons, that "at the same time assert the absolute necessity of these ideas to our knowledge, and declare that we may have certain knowledge without them?" Though your lordship very civilly says, "that you must do that right to the ingenious author of the Essay of Human Understanding (from whence these notions are borrowed, to serve other purposes than he intended them) that," &c. yet, methinks it is the author himself, and his use of these notions, that is blamed and argued against; but still in the plural number, which he confesses himself not to understand.

My lord, if your lordship can show me where I pretend to reason or certainty, without any foundation of reason; or where it is I assert the absolute necessity of any ideas to our knowledge, and declare that we may have certain knowledge without them, your lordship will do me a great favour: for this, I grant, is a new sort of certainty which I long to be rid of, and to disown to the world. But truly, my lord, as I pretended to no new sort of certainty, but just such as human understanding was possessed of before I was born; and should be glad I could get more out of the books and writings that come abroad in my days: so, my lord, if I have anywhere pretended to any new sort of certainty, I beseech

your lordship show me the place, that I may correct the vanity of it, and unsay it to the world.

Again, your lordship says thus,-"I know not whether it argues more stupidity or arrogance to expose a doctrine relating to the divine essence, because they cannot comprehend the manner of it."

Here, my lord, I find the same "they" again, which, some pages back, evidently involved me: and since that you have named nobody besides me, nor alleged any body's writings but mine; give me leave, therefore, to ask your lordship, whether I am one of these "they" here also, that I may know whether I am concerned to answer for myself? I am ashamed to importune your lordship so often about the same matter; but I meet with so many places in your lordship's (I had almost said new) way of writing, that put me to a stand, not knowing whether I am meant or no, that I am at a loss whether I should clear myself from what possibly your lordship does not lay to my charge; and yet the reader, thinking it meant of me, should conclude that to be in my book which is not there, and which I utterly disown. Though I cannot be joined with those who expose a doctrine relating to the divine essence, because they cannot comprehend the manner of it; unless your lordship can show where I have so exposed it, which I deny that I have any where done; yet your lordship, before you come to the bottom of the same page, has these words: "I shall now show, that there can be no sufficient evidence brought from them, by their own confession, concerning the existence of the most spiritual and infinite substance, even God himself."

If

your lordship did mean me in that "they" which is some lines backwards, I must complain to your lordship that you have done me an injury, in imputing that to me which I have not done. And if "their" here were not meant by your lordship to relate to the same persons, I ask by what shall the reader distinguish them? And how shall any body know who your lordship means? For that I am comprehended here is apparent, by your quoting my Essay in the very next words, and arguing against it in the following pages.

in other places; as, "which they may call a complication of simple ideas, if they please."

"We do not envy these pretenders to reason; but methinks they should not at the same time assert the absolute necessity of these ideas to our knowledge, and declare that we may have certain knowledge without them." And all along in that page, "they." And in the very next page my words being quoted, your lordship asks, "how can that be, when the same persons say, that notwithstanding their ideas, it is impossible for matter to think?" So that I do not see how I can exempt myself from being meant to be one of those pretenders to reason, wherewith we can be certain without any foundation of reason, which your lordship, in the immediate foregoing page, does not envy for this new sort of certainty. How can it be understood but that I am one of those persons, that "at the same time assert the absolute necessity of these ideas to our knowledge, and declare that we may have certain knowledge without them?" Though your lordship very civilly says, "that you must do that right to the ingenious author of the Essay of Human Understanding (from whence these notions are borrowed, to serve other purposes than he intended them) that," &c. yet, methinks it is the author himself, and his use of these notions, that is blamed and argued against; but still in the plural number, which he confesses himself not to understand.

My lord, if your lordship can show me where I pretend to reason or certainty, without any foundation of reason; or where it is I assert the absolute necessity of any ideas to our knowledge, and declare that we may have certain knowledge without them, your lordship will do me a great favour: for this, I grant, is a new sort of certainty which I long to be rid of, and to disown to the world. But truly, my lord, as I pretended to no new sort of certainty, but just such as human understanding was possessed of before I was born; and should be glad I could get more out of the books and writings that come abroad in my days: so, my lord, if I have anywhere pretended to any new sort of certainty, I beseech

your lordship show me the place, that I the vanity of it, and unsay it to the world.

may

correct

Again, your lordship says thus,-"I know not whether it argues more stupidity or arrogance to expose a doctrine relating to the divine essence, because they cannot comprehend the manner of it."

Here, my lord, I find the same "they" again, which, some pages back, evidently involved me: and since that you have named nobody besides me, nor alleged any body's writings but mine; give me leave, therefore, to ask your lordship, whether I am one of these "they" here also, that I may know whether I am concerned to answer for myself? I am ashamed to importune your lordship so often about the same matter; but I meet with so many places in your lordship's (I had almost said new) way of writing, that put me to a stand, not knowing whether I am meant or no, that I am at a loss whether I should clear myself from what possibly your lordship does not lay to my charge; and yet the reader, thinking it meant of me, should conclude that to be in my book which is not there, and which I utterly disown. Though I cannot be joined with those who expose a doctrine relating to the divine essence, because they cannot comprehend the manner of it; unless your lordship can show where I have so exposed it, which I deny that I have any where done; yet your lordship, before you come to the bottom of the same page, has these words: "I shall now show, that there can be no sufficient evidence brought from them, by their own confession, concerning the existence of the most spiritual and infinite substance, even God himself."

If your lordship did mean me in that "they" which is some lines backwards, I must complain to your lordship that you have done me an injury, in imputing that to me which I have not done. And if "their" here were not meant by your lordship to relate to the same persons, I ask by what shall the reader distinguish them? And how shall any body know who your lordship means? For that I am comprehended here is apparent, by your quoting my Essay in the very next words, and arguing against it in the following pages.

1

I enter not here into your lordship's argument; that which I am now considering is your lordship's peculiar way of writing in this part of your treatise, which makes me often in doubt, whether the reader will not condemn my book upon your lordship's authority, where he thinks me concerned, if I say nothing: and yet your lordship may look upon my defence as superfluous, when I did not hold what your lordship argued against.

But to go on with your lordship's argument, your lordship says, " I shall now show that there can be no sufficient evidence brought from simple ideas by their own confession, concerning the existence of the most spiritual and infinite substance, even God himself."

Your lordship's way of proving it is this: your lordship says, "we are told, B. iv. c. 10. § 1, That the evidence of it is equal to mathematical certainty;' and very good arguments are brought to prove it, in a chapter on purpose: but that which I take notice of, is, that the argument from the clear and distinct idea of a God is passed over." Supposing all this to be so, your lordship, methinks, with submission, does not prove the proposition you undertook, which was this; "there can be no sufficient evidence brought from simple ideas, by their own confession concerning [i. e. to prove] the existence of a God." For if I did in that chapter, as your lordship says, pass over the proof from the clear and distinct idea of God, that, I presume, is no confession that there can be no sufficient evidence brought from clear and distinct ideas, much less from simple ideas, concerning the existence of a God; because the using of one argument brought from one foundation, is no confession that there is not another principle or foundation. But, my lord, I shall not insist upon this, whether it be a confession or no.

Leaving confession out of the proposition, I humbly conceive your lordship's argument does not prove. Your lordship's proposition to be proved, is, "there can be sufficient evidence brought from simple ideas to prove the existence of a God;" and your lordship's reason is, because the argument from the clear and