these societies, which are in their original, end, business, and in everything, perfectly distinct and infinitely different from each other." (Works II. 326.) There can be no doubt of Locke's position on this question, Article 96 of the Constitution of Carolina, 1669, which provides that the Church of England is to be regarded as the Church of State and be supported by the State as a national institution, was inserted against the protest of Locke. 1) Professor Paulsen continues, "Als Denker hat er weder grosse Originalität noch Tiefe; mit Hobbes oder Spinoza ist er nicht zu vergleichen. Aber er steht dem Common Seuse am nächsten, und dieser versteht ihn". (596.) To the first sentence we have nothing to remark; but the last sentence is suggestive. It is a serious reflection upon two centuries of Locke's critics. Perhaps no modern system has met with more various and conflicting judgments than that of Locke. What is his theory of knowledge? Bald sensationalism, says Cousin; intellectualism like that of Kant, says Webb; Locke is a disciple of Hobbes, says Paulsen; "he roots in Bacon", says Kuno Fischer; he "relies exclusively on Gassendi" says Sir Wm. Hamilton; he builds on Descartes, thinks Reid; "My theories are spun out of my own thoughts and are not derived from any other original", says Locke, and Lewes remarks, "there is scarcely a writer we could name whose works bear such an indisputable impress of his having raised himself above the alıms basket, and, not content to live lazily on the scraps of begged opinions set his own thoughts to work to find out and follow truth." This diversity of opinion extends itself to the particulars of Locke's philosophy. What is his doctrine of freedom? Green and Kirchmann place him with the libertarians; Professor Webb and Dr. Münz with the determinists or necessitarians; Priestly and Hamilton think that while opposing necessity verbally, he adopted it substantially without being aware of it, while Henry Rogers thinks that he left

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no verdict on the question. Locke has been called realist, nominalist, conceptualist, but it is useless to carry the reproach further. We are reminded of the exclamation of Socrates when he heard Plato read the Lysis. "O Hercules, what a number of lies the young man has told about me". (Diog. Laert. III. 24.) In estimating the influence of one writer upon another, one should either follow the main lines of thought, or confine one's-self to such particulars in the writings of the latter as had their inception in the writings of the former, and are not derived by both, the earlier and the later writer, from a common source. Observing this rule, we may say that in neither instance is there a trace of indebtedness of Locke to Hobbes. On the main lines Locke opposes Hobbes throughout, while agreements in particulars are the agreements of both with others who went before. Notwithstanding the difficulties of Locke's system, and they are many, his works still remain the most important source of a knowledge of his doctrines. Although we do not subscribe to the Lockian scheme we take advantage of the diversity of opinion to excuse ourselves for drawing our views of Locke's ethics solely from Locke's writings, for quoting his own language somewhat fully, and as an appeal for charity from those who differ from our judgment of his ethical doctrines.

Chapter II.

Ethical Faculty or Criterion.

The purpose of this chapter is to discover the ethical faculty, and the ground of certainty. It is in no respect a discussion of Locke's work, other than to make clear these two important factors of his ethical theory.

I. The Motive and Method of Locke's "Essay concerning Human Understanding". Locke, in his controversies with the critics of his essay, often refers to the Epistle to the Reader as a thorough explanation of the occasion and design of his book. (Works I. 749.) It is therefore of primary importance that we give attention to this letter. We may also consider in this connection the first chapter of his Essay, as it is included in the general introduction.

The occasion of the Essay was threefold, firstly, a discussion held in his chamber, with five or six friends "discoursing on a subject very remote from this". One of Locke's friends, James Tyrell, remarks, "I remember, myself, being one of the number that met there when the discussion began about the principles of morality and revealed religion".1) The Essay, then, is not to be regarded as fully representing Lockes ethical views. Secondly, the conviction that philosophical enquiry "begins at the wrong end, takes a wrong course; that instead of letting loose our thoughts into the bot ocean of being to wander in those depths where they Jan find no sure footing, we should take a survey of our ownd understandings, examine our own powers, and see to whdt ithings they are adapted. Till this is done we seek in vainenfor satisfaction in a quiet and sure possession of truths." Thirdly, the chaotic condition of the thought of his age led thanyrgo think "either there is no such thing as truth at all, rithatmankind hath no sufficient means to attain a certain knowledge of it." Locke thinks this is refusing to walk beeigise he has no wings to fly, or neglecting duties by cadelight because we have not the full blaze of the sun. He hopes to show that "the candle that is set up in us shines bright enough for all our purposes". Locke would distinguish with the Stoics, things within our reach, τὰ ἐφ ̓ ἡμῖν, from those beyond our reach, τὰ οὐκ εφἡμῖν. (Intro. sec. 4, 6.) The entire writings of Locke bear a practical and ethical impressnot our business to know all things, but only

those that concern our conduct." "Whatsoever is necessary for the conveniences of life and the information of virtue is

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within our reach." "It is rational to conclude that our proper employment lies in those enquiries, and in that sort of knowledge which is most suited to our natural capacities, and carries in it our greatest interest, i.e., the condition of our eternal estate; hence I think I may condude that morality is the proper science and business of mankind in general, who are both concerned and fitted to search out their sumnum bonum." 1) Added to this, was the great attraction of the subject itself. "Since it is the understanding that sets man above the rest of sensible beings, and gives him all the advantage and dominion that he has over them, it is certainly a subject even for its nobleness worth our labou to enquire into." (I.

1; 1.) This is significant, in the begin ning, as indicating Locke's concept of man as a ration being, and as distinguishing his view from that of Hobbes and Spinoza. This is further seen in his remark, "God having designed man for a social creature, made him mat only with an inclination and under a necessity to avo fellowship with those of his own kind; but furnished shihw also with language which was to be the great struv (ment and common tie of society." (III. 1; 1.) Thus, the two parts of the Essay we have placed in the foreground a strong optimistic concept of man as a rational andisdeiad, being. belwor

The purpose of the essay, is, "to enquire into the origis nal, certainty, and extent of human knowledge; dolga,hen with the grounds and degrees of belief, opinion, and assent'a guons agind

1) Introduction. Sec. 7. 5. H. U. IV. 12; 11. King Liu Blac

Again, it is, "to clear my way", says Locke, "to those foundations which I conceive are the only true ones, to give an account of the reasons that I had to doubt of innate principles and to raise an edifice uniform and consistent with itself as far as my own observation and experience will assist me". Again, his purpose is indicated as twofold, "to show how our understandings come to attain those notions of things we have, and to set down the measures of the certainty of our knowledge". This last indication of his purpose is perhaps the most significant. It suggests the twofold division of his work.

The features of Locke's method are sufficiently clear. They are psychological, empirical, critical. The human understanding is objectified for analysis. The conscious mind is at once the observing subject and the object observed. The extensive force of this introspective method is indicated in Locke's remark about his book, "It is a copy of my own mind in its several ways of operation. And all I can say for the publishing of it, is, that I think the intellectual faculties are made and operate alike in most men". (Works I. 749.) Locke's method is the opposite to that of Descartes. Descartes postulated existence and ideas, and enquired for knowledge; Locke postulates the same, and enquired into the origin of ideas before discussing the problem of knowledge. From the same position the one takes a deductive, the other an inductive course. Locke also calls his method an "historical plain method". This he proposes to follow, and at the end of his enquiry concerning ideas he declares; "I have given a short, and, I think, true history of the first beginnings of human knowledge, whence the mind has its first objects, and by what steps it makes its progress." What are called the comparative and historical methods are strongly suggested by Locke, and much used in the first book of his Essay, as well as in his political writings. With such data, induding his frequent appeals to observation and experience, and the absence of dogmatism from his work, Locke may be justly called the father of the

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