principle of Equity. "Whatever I judge reasonable or unreasonable for another to do for me, that, by the same judgment I declare reasonable or unreasonable that I, in the ilke case, should do for him." It is evident that this is no improvement upon what Locke had laid down in his principle of Love, while it introduces a difficulty which Locke escaped, viz, the difficulty contained in the words, "that I, in the like case, should do for him". This principle destroys itself, and demonstrative morality along with it, for until we are as much informed of the character and circumstances of another as we are of our own, however much we may applaud the rule as rational, or self evident, it remains a dead law in the code of practical morality. This constitutes one of Locke's objections to mathematical morality, and indicates a point where Locke demands the assistance of common sense, or practical judgment. In other main points Clarke stands in essential harmony with Locke. His "fitness and unfitness of the application of different things or different relations, one to another", fall under Locke's relations, and agreement or disagreement of ideas or propositions. He maintains, with Locke, that it is as natural, and morally speaking, as necessary, that the will should be determined in every action by the reason of the thing and the right of the case, as it is natural, and, absolutely speaking, necessary, that the understanding should submit to a demonstrative truth.

Dugald Stewart, in his "Dissertation", has associated Shaftesbury with Locke, and, we believe, with justice, at least in the main features of his practical philosophy. Certainly he showed the generous spirit and love of liberty of his master. The doctrines of a moral sense and benevolence were taken up by Shafteshury with less vigor than they had been presented by More and Cumberland, while the system which is generally ascribed to him was first put in form by Hutcheson. The special service rendered by Shaftesbury was in the field of aesthetics. Although Shaftesbury seems to draw on More and Cumberland more abundantly

than on any other of his predecessors, he agrees with Locke on many important points. With Locke, he makes psychological experience the basis of ethics, and his psychology is not different from that of Locke, though, on the whole, less clear. For instance, where Locke recognises two classes of affections, natural and unnatural, Shaftesbury illogically makes three, natural, self, and unnatural affections, as if self affections were not natural. He more than agrees with Locke in the following statement, "The height of virtue must be owing to the belief of a God", but he fails to make any ethical use of this position in his doctrine of obligation, as does Locke. The result is, that while he agrees with Locke that happiness and virtue are one, and that there can be no conflict between self-interest and the public interest, his system presents no other obligation than self-interest, and no other end than individual happiness. Again, while languidly agreeing with Locke that moral distinctions have their foundations in nature; that the rational affections must triumph over the sensual, in order to virtue, and that moral principles may be mathematically demonstrated, he does not follow any one of these points with vigour. Shaftesbury's theory of conscience is the same as that presented by Locke. He makes no claim for an independent or distinct faculty. His "moral sense" is a reflex of experience which seems to correspond with Locke's moral or rational judgment, yet has less force as it receives no strength from the rational nature. But the Lockeian spirit broods upon the pages of Shaftesbury, and we find the latter in full agreement with the former in thinking that to love one another is the fulfilment of the moral law, the sum of all morality, the essence of religion, and the ground of all human advancement. Both see in future rewards and punishments inferior motives to a moral life, but a powerful means of arousing men from their lethargy, and, rightly understood a reasonable stimulant to the hope and expectations of virtue. The political ethics of Shaftesbury, so far as he has suggested them, seem to be in strict agree

ment with the views expressed in Locke's second Essay on Government, and he makes use of the arguments of Locke in combatting Hobbes.

In passing from Shaftesbury to Butler we enter a more vigorous, but a less delightful atmosphere. Butler begins where Locke began, holding it to be of prime importance to investigate the nature of man, and see for what it is adapted. Butler does not present a systematic psychology, but he seems to pursue the general scheme of Locke. His conception of man, like that of Locke and Shaftesbury, is the reverse of that of Hobbes, and he holds with Locke, against Shaftesbury, that the Reason is the sole umpire in every department of knowledge. Here Butler is far more confusing than Locke, as he speaks alternately of "Reason", "Conscience", "Principle of Reflection", and "Reflex Approbation", but his position is given almost in the words of Locke; "Reason is the only faculty which we have wherewith to judge concerning anything, even Revelation itself." (Analogy II. 3.) He attempts, with Hobbes, Locke, and Clarke, to state one general principle which may be taken as a moral imperative. In his Sermon on Self-Deceit he holds that a constant check to self-partiality, and a rule of conduct, is found in the practical rule of our Saviour; whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, even so do unto them. This rule should be made our way of thinking. The rule, he says, "consists of two parts. One is, to substitute another for yourself when you take a survey of any part of your behaviour, or consider what is proper, fit, and reasonable for you to do on any осcasion; the other part is that you substitute yourself in the room of another, consider yourself as the person affected by such behaviour, or toward whom such an action is done, and then you would not only see, but likewise feel the reasonableness or unreasonableness of such an action or behaviour." Happiness is the only rational end, but this happiness may not be immediate, but mediate. Happiness results only when the rational end is attained. It is also

identical with virtue. Here again, Butler is a disciple of Locke. Professor Sidgwick well says, "The aim of his teaching is, not to induce men to choose duty rather than interest, but to convince them that there is no inconsistency between the two, that self-love and conscience lead to one and the same course of life."1) Butler maintains in more chilly language than we find anywhere in Locke; "Though virtue or moral rectitude does indeed consist in affection to, and pursuit of, what is right and good, as such; yet when we sit down in a cool hour, we can neither justify to ourselves this or any other pursuit, till we are convinced that it will be for our happiness, or at least; not contrary to it.") In the scheme of Butler, benevolence holds a small and cramped position compared to that of Locke. It is confined to the family circle, and does not go out to man as man. (Dissertation.) This diminution of benevolence, and the constant tendency to bring obligation to virtue to a level with self-interest, weakens his theory of virtue on the one hand, and subtracts from the value of conscience on the other. Butler agrees with Locke in holding there can be no conflict between conscience and self-interest, but differs radically, when, supposing a conflict, he holds that conscience will and ought, to give way to self-interest. (Sermon XI.) But he is firmly convinced, with Locke, that mankind is a community, that we all stand in a relation with each other, that there is a public end and interest of society which each particular is obliged to promote, is the sum of morals. (Sermon IX.)

The conflict between the moral reason and self-interest which appears in the writings of Clarke, Shaftesbury, and Butler, is recognised by Locke, but always as under wrong measures of good and evil, or wrong judgments. Locke allows no concession to self-interest as against virtue, and to eliminate the causes of conflict, he has characteristically

sought out the remedy in a practical and effe their method of education. If we ask Locke, How is it posrize for a conflict to arise between conscience and self-interest, he would reply, only when the tastes and manners of men are corrupted and they do not follow their real interests, which are those of virtue. But neither Clarke, Shaftesbury, nor Butler, take up ethical questions with the same breadth and fullness as does Locke. Nor does Price, who, more than they, represents the general tenor of Locke's system. Price takes Lockian ground on psychology, and accepts Locke's position that we know immediately that some actions are good, and that others are evil, and that our conceptions of right and wrong, of fitness and unfitness, are immediate to common sense. He repudiates, with Locke, the doctrine that the moral sense is independent, or different from the reason and the judging power. "It is the intellect that examines and compares, and is capable of discerning general truths". (Review. p. 19.) The ethical end is happiness, and his general conception of God, with the relation of theologyto ethics is essentially that of Locke. Such attributes of Deity as justice, veracity, and goodness, are cardinal f inciples of virtue, and right and wrong are distinctions eternal and immutable in their nature. (Review. p. 432. 440.) It is also maintained that future rewards and punishments are a demand of morality, or of the moral government of God. (Review. p. 453.) Reason is, with Price, the ethical faculty, but, as with Locke, comes to the place of practical reason, or common sense. From this point we need not advance, for here, we come, in the line of Locke's successors, directly upon Kant and the Scottish School. The latter drew largely upon Locke, indeed, the majority of its members were educated in the Lockeian atmosphere. The former, Kant, stands upon German soil, yet perhaps, with both Scottish and English parentage. It is no part of our task to point_out the relations of his ethical speculations to those of Locke however small or great they may be. Enough has been said to indicate our view as to the direction taken by