back to the people what had been injuriously taken from them; and brought them nearer their genuine and pure conftitution.

We shall now pass on to his reflexions on the reign of Charles I. the next moft remarkable period of the English annals.

The generous impartiality of this gentleman does credit to his acuteness and fpirit. Notwithstanding his just severity on the arbitrary measures of Charles I. he is far from ranking the members of the long parliament with the moft diftinguished patriots of antiquity, however highly they may be revered by our modifh politicians. For their inftru&tion, and to do justice to our author, we fhall quote his following remarks on that parliament.

There is no chief magiftrate, no political body of men, call them by what name you pleafe, whether the many, or the few, let them be ever fo wife, ever fo virtuous, ever fo moderate, or high in your expectation, at the entrance upon their office, but what will (if you once make them powerful, and fix them above your own control) moft certainly degenerate into tyrants, and make you flaves. This doctrine was amply verified, in the conduct of this parliament. However, at the time of paffing the act, by which they were not to be diffolved without their own confent, it was doubtful, whether they intended to make use of their power to establish the conftitu tion upon a folid foundation, or to deftroy it altogether. But their intention became afterwards very manifeft, when they delivered their remonstrance to the king, dated December ift, 1641.

In this remonftrance, they declare, "That they had fecured the property of the fubject to himself, by reducing the pretended prerogative of the king within the limits of law, and prevented, for the future, his taxing the fubject, or charging their eftates without the confent of parliament. That they had fecured the liberty of the fubject, by abolishing all the arbitrary courts of law, and reducing others within their due bounds. That they had made an example of evil counsellors and inftruments of past grievances; by which no man, for the future, durft obey the king's illegal commands. That they had repealed many obfolete laws, which had been a cover for many grievances. They acknowledge the king, during this parliament, had paft more good laws, for the advantage of the fubject, than had received the royal affent for many ages. And as a matter above all the reft, that the king had paffed an act for triennial parliaments, which, as they themselves fay, afforded a perpetual fpring of remedies for the future."

If then they had rectified what was amifs, in times past, and provided a remedy for the time to come, what had they more to do? Nothing, but to confent to their own diffolution, and renounce that unconftitutional power they had become poffeffed of, and leave the ftate to that perpetual spring of remedies, which they had provided for the future.

'Had they done this, they had done like honest men. But a diffolution of their power was far from their thoughts. The last mentioned remonstrance can be confidered as nothing less than a cause of further quarrel, in which they might feek a pretence to continue their authority. For they had now drunk deep of that diabolical spring, which intoxicates all mankind, and renders their thirst of power in-. fatiable. They had obtained a right, by law, to their feats in parliament, during their own pleasure; and it is very evi-, dent they never pleased to rife, till they were forced out of the house, by a file of musketeers, under the command of Oliver Cromwell.

To this infernal principle, the thirft of power, I must ascribe that unrelenting vengeance, with which the parliament pursued the king, through the whole course of a most bloody war; because he was the greatest obstruction to the establish. ment of their intended commonwealth, and confequently to the establishment of their intended power, and tyranny, over their own conftituents. We fhall not ftay to make any remarks upon the war, but only obferve, that the parliament never gave the king one moment's refpite, till they brought his head to the block, and made way, through his blood, to establish their own fovereign authority.

With the king fell the houfe of lords, which, indeed, had been but too inftrumental in pulling down the REGAL PART of our government, and thus destroying that just divifion of power, which conftitutes the beauty and ftrength of our constitution. Thus all degrees of power, in the state, were at once swallowed up in the house of commons: and the people left to bewail the dreadful confequence of their own credulity, with their lives, liberty, and property, at the mercy of these traitors to their truft. The people were now more flaves, to their own representatives, than they had ever been to the king; for WHERE ANNUAL ELECTION ENDS, THERE SLAVERY BEGINS, whatever that power be that bars fuch election.

• The spirit of our English conftitutional liberty, is founded upon the annual exercise of our elective rights; and not in having a fixed reprefentative body of men, in parliament. The house of commons were no longer the reprefentatives of

the

the people, than they were conftitutionally fo, that is, for one year; agreeable to the ancient law of the land, and confirmed by a ftatute of Edward III. which declares, "That parliaments should be holden every year, or oftener, if need be, for the redress of divers mifchiefs and grievances that daily happen." They were not the more the reprefentatives of the people, though they first elected them, becaufe they afterwards continued themfelves, by their own authority, during their pleasure.

• Men of cool reflection, upon these historical events, (when they had seen, in this great ftruggle for power between the king and parliament, every nerve of the conftitution exerted, upon one fide, or the other, and every conftitutional right claimed, on both fides, which might contribute to their fuccefs) justly concluded, THAT ENGLAND COULD NEVER BROUGHT INTO SLAVERY, BUT BY PARLIAMENTS THEMSELVES.

BE

'It is very evident that the great barrier, of our conftitutional liberty, confifts in an infeparable union of interests, between the house of commons, and the people; which can only fubfift by annual election. And that Charles I. by endeavouring to govern without parliaments, had only cemented this union, and made this barrier impenetrable against himfelf; as it had been against every king, who had attempted to deftroy it, fince Henry III.

But when the house of commons came to divide from the people, and fet up a feparate intereft for themselves, it was but too evident, they could impofe all manner of insult, and outrage, as well as any fingle-handed tyrant whatever. They had no more regard to the ancient form of government, to the rights, privileges, and franchifes of the people, than William the Conqueror, or any other tyrant, fince his time. Indeed, after they durft fo impioufly, and treacherously destroy the elective power of the people, by confenting to a law for their own duration, it is no wonder they fhould MURDER THE KING, DESTROY THE HOUSE of LORDS, AND MAKE SLAVES OF THE WHOLE REALM.'

This writer obferves, with great juftice, that neither William the Norman, Charles I. nor the rebel-parliament exercised more tyranny over the nation than Charles II. and his penfioned parliament, which he continued by prorogation from time to time for eighteen years. By this corrupt, and fervile parliament, and by a ftanding army, which was introduced in his reign, the laws were no longer any protection to the innocent; judgment, and juftice were directed by court-policy; feverity and cruelty took the place of mercy and moderation;

flitting of noses, cutting of ears, whipping, pilloring, branding, fining, imprisoning, hanging, and beheading, were the conftant lot of those who had virtue enough to speak, write, or act in defence of conftitutional liberty.

He further remarks, that in this reign the people of England had been restrained from their elective rights for fifty years; for twelve years under the tyranny of Charles I. for twenty years under the tyranny of the long parliament; and eighteen years under Charles II. and his penfioned parliament. There were only two regular elections for fifty years; one in the year 1640, which produced the long parliament; and one in 1660, which produced the penfioned parliament of Charles II.

Our author, never lofing fight of his favourite object, inveighs feverely against the convocation for propofing, in vague terms, frequent parliaments, at the Revolution, when they had it in their power to ftipulate with William for annual parliaments, and to restore the constitution to its proper footing. The fubfequent act for triennial parliaments; the law for a landed qualification of the members of the house of commons, made in the reign of queen Anne; and that for feptennial parliaments made in the reign of George I. he mentions with indignation, and pronounces them fubverfive of the rights of a free people.

From this time, fays he (the time of the qualifying act) therefore, many of our fubfequent laws, and especially those refpecting property, trade, and taxation, have become partial laws; and have been made to operate, in a manner, for the fole advantage of the rich in land. All laws will be partial, that are made by only one part of the people; or, in other words, by one clafs of the people. From this selfish principle proceeds the partial, arbitrary, and tyrannical spirit of our game-laws; so that now no man can neither fish, or shoot, without having a qualification in land. Indeed all this tribe of laws are fo pitifully partial, mean, poor, and wretched, that they would difgrace the petty tyrants of Barbary.

They have engroffed, within a line of their own drawing, all hares, wild fowl, and fifh, that are natives of this kingdom; which, in their own nature, being wild, and wandering, and not fubject to reftraint, are, therefore, the natural right of the first man that can catch them. But these laws, have not only fubverted this natural right of mankind, but established their own, with a bitterness little lefs than cruelty; for they are guarded and defended with the same selfish spirit, that the most niggardly mifer would guard his treasure. So that a poor man cannot entertain his longing wife, with a

gud

gudgeon, of his own catching, without being guilty of felony; or kill a partridge, without fine and imprisonment. Nay more than this, no man dare touch one of these prohibited bodies, even when they are dead, under a penalty of five pounds, without being first franked with the hand of one of these qualified engroffers. In short, they have defended thefe laws, with the fame care, that I hope to fee the house of commons defended, from place-men, penfioners, and contractors; that is, by all the locks, bolts, and bars, that the ingenuity of man can contrive, or invent.'

I fhall now fpeak to the feptennial law of George I. which has confirmed the aristocracy introduced at the Revolution. Befides, this law hath removed the conftitutional ground of the Englishman's boafted right of difpofing of his own money, for the fervice of the state, by electing a new house of commons, every time the king wanted a new supply, by vesting that power in a feptennial house of commons, independent of the people. This was deftroying that mutual bond of obligation between the king and his people, fince the king was no longer obliged to his people to give their money, while the house of commons could take it away, without their confent. It was creating, in the house of commons, a dependance upon the king, for their continuance; and not upon the people for their election. It was deftroying that confidence between the commons and the people, which had been the support of the conftitution for many ages; and robbing the people of their remedy for all grievances. It was, in effect, reducing the government to the fame ftate as under Charles II. for the injury done to the people, was the fame, whether they were deprived of their annual elective rights, by the prerogative of Charles II. or by an act of George I.'

In the two laft chapters of his book he treats of the power of juries, and the right of the parliament to tax our colonies. He infifts that juries fhould be confidered as judges of law as well as of fact; otherwise they must often forward arbitrary decifions. What he urges on this subject he inforces with ftrong precedents and arguments. He warns juries not to be intimidated in the difcharge of their office by any power upon earth; for they are only refponfible to God, and their confcience.

The conftitutional right of the British parliament to tax our diftant provinces, he evinces fo clearly, that we cannot think it would be difputed by any unprejudiced and fenfible American who should read this part of his work. But fuch a partial tax as that of the stamp-act he fhews to be unconftitutional, and feverely condemns. He would have all our tax