offend every byftander. It is a public wrong, fo far as the rules of equity are violated: It is a private harm, fo far as an individual is injured. And though the second confideration could have no place, were not the former previously established; for otherwise the diftinction of mine and thine would be unknown in fociety: Yet there is no question, but the regard to general good is much enforced by the refpect to particular. What injures the community, without hurting any individual, is often more lightly thought of. But where the greatest public wrong is alfo conjoined with a confiderable private one, no wonder the highest disapprobation attends fo iniquitous a behaviour.

APPENDIX IV.

OF SOME VERBAL DISPUTES.

NOTHING is more ufual than for philofophers

to encroach upon the province of grammarians, and to engage in difputes of words, while they ima gine, that they are handling controverfies of the deepeft importance and concern. It was in order to avoid altercations, fo frivolous and endless, that I endeavoured to ftate with the utmost caution the object of our prefent inquiry; and propofed fimply to collect, on the one hand, a list of those mental qualities which are the object of love or esteem, and form a part of perfonal merit; and on the other hand, a catalogue of thofe qualities which are the object of censure or reproach, and which detract from the character of

the

the person poffeffed of them; fubjoining fome reflec tions concerning the origin of these fentiments of praife or blame. On all occafions, where there might arife the leaft hesitation, I avoided the terms virtue and vice; because fome of thofe qualities, which I claffed among the objects of praife, receive, in the English language, the appellation of talents, rather than of virtues; as fome of the blamable or cenfurable qualities are often called defects, rather than vices. It may now, perhaps, be expected, that, before we conclude this moral inquiry, we should exactly separate the one from the other; fhould mark the precise boundaries of virtues and talents, vices and defects; and should explain the reafon and origin of that diftinction. But in order to excufe myself from this undertaking, which would, at laft, prove only a grammatical inquiry, I shall subjoin the four following reflections, which fhall contain all that I intend to say on the prefent fubject.

First, I do not find, that in the English, or any other modern tongue, the boundaries are exactly fixed between virtues and talents, vices and defects; or that a precife definition can be given of the one as contradiftinguished from the other. Were we to fay, for inftance, that the esteemable qualities alone, which are voluntary, are entitled to the appellation of virtues, we should foon recollect the qualities of courage, equanimity, patience, felf-command, with many others, which almost every language claffes under this appellation, though they depend little or not at all on our choice. Should we affirm, that the qualities alone, which prompt us to act our part in VOL. III.

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fociety, are entitled to that honorable distinction; it muft immediately occur, that thefe are indeed the most valuable qualities, and are commonly denominated the focial virtues; but that this very epithet fuppofes, that there are also virtues of another species. Should we lay hold of the diftinction between intellectual and moral endowments, and affirm the laft alone to be the real and genuine virtues, because they alone lead to action; we should find, that maof those qualities, ufually called intellectual virtues, fuch as prudence, penetration, difcernment, difcretion, had alfo a confiderable influence on conduct. The diftinction between the heart and the head may also be adopted: The qualities of the first may be defined fuch as in their immediate exertion are accompanied with a feeling or fentiment; and these alone may be called the genuine virtues: but industry, frugality, temperance, fecrecy, perfeverance, and many other laudable powers or habits, generally styled virtues, are exerted without any immediate fentiment in the perfon poffeffed of them; and are only known to him by their effects. It is fortunate, amidst all this feeming perplexity, that the question, being merely verbal, cannot poffibly be of any importance. A moral, philofophical dif courfe, needs not enter into all thefe caprices of language, which are so variable in different dialects, and in different ages of the fame dialect. But on the whole, it feems to me, that though it is always allowed, that there are virtues of many different kinds, yet when a man is called virtuous, or is denominated a man of virtue, we chiefly regard his

focial qualities, which are indeed the most valuable. It is at the fame time certain, that any remarkable defect in courage, temperance, economy, induftry, understanding, dignity of mind, would bereave even a very good-natured, honeft man of this honorable appellation. Who did ever fay, except by way of irony, that such a one was a man of great virtue, but an egregious blockhead?

But, fecondly, it is no wonder, that languages fhould not be very precife in marking the bounda ries between virtues and talents, vices and defects; fince there is fo little diftinction made in our internal estimation of them. It seems indeed certain, that the fentiment of conscious worth, the felf-fatisfaction proceeding from a review of a man's own conduct and character; it seems certain, I fay, that this fentiment, which, though the most common of all others, has no proper name in our language', arifes from the endowments of courage and capacity, induftry and ingenuity, as well as from any other mental excellencies. Who, on the other hand, is not deeply mortified with reflecting on his own folly and diffolutenefs, and feels not a fecret fting or compunction, whenever his memory presents any past occurrence where he behaved with ftupidity or ill-manners? No time can efface the cruel ideas of a man's own foolish conduct, or of affronts which cowardice or impudence has brought upon him. They ftill haunt his folitary hours, damp his most afpiring thoughts, and how him, even

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to himself, in the moft contemptible and most odious colors imaginable.

What is there too we are more anxious to conceal from others than fuch blunders, infirmities, and meanneffes, or more dread to have expofed by raillery and fatire? And is not the chief object of vanity, our bravery or learning, our wit or breeding, our eloquence or addrefs, our taste or abilities? Thefe we difplay with care, if not with oftentation; and we commonly show more ambition of excelling in them, than even in the focial virtues themselves, which are, in reality, of fuch fuperior excellence. Good nature and honesty, especially the latter, are fo indifpenfably required, that though the greatest censure attends any violation of these duties, no eminent praise follows fuch common inftances of them, as feem effential to the fupport of human fociety. And hence the reafon, in my opinion, why, though men often extol fo liberally the qualities of their, heart, they are fhy in commending the endowments of their head: because the latter virtues, being fupposed more rare and extraordinary, are observed to be the more ufual objects of pride and felf-conceit; and when boafted of, beget a ftrong fufpicion of these fentiments.

It is hard to tell whether you hurt a man's character most by calling him a knave or a coward; and whether a beaftly glutton or drunkard be not as odious and contemptible, as a felfish, ungenerous mifer. Give me my choice, and I would rather, for my own happiness and self-enjoyment, have a friendly, humane heart, than poffefs all the other virtues