majority of them in the depths of the fall, but enhanced their misery by the sight of his partiality to the elect? "Once more: what becomes of fair dealing, if God every where represents sin as the dreadful evil which causes damnation, and yet the most horrid sins work for good to some, and, as P. O. intimates, 'accomplish their salvation through Christ?' And what of honesty, if the God of truth himself promises that all the families of the earth shall be blessed in Christ,' when he has cursed a vast majority of them with a decree of absolute reprobation, which excludes them from obtaining an interest in him, even from the foundation of the world? of "Nay, w becomes of his sovereignty itself, if it is torn from the mild and gracious attributes by which it is tempered? If it is held forth in such a light as renders it more terrible to millions than the sovereignty Nebuchadnezzar in the plain of Dura appeared to Daniel's companions, when the form of his visage was changed against them, and he decreed that they should be cast into the burning fiery furnace? For they might have saved their bodily life, by bowing to the golden image, which was a thing in their power; but poor Calvinian reprobates can escape at no rate; the horrible decree' is gone forth; they must, in spite of their best endeavours, dwell,' body and soul, with everlasting burnings.' To these queries, taken from the Third Check, I now add those which follow:-What becomes of God's infinite power, if he cannot make free agents, or creatures endued with free will? And what of his boundless wisdom, if, when he has made such creatures, he knows not how to rule, overrule, reward, and punish them, without necessitating them, that is, without undoing his own work-without destroying their free agency, which is his masterpiece in the universe? Nay, what would become of the Divine immutability, about which Zelotes makes so much ado, if after God had suspended in all the Scriptures the reward of eternal life, and the punishment of eternal death, upon our unnecessitated works of faith and unbelief, he so altered his mind, in the day of judgment, as to suspend heavenly thrones, and infernal racks, only upon the good works of Christ, and the bad works of Adam; through the necessary medium of faith and holiness, absolutely forced upon some men to the end; and through the necessary means of unbelief and sin, absolutely bound upon all the rest of mankind? And, to conclude, how shall we be able to praise God for his invariable faithfulness, if his secret will and public declarations are at almost perpetual variance? And if Zelotes' doctrines of grace tempt us to complain with the poet, Nescio quo teneam mutantem Protea nodo ;* instead of encouraging us to say, with David, "For ever, O Lord, thy word is settled in heaven:" "thy faithfulness is unto all generations." If Zelotes cannot answer these queries in as rational and Scriptural a manner as his objections have, I trust, been answered; will not the "He is like Proteus: I know not how to hold him :" whether by his secret will, which has absolutely predestinated millions of men to necessary sin and eternal damnation; or by his revealed will, which declares that he willeth not primarily that any man should perish, but that all should be eternally saved, by working out their own salvation," according to the talent of will and power, which he gives to every man to profit withal. Calvinian doctrines of unscriptural free grace and everlasting free wrath appear to unprejudiced persons as great enemies to the Divine perfections, and to "the sincere milk of God's word," as Virgil's Harpies were to the Trojan hero, and to his richly spread tables? And is there not some resemblance between the Diana and Hecate whom I unmask, and the petty goddesses whom the poet describes thus ? Sive* Deæ, seu sînt diræ obscenæque volucres,— SECTION XI. Zelotes' last objection against a reconciliation with Honestus-In answer to it, the reconciler shows, by various illustrations, that the Scriptures do not contradict themselves in holding forth first and second causes Primary and subordinate motives; and that the connection of free grace with free will is properly illustrated by the Scriptural emblem of a marriage; this relation exactly representing the conjunction and opposition of the two Gospel axioms, together with the pre-eminence of free grace, and the subordination of free will. IF you compare the prejudice of Zelotes against Honestus to a strong castle, the objections which fortify that castle may be compared to the rivers which were supposed to surround Pluto's palace. Six of them we have already crossed; one more obstructs our way to the reconciliation, and, like Phlegethon, it warmly runs in the following lines: OBJECTION VII. "When King Joram said to Jehu, Is it peace?' Jehu answered, 'What peace, so long as the whoredoms of thy mother Jezebel are so many ?' And what peace can I make with Honestus and you, so long as you adulterate the Gospel, by what you call the evangelical marriage, and what I call the monstrous mixture of free grace and free will? I cannot, in conscience, take one step toward a reconciliation, unless you can make appear that, upon your conciliating plan, the dignity of free grace is properly secured. But, as this is impossible, I can only look upon your Scripture Scales as a new attempt to set one part of the Scripture against the other, and to give infidels more room to say that the Bible is full of contradictions." ANSWER. Exceedingly sorry should I be, if the Scripture Scales had this unhappy tendency. To remove your groundless fears in this respect, and to prevent the hasty triumph of infidels, permit me, (1.) To show that what at first sight seems a contradiction in the scriptures which compose my Scales, appears, upon due consideration, to be only *""Tis hard to say whether they are goddesses or fowls obscene. However, they are as ugly and dangerous appearances as ever ascended from the Stygian lake. They have faces like virgins, hands like birds' claws, and an intolerable filthy looseness! As for their body, it is invulnerable; at least, you cannot wound it, they so nimbly fly away into the clouds; leaving the food, which they greedily tore, polluted by their defiling touch." union the just subordination of second causes to the first, or the proper of inferior motives with leading ones. And, (2.) To prove what Zelotes calls "a monstrous mixture of free grace and free will," is their important concurrence, which the Scriptures frequently represent to us under the significant emblem of a marriage. Plain illustrations will throw more light upon the subject than deep arguments; I shall therefore use the former, because they are within the reach of every body, and because Zelotes cannot set them aside under pretence that they are "metaphysical." I. May we not, on different occasions, use with propriety words which seem contradictory, and which nevertheless agree perfectly together? For instance with respect to the doctrine of first and second causes, and of primary and secondary means, may I not say, "I ploughed my field this year," because I ordered it to be ploughed? May I not say, on another occasion, "Such a farmer ploughed it alone," because no other farmer shared in his toil? May I not, the next moment, point at his team, and say, "These horses ploughed all my field alone," if I want to intimate that no other horses were employed in that business? And yet, may I not by and by show Zelotes a new constructed plough, and say, "That light plough ploughed all my field?" Would it be right in Zelotes or Lorenzo to charge me with shuffling, or with self contradiction, for these different assertions? If this illustration do not sufficiently strike the reader, I ask, May not a clergyman, without a shadow of prevarication, say, on different occasions, I hold my living through Divine permission; through the lord chancellor's presentation; through a liberal education; through my subscriptions; through the bishop's institution, &c? May not all these expressions be true, and proper on different occasions? And may not these causes, means, and qualifications, concur together, and be all essential in their places? Once more speaking of a barge that sails up the river, may I not, without contradicting myself, say one moment, The wind alone (in opposition to the tide) brings her up? And if the next moment I add, Her sails alone (in opposition to oars or haling lines) bring her up against the stream, would it be right to infer that I exclude the tackling of the vessel, the rudder, and the steersman from being necessary in their places? Such, however, is the inference of Zelotes. For while Honestus thinks him an enthusiast, for supposing that absolutely nothing but wind and sail [grace and faith] is requisite to spiritual navigation, Zelotes. thinks that Honestus is hardly fit to be a cabin boy in the ship of the Church, because he lays a particular stress on the right management of the tackling and rudder; and both will perhaps look upon me as a trimmer, because, in order to reconcile them, I assert that the wind and sails, the masts and yards, the rigging and the rudder, the compass and pilot have each their proper use and office. II. With respect to primary and secondary motives, may I not say that Christ humbled himself to the death of the cross, out of obedience to his Father; out of compassionate love for a lost world; that he might put away sin by the sacrifice of himself; that whosoever believeth in him should not perish; that the Scriptures might be fulfilled; that he might leave us an example of humble patience; that through death he might destroy the prince of darkness; and that he might see the fruit of the travail of his soul, obtain the joy that was set before him, and be satisfied? Would Zelotes show himself a judicious divine, if he intimated that these motives are incompatible and contradictory? May not a variety of motives sweetly concur to the same end? May you not, for example, relieve your indigent neighbour, out of fear lest you should meet the fate of the inexorable rich man in hell? Out of pity for a fellow creature in distress? Out of regard for him as a fellow Christian? Out of a desire to maintain a good conscience, and to keep the commandments? Out of gratitude, love, and obedience to Christ? That the worthy name by which we are called Christians may not be blas. phemed? That your neighbour may be edified? That you may show your love to God? That you may declare your faith in Christ? That you may lay up treasure in heaven? That, like a faithful steward, you may deliver up your accounts with joy? That you may receive the reward of the inheritance? That you may be justified by your works as a believer in the great day, &c? May not all these motives, like the various steps of Jacob's mysterious ladder, perfectly agree together? And if a good work" comes up for a memorial before God," winged with all these Scriptural motives, is it not likely to be more acceptable than one which ascends supported only by one or two such motives? Zelotes frequently admits but of two causes of our salvation, and recommends but one motive of good works. The two causes of eternal salvation, which he generally confines himself to, are Christ and faith: and, what is most astonishing, Solifidian as he is, he sometimes gives up even faith itself: for if he reads that "faith was imputed to Abraham for righteousness," he tells you that faith is to be taken objectively for Christ and his good works; which is just as reasonable as if I said that when Sir Isaac Newton speaks of the eye and of a telescope, he intends that these words should be taken objectively, and should mean the sun and the moon. Again; as Zelotes frequently admits but one cause of salva tion, that is, Christ's righteousness, so he often admits but one motive of sincere obedience, and that is, the love of Christ known by name. Hence he gives you to understand that all the good works of those who never heard of Christ are nothing but splendid sins. To avoid his mistake, we need only admit a variety of causes and motives: and to steer clear of the error of Honestus, we need only pay to the Redeemer the so justly deserved honour of being, in conjunction with his Father and Spirit, the grand original cause, and as he is the Lamb slain, the one properly meritorious cause of our salvation; representing a grateful love to him as the noblest and most powerful motive to obedience, where the Christian Gospel is preached. In following this reasonable and catholic method, we discover the harmony of the Scriptures; we reconcile the opposite texts which fill the Scripture Scales; and far from giving room to infidels to say that the Bible is full of contradictions, we show the wonderful agreement of a variety of passages, which, upon the narrow plans of Zelotes and Honestus, are really inconsistent, if not altogether contradictory. III. With respect to the two Gospel axioms and their basis, FREE GRACE and FREE WILL, contrary as they seem to each other, they agree as well as a thousand harmonious contrasts around us. If Zelotes consider the natural world in a favourable light, he will see nothing but opposition in harmony. Midnight darkness, when it is reconciled with the blaze of noon, crowns our hills with the mild, the delightful light of the rising or setting sun. When sultry summers and frozen winters meet half way, they yield the flowers of the spring and the fruits of autumn. If the warming beams of the sun act in conjunction with cooling showers, the earth opens her fruitful bosom, and crowns our fields with a plenteous harvest. Reflect upon your animal frame: how does it subsist? Is it not by a proper union of opposite things, fluids and solids? And by a just temperature of contrary things, cold and heat? Consider your whole self: are you not made of a thinking soul, and of an organized body? Of spirit and matter? Thus two things, which are exactly the reverse of each other, by harmonizing together, form man, who is the wonder of the natural world: just as the Son of God, united to the son of Mary, forms Christ, who is the wonder of the spiritual world. I readily confess that the connection of the two Gospel axioms, like that of matter and spirit, is a deep mystery. But as it would be absurd to infer that man is an imaginary being, because we cannot explain how thought and reason can be connected with flesh and blood: so would it be unreasonable to suppose that the coalition of free grace with free will is a chimera in divinity, because we cannot exactly describe how they are coupled. We are, however, indebted to St. Paul for a most striking emblem of the essential opposition and wonderful union that subsist between the two axioms, or (which comes to be the same thing) between the Redeemer and the redeemed-between free grace and free will. If the true Church is a mystical body composed of all the souls whose submissive free will yields to free grace, and exerts itself in due subordi. nation to our loving Redeemer; does it not follow that free grace exactly "Now," answers to Christ, and holy free will to God's holy Church? says the apostle, "the husband is the head of the wife, even as Christ is the head of the Church: husbands, love your wives as Christ loved the Church: a man shall be joined unto his wife, and they two shall be one flesh: this is a great mystery, but I speak concerning Christ and the Church;" and upon the preceding observation I take the liberty to add:-This is a great mystery, but I speak concerning FREE GRACE and FREE WILL. If marriage is a Divine institution, honourable among all men, and typical of spiritual mysteries: if Isaiah says, "Thy Maker is thy husband:" if Hosea writes, "In that day, says Jehovah, thou shalt call me ISHI;" that is, MY HUSBAND: if St. Paul says to the Corinthians, "I have espoused you as a chaste virgin to one HUSBAND, even Christ :" and if he tells the Romans that they "are become dead to the law, that they should be married to another, even to HIM who is raised from the dead, that they should bring forth fruit unto God:" if the sacred writers, I say, frequently use that emblematical way of speech, may I not reverently tread in their steps, and in the fear of God warily run the parallel between the conjugal tie and the mystical union of free grace and free will? And, (1.) "If the husband is the head of the wife," as says St. Paul; or her lord, as St. Peter intimates; is not free grace the head and lord of free will? Has it not the pre-eminence in all things? (2.) If the bride. 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