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fore also said the wisdom of God, I will send them prophets and apostles, and some of them they shall slay and persecute: that the blood of all the prophets, which was shed from the foundation of the world may be required of this generation. From the blood of Abel unto the blood of Zacharias, which perished between the altar and the temple: verily I say unto you it shall be required of this generation." Now here, I ask, on what principle was it that all the blood of martyred prophets ever since the world began was required of that generation? Because they deserved it; for God does no such thing as injustice. It never was known that he punished any people or any individual beyond their desert.

But why and how did they deserve this fearful and augmented visitation of the wrath of God for past centuries of persecution?

The answer is two-fold: they sinned against accumulated light, and they virtually endorsed all the persecuting deeds of their fathers, and concurred most heartily in their guilt. They had all the oracles of God. The whole history of the nation lay in their hands. They knew the blameless and holy character of those prophets who had been martyred; they could read the guilt of their persecutors and murderers. Yet under all this light, themselves go straight on and perpetrate deeds of the same sort, but of far deeper malignity.

Again: in doing this they virtually endorse all that their fathers did. Their conduct towards the Man of Nazareth put into words would read thus-" The holy men whom God sent to teach and rebuke our fathers, they maliciously traduced and put to death; they did right, and we will do the same thing toward Christ." Now it was not possible for them to give a more decided sanction to the bloody deeds of their fathers. They underwrote for every crime-assumed upon their own consciences all the guilt of their father. In intention, they do those deeds over again. They say, "if we had lived then, we should have done and sanctioned all they did."


On the same principle the accumulated guilt of all the blood and miseries of Slavery since the world began rests on this nation now. The guilt involved in every pang, every tear, every blood-drop forced out by the knotted scourge-all lie at the door of this generation.

Why? Because the history of all the past is before the pro-slavery men of this generation, and they endorse the whole by persisting in the practice of the same system and of Same wrongs. No generation before us ever had the light


on the evils and the wrongs of Slavery that we have; hence our guilt exceeds that of any former generation of slave-holders; and moreover, knowing all the cruel wrongs and miseries of the system from the history of the past, every persisting slave-holder endorses all the crimes and assumes all the guilt involved in the system and evolved out of it since the world began.

Rom. 7: 13-"Was then that which is good made death unto me? God forbid. But sin, that it might appear sin, worketh death in me by that which is good, that sin by the commandment might become exceeding sinful.' The last clause of this verse brings out clearly the principle that under the light which the commandment, that is, the law affords, sin becomes exceeding guilty. This is the very principle, which, we have seen, is so clearly taught and implied in numerous passages of Scripture.

The diligent reader of the Bible knows that these are only a part of the texts which teach the same doctrine: we need not adduce any more.

2. I remark that this is the rule and the only just rule by which the guilt of sin can be measured. If I had time to turn the subject over and over-time to take up every other conceivable supposition, I could show that none of them can possibly be true. No supposition can abide a close examination except this, that the rule or measure of guilt is the mind's knowledge pertaining to the value of the end to be chosen.

There can be no other criterion by which guilt can be measured. It is the value of the end that ought to be chosen which constitutes sin guilty, and the mind's estimate of that value measures its own guilt. This is true according to the Bible, as we have seen; and every man needs only consult his own consciousness faithfully, and he will see that it is equally affirmed by the mind's own intuitions to be right.

(7.) The guilt of transgression is just equal to the degree of obligation.

[1.] The guilt of sin lies in its being the violation of an obligation.

[2] It must follow that the degree of the guilt of violation must be just equal to the degree of obligation. This, as we have seen, is not true of virtue, for obvious reasons. But it must be true of vice.


[3.] Moral obligation respects the choice of an end. amount of the obligation must be just equal to the mind's ap prehension of the intrinsic value of the end to be chosen. The

guilt of transgression is and must be just equal to the amount of the obligation. This conducts us to the conclusion or truth to be demonstrated, namely:

(8.) That moral agents are at all times either as holy or as sin ful as with their knowledge they can be.

This will more fully appear if we consider,

[1] That moral obligation respects ultimate intention alone.

[2] That obligation to choose or intend an end is founded in the apprehended intrinsic value of the end.

[3] That when this end is chosen in accordance with apprehended value all present obligation is met or complied with. Virtue is now complete in the sense that it can only be increased by increased light in regard to the value of the end. New relations and interests may be discovered, or the mind may come to apprehend more clearly the intrinsic value of those partially known before. In this case virtue may increase and not otherwise. It matters not what particular course is taken to realize this end. The intention is honest. It is and must, to be honest, be intense according to the mind's apprehension of the intrinsic value of the end. The mind can not but act in accordance with its best judgment in regard to the use of means to compass its end. Whatever it does it does for one and the same reason. Its virtue belongs to its intention. The intention remaining, virtue does not, can not vary but with varying light. This renders it evident that the virtuous man is as virtuous as with his present light he can be.


The same must be true of sin or selfishness. We have seen in former lectures that malevolence, strictly speaking, is impossible; that selfishness is ultimate intention, or the choice of self-gratification as an end; that the obligation to benevolence is founded in the intrinsic value of the good of God and the universe, that the amount of obligation is equal to the mind's apprehension or knowledge of the value of the end; that sin is a unit and always consists in violating this obligation by the choice of an opposite end; that the guilt of this violation depends upon and is equal to the mind's apprehension of the intrinsic value of the end it ought to choose.

Selfishness is the rejection of all obligation. It is the violation of all obligation. The sin of selfishness is then complete; that is, the guilt of selfishness is as great as with its present light it can be. What can make it greater with present light? Can the course that it takes to realize its end mitigate its guilt? No: for whatever course it takes it is for a

selfish reason, and therefore in no wise lessens the guilt of the intention. Can the course it takes to realize its end without more or less light. increase the guilt of the sin? No: for the sin lies exclusively in having the selfish intention. The intention necessitates the use of the means; and whatever means the selfish person uses, it is for one and the same reason, to gratify himself. As I said in a former lecture, if the selfish man were to preach the gospel, it would be only because upon the whole it was most pleasing or gratifying to himself, and not at all for the sake of the good of being, as an end. If he should become a pirate, it would be for exactly the same reason, to wit, that this course is upon the whole most pleasing or gratifying to himself, and not at all for the reason that that course is evil in itself. Whichever course he takes, he takes it for precisely the same reason; and with the same degree of light it must involve the same degree of guilt. Which of these courses may tend ultimately to the most evil, no finite being can say, nor which shall result in the greatest evil; and if one could, guilt is not to be measured by tendency nor by results, but belongs to the intention; and its degree is to be measured alone by the mind's apprehension of the reason of the obligation violated, namely the intrinsic value of the good of God and the universe which selfishness rejects. Now it should be remembered that whichever course the sinner takes to realize his end, it is the end at which he aims. He intends the end. If he become a preacher of the gospel for a selfish reason, he has no right regard to the good of being. If he regards it at all, it is only as a means of his own good. So, if he becomes a pirate, it is not from malice or a disposition to do evil for its own sake, but only to gratify himself. If he has any regard at all to the evil he may do, it is only to gratify himself that he regards it. Whether therefore he preach or pray, or rob and plunder upon the high seas, he does it only for one end, that is, for precisely the same reason; and of course his sinfulness is complete in the sense that it can be varied only by varying light. This I know is contrary to common opinion, but it is the truth and must be known; and it is of the highest importance that these fundamental truths of morality and of immorality should be held up to the minds of all.

Should the sinner abstain from any course of vice because it is wicked, it cannot be because he is benevolent, for this would contradict the supposition that he is selfish or that he is a sinner. If in consideration that an act or course is wicked he abstains from it, it must be for a selfish reason.

It may

be in obedience to phrenological conscientiousness, or it may be from fear of hell, or of disgrace, or from remorse; at all events, it can not but be for some selfish reason.

(9.) Total moral depravity is an attribute of selfishness, in the sense that every selfish person is at all times just as wicked and blame-worthy as with his present light he can be.

[1.] He, remaining selfish, can take no other course than to please himself, and only that course which is upon the whole most pleasing to him for the time being. If he takes one course of outward conduct rather than another, it is only to please and gratify himself.

[2.] But if for this reason he should take any other outward course than he does, it would not vary his guilt, for his guilt lies in the intention and is measured by the light under which the intention is maintained.

A few inferences may be drawn from our doctrine.

1. Guilt is not to be meaaured by the nature of the intention; for sinful intention is always a unit-always one and the same thing-being nothing more nor less than an intention to gratify self.

2. Nor can it be measured by the particular type of selfgratification which the mind may prefer. No matter which of his numerous appetites or propensities the man may choose to indulge-whether for food, or strong drink-for power, pleasure, or gain-it is the same thing in the end-self-gratification, and nothing else. For the sake of this he sacrifices every other conflicting interest, and herein lies his guilt. Since he tramples on the greater good of others with equal recklessness, whatever type of self-gratification he prefers, it is clear that we can not find in this type the true measure of his guilt.

3. Nor again is the guilt to be decided by the amount of evil which the sin may bring into the universe. An agent not enlightened may introduce great evil, and yet no guilt attach to this agent. This is true of evil often done by brute animals. In fact it matters not how much or how little evil may result from the misdeeds of a moral agent, you can not determine the amount of his guilt from this circumstance. God may overrule the greatest sin so that but little evil shall result from it, or he may leave its tendencies uncounteracted, so that great evils shall result from the least sin. Who can tell how much or how little overruling agency may interpose between any sin, great or small, and its legitimate re


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