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passive as distinguished from a voluntary faculty. All its phenomena are under the law of necessity. I am conscious that I cannot, by any direct effort, feel when and as I will. This faculty is so correlated to the intelligence that when the intellect is intensely occupied with certain considerations, the Sensibility is affected in a certain manner, and certain feelings exist in the Sensibility by a law of necessity. I am conscious that when certain conditions are fulfilled, I can not but have certain feelings, and that when these conditions are not fulfilled, I can not have those feelings. I know by consciousness that my feelings and all the states and phenomena of the Sensibility are only indirectly under the control of my Will. By willing I can direct my Intelligence to the consideration of certain subjects, and in this way alone affect my Sensibility, and produce a given state of feeling. So on the other hand if certain feelings exist in the Sensibility which I wish to suppress, I know that I can not annihilate them by directly willing them out of existence, but by diverting my attention from the cause of them, they cease to exist of course and of necessity. Thus feeling is only indirectly under the control of the Will. Another faculty indispensable to moral agency is,
(3.) Free Will. By Free Will is intended the power to choose, in every instance, in accordance with moral obligation, or to refuse so to choose. This much must be implied in Free Will, and I am not concerned to affirm any thing more. The Will is the voluntary power. In it resides the power of causality. As consciousness gives the affirmation that necessity is an attribute of the phenomena of the Intellect and of the Sensibility, so it just as unequivocally gives the affirmation that Liberty is an attribute of the phenomena of the Will. I am as conscious of affirming that I could will differently from what I do in every instance of moral obligation, as I am of the affirmation that I can not affirm, in regard to truths of intuition, otherwise than I do. I am as conscious of being free in willing as I am of not being free or voluntary in my feelings and intuitions.
Consciousness of affirming the Freedom of the Will, that is, of power to will in accordance with moral obligation, or to refuse thus to will, is a necessary condition of the affirmation of moral obligation. For example: No man affirms, or can affirm, his moral obligation to undo all the acts of his past life, and to live his life over again. He can not affirm himself to be under this obligation, simply because he cannot but affirm the impossibility of it. He can affirm, and indeed can
not but affirm his obligation to repent and obey God in future, because he is conscious of affirming his ability to do this. Consciousness of the affirmation of ability to comply with any requisition, is a necessary condition of the affirmation of obligation to comply with that requisition. Then no moral agent can affirm himself to be under moral obligation to perform an impossibility.
(4.) A fourth condition of moral obligation is LIGHT, or so much knowledge of our moral relations as to develop the idea of oughtness. This implies,
 The perception or idea of the intrinsically valuable. [2.] The affirmation of obligation to will the valuable for its own sake.
[3.] The development of the idea that it is right to will the good or the valuable and wrong not to will it for its own sake or disinterestedly.
Before I can affirm my obligation to will, I must perceive something in that which I am required to will as an ultimate end, that renders it worthy of being chosen. I must have an object of choice. That object must possess in itself that which commends itself to my Intelligence as worthy of being chosen.
All choice must respect means or ends. That is, every thing must be willed either as an end or a means. I can not be under obligation to will the means until I know the end. I can not know an end, or that which can possibly be chosen as an ultimate end, until I know that something is intrinsically valuable. I can not know that it is right or wrong to choose or refuse a certain end, until I know whether the proposed object of choice is intrinsically valuable or not. It is impossi ble for me to choose it as an ultimate end, unless I perceive it to be intrinsically valuable. This is self-evident; for choos ing it as an end is nothing else than choosing it for its intrin sic value. Moral obligation, therefore, always and necessa rily implies the knowledge that the well being of God and of the Universe is valuable in itself, and the affirmation that it ought to be chosen for its own sake, that is, impartially and on account of its intrinsic value. It is impossible that the ideas of right and wrong should be developed until the idea of the valuable is developed. Right and wrong respect intentions, and strictly nothing else, as we shall see. Intention implies an end intended. Now that which is chosen as an ultimate end, is and must be chosen for its own sake or for its intrinsic value. Until the end is apprehended
no idea or affirmation of obligation can exist respecting it. Consequently no idea of right or wrong in respect to that end can exist. The end must first be perceived. The idea of the intrinsically valuable must be developed. Simultaneously with the development of the idea of the valuable the Intelligence affirms, and must affirm obligation to will it, or, which is the same thing, that it is right to will it, and wrong not to will it.
It is impossible that the idea of moral obligation and of right and wrong should be developed upon any other conditions than those just specified. To affirm the contrary were absurd. Suppose, for instance, it should be said that the idea of the intrinsically valuable is not necessary to the development of the idea of moral obligation, and of right and wrong. Let us look at it. It is agreed that moral obligation, and the ideas of right and wrong, respect, directly, intentions only. It is also admitted that all intentions must respect either means or ends. It is also admitted that obligation to will means, can not exist until the end is known. It is also admitted that the choice of an ultimate end implies the choice of a thing for its own sake, or because it is intrinsically valuable. Now, from these admissions, it follows that the idea of the intrinsically valuable is the condition of moral obligation, and also of the idea of moral obligation. It must follow also that the idea of the valuable must be the condition of the idea that it would be right to choose or wrong not to choose the valuable. When I come to the discussion of the subject of moral depravity, I shall endeavor to show that the idea of the valuable is very early developed, and is among the earliest, if not the very first, of human intellections. I have here only to insist that the development of this idea is a sine qua non of moral obligation. It is, then, nonsense to affirm that the ideas of right and wrong are developed antecedently to the idea of the valuable. It is the same as to say that I affirm it to be right to will an end, before I have the idea of an end, or which is the same thing, of the intrinsically valuable, or wrong not to will an end when as yet I have no idea or knowledge of any reason why it should be willed, or in other words, while I have no idea of an ultimate end. This is absurd.
Let it be distinctly understood then, that the conditions of moral obligation are,
1. The possesssion of the powers, or faculties, and susceptibilities of a moral agent.
2. Light, or the development of the ideas of the valuable, of moral obligation, of right and wrong.
It has been absurdly contended that Sensibility is not necessary to moral agency. This assertion overlooks the fact that Moral Law is the Law of Nature; that, therefore, were the powers and susceptibilities radically different from what they are, or were the correlation of these powers radically otherwise than it is they could not still be moral agents in the sense of being under the same law that moral agents now are. Possessing a different nature, they must of necessity be subject to a different law. The law of their nature must be their law, and no other could by any possibility be obligatory upon them.
II. I am to show by an appeal to reason, or to natural theology, to what acts and states of mind moral obligation cannot directly extend.
1. Not to external or muscular action. These actions are connected with the actions of the Will by a law of necessity. If I will to move my muscles they must move, unless the nerves of voluntary motion are paralyzed, or some resistance is offered to muscular motion that overpowers the strength of my Will, or, if you please, of my muscles. It is generally understood and agreed that moral obligation does not directly extend to bodily or outward action.
2. Not to the states of the Sensibility. I have already remarked that we are conscious that our feelings are not voluntary but involuntary states of mind. Moral obligation can not, therefore, directly extend to them.
3. Not to states of the Intelligence. The phenomena of this faculty we also know by consciousness to be under the law of necessity. It is impossible that moral obligation should extend directly to any involuntary act or state of mind.
4. Not to unintelligent acts of Will. There are many unintelligent volitions or acts of Will, to which moral obligation can not extend, for example, the volitions of maniacs, or of infants, before the reason is at all developed. They must at birth be the subjects of volition, as they have motion or muscular action. The volitions of somnambulists are also of this character. Purely instinctive volitions must also come under the category of unintelligent actions of Will. For example: A bee lights on my hand, I instantly and instinctively shake him off. I tread on a hot iron, and instinctively move my foot. Indeed there are many actions of will which are put forth under the influence of pure instinct, and before the
Intelligence can affirm obligation to will or not to will. These surely can not have moral character, and of course moral obligation cannot extend to them.
III. To what acts and states of mind Moral Obligation must directly extend.
1. To all intelligent acts of will. These are and must be free.
2. All intelligent acts of will must consist, either in the choice of ends or means. The mind does not act intelligently, except as it acts in reference to some end or object of choice. 3. The choice of an ultimate end is an ultimate intention. 4. The choice of the means to secure an ultimate end, is but an endeavor of the will to secure it, and is therefore, but an exertion of the ultimate intention. It is choosing this as a means to that, that is, it is the choice of the end and of the means for its sake. Choosing the means is sometimes, though I think improperly, denominated subordinate choice, or the choice of subordinate ends.
5. All intelligent willing, choosing, intending, must consist, either in the choice of an end, or in volitions or efforts to secure an end. In other words, all choosing must consist in choosing an end, or something for its own sake, or in choosing means to compass the end. This must be, or there is really no object of choice.
6. I have said, that Moral Obligation respects the ultimate intention only. I am now prepared to say still further, that this is a first truth of Reason. It is a truth universally and ' necessarily assumed by all Moral Agents, their speculations to the contrary in any wise notwithstanding. This is evident from the following considerations.
(1.) Very young children know and assume this truth universally. They always deem it a sufficient vindication of themselves, when accused of any delinquency, to say, "I did not mean to," or if accused of short coming, to say, "I meant or intended to have done it-I designed it." This, if true, they assume as an all-sufficient vindication of themselves. They know that this, if believed, must be regarded as a sufficient excuse to justify them in every case.
(2.) Every Moral Agent necessarily regards such an excuse as a perfect justification, in case it be sincerely and truly made.
(3.) It is a saying as common as men are, and as true as common, that men are to be judged by their motives, that is, by their designs, intentions. It is impossible for us not to assent