and, although by baptifm he is born into a new state, a state of grace and acceptance with GoD, through CHRIST; yet the infection of his nature still remains; and fo far as it doth remain, hath of itself the nature of fin. The conclufion that has been generally drawn from this article is, that all mankind, confidered in their natural condition, are in a ftate of fin and condemnation before God. that one great object of CHRIST's meritorious office, was to take off the condemnation lying upon our species, and to place man in a state of grace and acceptance with GOD, that " as in ADAM all die, fo in CHRIST all fhould be made alive."

And

In this light, admiffion into Christianity by baptifm is to be confidered as the putting man in a way, by, which, through the operation of the Spirit, he may become fo purified from his natural corruption, as to be qualified for the falvation which has been purchafed for him.

The tenth article is but a corollary to the ninth. The doctrine contained in it is obvious, and briefly this; that, in confequence of man's alienation from GOD, and spiritual things, he must, through CHRIST, have the grace of GoD to enable him both to will and to do good works, pleasant and acceptable to God.

The ninth article defcribes the natural state of man, in confequence of the fall; the tenth points out the remedy, by which alone he is to be recovered from it. This article profeffes in its title to treat of free-will. By which term we understand, that although no man, in an unregenerate state, has any free-will, but to do evil; being, whilft in that ftate, under fubjection to his fallen nature; yet, by the grace of GOD in CHRIST, he poffeffes a degree of free-will towards the performance of spiritual fervices, for the non-performance of which he will be accountable. For, the negative propofition contained in this article, that no man has power to do good works, pleasant and acceptable to GOD, without the grace of GoD, includes within it the pofitive one, viz. that with that grace good works, pleasant and acceptable to God, may be performed by him. "I can do all things," &c. Phil. iv. 13. "I laboured more abundantly," &c. out your falvation," &c.

"Work

I Cor. xv. 10.
Phil. ii. 12. A direction

which furnishes a plain comment upon the foregoing article, by making the affiftance of Divine grace an argument for human exertion.

This article may be confidered, then, as having a double afpect: it looks to man in a ftate of nature,

and in a state of grace. In the former he can do no good works; in the latter he may, because the fpirit of GOD is vouchfafed to him for the purpose. When it is faid, therefore, that we have no power to do good works; it is not meant that man cannot contribute any thing towards the performance of Chriftian duty, or that that duty is to be fufpended till he is fure that he has neceffary affiftance: but he is therefore to attempt the performance of his duty with the most strenuous exertion, because he has full dependence on that affiftance, which, as a child of GOD in CHRIST, he is entitled to receive in the proper of the appointed means.

ufe

Now although ST. AUGUSTINE might occafionally be warmed into faying fome very strong things in favour of the Divine agency, with the view of counteracting the Pelagian herefy; yet I fhould be inclined. to think, that his deliberate judgment on this fubject did not widely differ from that which has been here drawn from the article in queftion. His words are thefe; "Si non eft DEI gratia, quomodo falvat mundum? Si non eft liberum arbitrium, quomodo judicat mundum? Quia ifta queftio, ubi de arbitrio voluntatis et DEI gratiâ difputatur, ita eft ad difcernendum difficilis, ut quando defenditur liberum

arbitrium, negari DEI gratia videatur; quando autem afferitur DEI gratia, liberum arbitrium putetur auferri." To draw the line between these two diftinct powers of grace and free-will, our church does not prefume; fhe fimply afferts, what, I truft, every Christian believes, that no man in his ftate of nature can do good works; but that good works, i. e. virtuous actions upon Chriftian principles, and as fuch pleafant and acceptable to GOD, may be performed by a man in a ftate of grace. Thefe two powers are doubtlefs reconcilable in their nature, though we short-fighted mortals at prefent know not how perfectly to reconcile them. We receive the doctrine, therefore, as we do all other doctrines of a mysterious nature, without attempting to explain it. If the doctrine contained in this article tend to roufe man to the actual performance of his baptifmal engagement, confidering himself as the agent in the work of falvation; at the fame time that it keeps in view the power, by which alone he is enabled to exert himself in the important bufinefs; the article anfwers the defign for which it was originally compofed. Man is to work out his falvation, not because of himself he is able fo to do, but because he is affifted by that Being to whom all things are poffible, and who can enable him

both to will and to do of his good pleasure." And, however difficult it may be to explain this in words, predicated as it is of GOD, we find no difficulty either in comprehending or believing, that though, like fome other doctrines, it may be above reason, it is not contrary to it; perfectly confiftent with the attributes of GOD, and not incompatible with the free-agency of man.

And it is furely of great importance to see all expreffions about grace in fuch a light, that they shall leave the efficacy of rewards and punishments undiminished, and shall afford no pretence for remiffnefs in fpiritual diligence." Thus (to make ufe of the words of Dr. JORTIN) " do the doctrine of Divine grace and the doctrine of free-will unite and confpire, in a friendly manner, to our everlasting good. The first is adapted to excite in us gratitude, faith, and humility; the fecond, to awaken our cautions and quicken our diligence." Conclufion of

firft Differtation.

Having given this plain account of the fenfe in which I understand those two articles, which you have been pleased to fuppofe I do not really believe; I proceed to the confideration of the conclufion you have drawn from me.