Corinthians would never have been interpreted by him as having relation to hypostasis, (certainly not had Rom. 1: 16 been compared with it), unless the custom had already existed, of interpreting the text in 1 Cor. 1: 24 as having reference to the Logos. To do this, one interchanged the oogia of this text with the loyos of John, inasmuch as the two words are very nearly related in some of their meanings. Moreover a distinction was not made, such as the Scripture requires (Hippolytus himself being judge), between λóyos and viós. Hence the passage 1 Cor. 1: 24, [Christ the wisdom of God and the power of God], seemed to Origen to afford the best New Testament ground for a comparison with the passages in Prov. VIII., and with several in the Apocryphal book of Wisdom, respecting the Son and Wisdom. These the Alexandrine teachers applied to the Logos.

If now we consider, that the hypostatical view of the passage in John I., (as Origen has beyond all doubt fully and plainly represented it in his Commentary on this evangelist), rests principally on the two following considerations, viz., first that eos without the article has a sense different from oɛós, and secondly that лoos tov veóv conveys a meaning different from that which would be conveyed by iv to de-all this I say being duly considered, it seems difficult to believe, that such an interpretation as that of Origen could come from a simple and impartial view of the passage. There must have been a strong previous inclination to such an interpretation, and to the belief of such a hypostatical condition of the Logos. What could be plainer, than that the want of the article before eos in the phrase xai deos v ó óyos, merely determined that ɛós belonged (notwithstanding its position) to the predicate of the sentence, and that such an artificial distinction built on a grammatical circumstance of such minuteness, was not at all in the spirit of John. In like manner, one need only see how sòs žv ò dóyos is included between пoos zov tov on either hand (vs. 1,2), and call to mind how noós is used as corresponding to the Hebrew and, in order to satisfy himself that no more is to be attributed to the expression ἦν πρὸς τὸν Θεόν, than that it is the counterpart or antithesis of v. 14, viz., λóyos odos ¿yévεro.

Hence those who favoured the views of Noetus and Beryll, never felt themselves excited to any doubt about the genuineness of the passage in John 1:1, nor betook themselves to such a variety of artifices in respect to it, as later opposers of the divine

nature of Christ have done. To them the passage appeared to have a meaning quite simple, and altogether accordant with their views. They only warned against confounding loyos and viós, as the connection of their expressions shews, and as one must conclude from the declarations of Hippolytus; and this they did, because they considered viós not as the equivalent of λόγος simply, but of λόγος σάρξ γενόμενος. More than this they were not necessitated to do, in order to harmonize all which the Scripture says of the distinction between the Son and the Father, with the opinion that the divine nature in the Son is the same with that of the Father.

How then shall we declare ourselves, in respect to circumstances of such a kind, which arose not from mere interpretation, but from a previous inclination to hypostatize the divine nature of the Son which had already obtained predominance in the church creed? The undeniable oscillation of the theories, between the equality of the so-called persons in the Godhead and the subordination of the same, shews plainly that not only a religious interest, but also one not purely of a religious nature, bore sway in all this. A mere religious interest could never have produced any oscillation, nor any contest between this party and that which did not admit an original personal distinction in the Godhead. Noetus and Beryll were learned men, as` general report says, without any participation in such an oscillating state of opinion. What Beryll added to the creed of Noetus, was only a more complete development of his principles, without being any departure from them. We are forced then to the conclusion, that the oscillating party were under the influence of a cosmological or philosophical interest, namely, that of finding a point of union for the order of spiritual beingssomething to fill the void between the simply infinite Being, the autóteos, and finite intelligences.

Inasmuch now as this interest in process of time elevated itself above the purely religious one, Arianism arose, which placed the Son at the head of finite beings, and gave him a beginning. before the beginning of things. Origen was kept back from embracing this view, because in him the religious and philosophical interests had found a common point of union in his sentiment respecting the absolute immutability of the Most High; on which account he denied both the beginning of the Son, and the beginning of all other things. Taking his stand here, he was, on the one hand, brought very near to the opinion of Noe

tus; he would not concede that the Logos in Christ could be exempted from the continued generation of the Father, lest he should thus detract from the "exceeding pre-eminence” which belonged to his mediatorial dignity; while, on the other, his philosophical views drew him to the subordination-theory; for only by the distance between Father and Son could he find a measure by which he could estimate the distances between other spiritual and living intelligences.*

If now we have good reason for believing that Beryll was not swayed by such views, because he in common with many other earlier and later fathers who were learned and intelligent, contented himself with the usual views of creation in time, on account of which such an interposition as Origen maintained seemed less necessary; so it must follow, that Beryll was not moved to give up his views by feeling that the demands of such a theory could not be satisfied by the views that he defended. What then induced him to give it up?

In answer to this question we must first inquire, how far he did give it up; and how far we may trust to the representations of Eusebius on this point? This historian appears to have had the records of the Synod of Bostria before him, and to have made his narration from them. But who can assure us, that Beryll's explanations are not, in one way or another, cut short; or that something of them was not overlooked by the dominant

* “Ωστε, κατὰ τοῦτο, μείζων ἡ δύναμις τοῦ πατρὸς παρὰ τὸν υἱὸν καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον, πλείων δὲ ἡ τοῦ υἱοῦ παρὰ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον· καὶ πάλιν, διαφέρουσα μᾶλλον τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος ἡ δύναμις παρὰ τὰ ἄλλα äyta. De Princip. I. 3. 5. [So that, according to this, the power of the Father is greater than what the Son or the Holy Spirit has; and the power of the Son is greater than that of the Holy Spirit: and again, the power of the Holy Spirit far exceeds that of all other holy beings.' If this be not Arianism, it is something even below it, at least in respect to the divine Spirit. TR.] This passage, the original Greek of which is found only in the well known letter of Justinian which is written in Greek, runs quite differently in the Latin version of Rufinus. Its authenticity, however, is sufficiently confirmed by the sentiment in passages already cited above, out of Origen's Comm. in Johannem. That a philosophical and speculative interest lay at the bottom of such sentiments, is plain from the arrangement itself of Origen's book; where he goes from treating of the Trinity, to the consideration of rational beings in their order, specially the higher The same thing is shewn, by his ranking Christ with other beings that become gods; see Note above, on p. 20.

ones.

party, or designedly passed by, either of which would not be a thing ungrateful to them?

The colloquy between the parties, and the letter of thanks to Origen written by Beryll, which Jerome quotes (Vir. Illust. art. Beryllus), cannot be regarded as additional testimony; inasmuch as we can hardly suppose such compositions to have been any thing more than factitious writings, by which those transactions were published, and placed in the light that was grateful to the dominant party.

The doubt, moreover, whether Beryll did go over entirely to the views of Origen, is the more natural, since, although we cannot assume it yet we cannot deem it improbable, that, in an assembly where all was managed with frankness and inoderation and where there was no reason to expect spies, to which moreover Origen was invited on account of his distinguished learning and intelligence, he kept in the back-ground one part of his theory, viz., that of subordination, and was purposely silent respecting it, or artfully concealed it. As little can we feel assured, that Beryll was not only induced to admit the eternal personality of the Godhead of Christ, (a thing which appeared superfluous to him in the Christian economy), but at the same time was also persuaded to admit a diminution of his Godhead, which stood directly opposed to his own previous convictions. If we suppose the latter, we must then suppose that Origen undertook to shew, that the full and entire Godhead of the Redeemer was not an indispensable thing in the scheme of redemption. But in this way Origen never would have proceeded; at all events, we have no evidence in his writings that he did so. Even those passages of Scripture which he quotes, in order to prove that the Son is different from the Father,* are so handled, that Beryll would not have felt himself moved by them. Beryll himself, who used the word Son only to designate the incarnate Logos, in which he allowed the Divinity to exist κατ' ἰδίαν τῆς ουσίας περιγραφήν, would of course allow the Son, in this respect, to be distinguished from the Father.

See Note*, from p. 199 of Origen's Comm. in Johann., on p. 21 above, and the texts in the original connected with it. Let any one compare now what Epiphanius cites for the like purpose againt Noetus, and he may easily satisfy himself how easily Beryll could have replied to such arguments.

The only point, then, where union seems to have been required between the two, was that which respects the interpretation of such Old Testament passages as might be thought to have a bearing on the doctrine of eternal generation. In respect to these, we may easily imagine that Beryll found some perplexity, in consequence of the usual mode of exegesis which was applied to them. But we can hardly suppose that he felt necessitated to go any farther than to concede, that on account of the tenor of such passages, one might be led so to express himself, as if, because of the divine decree respecting the incarnation which is of paramount importance and is the true basis of all the phenomena of the Christian religion, even from eternity there had been in the divine Being a special reference to this, and the Godhead as determining on this was the Father, and as determined, the Son. And with this, or something like it, might the friends of the doctrine of personality afterwards have contented themselves, as a substantial consent to their views.

That Origen himself was not conscious of any signal victory over Beryll, appears from the fact, that neither in his Commentaries, nor in his work against Celsus, which is generally reputed as later, does he mention the theory of Beryll as a thing brought to an end, but as still in existence.

* Εἰ δέ τις ἐκ τούτων περισπασθήσεται, μή πη αὐτομολοῦμεν πρὸς τοὺς ἀναιροῦντας δύο εἶναι ὑποστάσεις πατέρα καὶ υἱόν. Cont. Cels. VIII. 12. ['But if any one shall be in perplexity by reason of these things, lest we should go over to the camp of those who deny that Father and Son can be two hypostases.'] One may believe, perhaps, that this might be more properly referred to Noetus than to Beryll; but that the latter is meant, seems sufficiently evident from the words that follow: ὡς οἴεσθαι ὅτι ἡ τῆς ἀληθείας ουσία πρὸ τῶν χρόνων τῆς τοῦ Χριστοῦ ἐπιφανείας οὐκ ἦν· [ Like supposing, that the substance of truth did not exist before the times of the appearance of Christ.'] This looks very much like one of the arguments which Origen employed against Beryll. In like manner, I apprehend that the following passage applies rather to Beryll than to Noetus, viz., to άorovμένους ἰδιότητα υἱοῦ ἑτέραν παρὰ τὴν τοῦ πατρός, ὁμολογοῦντας θεὸν siva Comm, in Johann. p. 50. ['Or those who deny that the peculiar characteristics of the Son are different from those of the Father, declaring him to be God']. That this applies to Beryll is made probable by the following context: καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν κατὰ περιγραφὴν τυγχάνουσav iτigav toi пargós ['And the substance which exists in a circumscription different from that of the Father.']