The idea of redemption, as it demands that both the human and the divine should exist in the Redeemer without detraction and without diminution, cannot be more purely preserved, than in a system where there is no special occasion on the one hand to introduce any thing peculiar to the Docetae, nor on the other to represent God simply considered, or the Father because he is God supreme, as greater and better than the divine nature which dwells in the Redeemer; while this at the same time is represented as inferior and dependent. It is in this latter way, that Tertullian, Hippolytus, and Origen, as the opposers of Beryll and others, have almost every where represented the Godhead of Christ. It is certain, moreover, that the more full and complete the Godhead in the Redeemer is acknowledged to be, and the less any circumstances are added which diminish or degrade it, the more complete must we suppose his humanity to be. But if any person ascribes to him only a Godhead of an inferior kind, one merely approaching true divinity or elevated towards it,* so must the human nature of the Redeemer be more or less changed in its phenomena. The kingdom also of the Redeemer, in which he gathers and governs his disciples by the power imparted to him, and renders them always happy-this remains stable, in case the Saviour ever retains his Godhead. What more than this, then, can one demand for the interests of Christian belief, since the two points that have just now been subjected to view, have ever been the corner-stones of all Christian preaching? And why should we rather lay stress, in respect to true Christian belief, upon an eternal plurality in the Godhead, which has no relation to any thing without, than content ourselves with such a distinction in it as is connected with Christian revelation? For this is the only difference that existed between Beryll and his opponents. One thing however may be said, (which is matter of common interest so far as the * Αληθινὸς οὖν θεὸς ὁ Θεός. Οἱ δὲ κατ ̓ ἐκεῖνον μορφούμενοι θεοί, ὡς εἰκόνες πρωτοτύπου. ̓Αλλὰ πάλιν τῶν πλειόνων εἰκόνων ἡ ἀρχέτυπος εixшv 8 лgòs TÒν Iɛóv lotɩ kóyos. Origen, in Johann. IV. p. 51. [God [supreme] is then the true God. But the Gods made in conformity with him, are images of the Prototype. Then again, the archetypal Image, which is the Logos that is with God, [is the model] of many more images.'] † Acts XXVII. analogy of the scriptural usus loquendi is concerned, and thereby a multitude of useless logomachies may be avoided), viz., that, according to the views of Beryll, one may find it difficult to see a reason, why the Godhead in connection with Jesus should be called Son, while in and by itself it is called Father. It was by considerations of this nature, that Origen appears to have designed to check the progress of Beryll's opinions.* Yet even this argument does not seem to have produced much effect, after the defenders of personal discrepancy in the Godhead had begun to soften down, through the reasoning of Noetus. Hippolytus himself grants, that before the incarnation of the Logos, he was indeed perfectly Logos, but not perfectly Son. The latter he became, only after the incarnation. And this, in fact, accords entirely with the Scripture method of speaking, where λóyos and sós are used together. Allowing now that the word Son does not designate merely the divine nature of Christ, but the whole person of Christ, why does not this theory accord entirely with that of Beryll? If God as he is in himself is the cause or ground of this connection [between divinity and humanity], and the whole person of Christ, as such and by virtue of the indwelling of the Godhead, is the archetypal image of God, why cannot such a relation between the two be well expressed by the relative words Father and Son? It is not however merely that the interests of Christian faith are promoted by such a creed as that of Beryll, as much as by the one that was opposed to him, (inasmuch as the Christian economy suffers nothing by this creed, and the doctrine of μovaggia remains entirely uninjured); but even the deeper scientifical views, which the handling of Christian doctrine demands and which belong to the proper theologian, become by this * Λεκτέον πρὸς αὐτοὺς πρῶτον μὲν τὰ προηγουμένως κατασκευαστικά ῥητὰ τοῦ ἕτερον εἶναι τὸν υἱὸν παρὰ τὸν πατέρα, καὶ ὅτι ἀνάγκη τὸν υἱὸν πατρὸς εἶναι υἱόν, καὶ τὸν πατέρα υἱοῦ πατέρα. Οrig. in Johan. IV. p. 199. D. ['We must address them with words which have been previously furnished, viz., that the Son is different from the Father, and that the Son of a Father must necessarily be a Son, and the Father of a Son [must necessarily be] a Father.'] † Οὔτε γὰρ ἀόρατος καὶ καθ ̓ ἑαυτὸν ὁ λόγος τέλειος ἦν υἱός· καίτοι télɛlos av hóyos μovoyer's Cont. Noet. XV. ['For the Logos, as invisible and in and by himself, was not a perfect Son; although he was perfect as only begotten Logos.'] opinion neither more abstruse nor more unfruitful. Not more abstruse; for by this theory we are saved from making any effort to account for it, how there can be diversity of relations and persons in the Godhead in and by itself, or in what these consist, inasmuch as all (on the ground now in question) is viewed as having relation to the Godhead as revealed to men. Not more unfruitful; for if we could even give an adequate and satisfactory account of all these distinctions and relations of the Godhead as it originally was in and of itself, this would have no important bearing on the operations of divine grace; which, after all, are the appropriate objects of true evangelical doctrine and instruction. On the unfolding of true Christian doctrine, then, the theory of Beryll would seem to have an influence equally advantageous at least with that of his antagonists. His scheme, as well as the other, would lead men to investigate the question, how far the relation of the divine to the human nature in Christ could be further unfolded. The attempt however fully to do this, was made in the church later than the times of Beryll. But had the church retained the opinion of this bishop, this would not at all have impeded its investigations relative to this subject. One may even say, that it does not become any easier to comprehend, in what way Christ differs from all other human beings in consequence of the union of the divine nature with the human, if, in order to do this, we assume that the divine Being which united with Christ did from all eternity exist in an iδία ουσίας περιγρα [separate circumscription of being]. I might rather say, that such an assumption is adapted to mislead us, inasmuch as we have to suppose to ourselves, that the divine Being, in its union with the human nature, is different from God as he is in himself, and is in a measure first lowered down and reduced to a subordinate rank. On these rocks the theory of Beryll is not so much exposed to dash. This appears still more evident when we consider, that besides the formulas common to both creeds, by which they were constrained to make attempts to explain what in all the actions and developments of the Redeemer, was the result of human, and what of divine agency, and how both natures or beings, constituting a unity of person, stood related to each other; besides this, I say, there was another idea to be unfolded, which, although not altogether peculiar to the theory of Beryll, is more easily understood and explained by it than by any other, viz., the determining how the existence of God in Christ stands related to that indwelling of his in all men, which is essentially connected with his omnipresence and universal agency. This is a view of the subject the right use of which must produce some very definite and accurate results. But this view cannot well be made use of, when one strenuously maintains eternal personality; because then, as experience shews, in doctrinal deductions made by Christian teachers, there is ever a leaning more and more to distinguish the personality, rather than to maintain the unity, of the Godhead; the consequence of which is, that omnipresence and universal agency are eventually ascribed only to the Father. If now we take all these considerations into view, we shall be more disposed to think that Beryll, when he had a conference with Origen at Bostria, ought rather to have converted him, than he to have converted Beryll. More particularly shall we be inclined to such an opinion, when we call to mind how conscious the great Alexandrine teacher must have been, of strenuous effort to shun the dangers that attended the assumption of three eternal or ante-mundane persons in the Godhead. Not without good reason has it been objected against him, that in his strenuous efforts to establish diversity between Father and Son, he has infringed upon the unity of the Godhead. Adopting the declarations of Clement of Alexandria, who says at one time that "the nature of the Son is nearest to that of the Father;"* and then again (using the like phraseology) says, that he who has true yvaois is most nearly related to God;† Origen in a similar way assumes the existence of a multitude of beings or natures who have become divine by that which was communicated to them, and then sets the Godhead as incarnate in Christ at the head of them all, for the reason that Christ is the nearest to the autóvɛos. Christ, thus constituted, he • Τελειωτάτη δὴ . . . ἡ υἱοῦ φύσις, ἡ τῷ μόνῳ παντοκράτορι προσεχεσ Tá Strom. VII. p. 831, edit. Potter. ['The nature of the Son is the most perfect, he being nearest of all to the only almighty [God']. † Προσεχέστερον δὴ ὁ γνωστικὸς ᾠκείωται θεῷ· Ib. p. 652. [The [true] Gnostic is most nearly like to God.'] See the afore-cited note from Origen in Johann. p. 51, on p. 20 above. Compare also the following: ...πollazov xɛîtai loyixai tıτῶν θείων ζώων, δυνάμεων ὀνομαζομένων, ὧν ἡ ἀνοτέρω καὶ κρείττων Χριστὸς ἦν· οὐ μόνον σοφία Θεοῦ, ἀλλὰ καὶ δύναμις προσαγορευόμενος · maintains to be the first of all beings in consequence of his to πỌÒS TÒν Deòv elvat, i. e. his intimate communion with God, by which he attracts as it were divinity to himself.* He further holds, that the Logos is God in this way and on this account, and continues to be such by virtue of the to пOOS TÓV dεov elvaι, and by his uninterrupted and constant intuition of the Bavos of the Father.+ These views incline so evidently to maintaining, that the Godhead of the Son is one which is as it were in a state of becoming divine, in part commencing and in part already commenced, and not a complete and actually existing thing, that one may easily see the reason, why Origen strove not to confound the Son with the Father; and this, so long and so much that he came at last nearly to make an entire separation between Father and Son.t In this way also, Origen came so near, on the one hand, to ὥσπερ οὖν δυνάμεις θεοῦ πλείονες εἰσιν, ὧν ἑκάστη κατὰ περιγραφήν, ὧν diapégei o σwing, outws, x. t. 2. Comm. in Johann. p. 47. [Every where are placed some rational living creatures of a godlike nature, who are called dvváμeis, of whom the higher and more preeminent is Christ, who is named not only the Wisdom but the Power of God. Inasmuch then as there are many Powers of God, each one according to his own circumscription, from whom the Saviour differs; so etc."] ... 7 ᾧ πάντως ὁ πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως, ἅτε πρῶτος τῷ πρὸς τὸν θεὸν εἶναι, σπάσας τῆς θεότητος εἰς ἑαυτόν, τιμιώτερος ἐστι τοῖς λοιποῖς лаg avτoй dɛοîç, x. t. λ. Ib. p. 51. [... to whom he is altogether the first-born of all creation, since he is first by being with God; and thus attracting divinity to himself, he is more honourable than other gods who are with him, etc.'] † Τῷ εἶναι πρὸς τὸν θεὸν ἀεὶ μένων θεός, οὐκ ἂν δ ̓ αὐτὸ ἐχηκώς, εἰ μὴ πρὸς τὸν θεὸν ἦν, καὶ οὐκ ἂν μείνας θεός, εἰ μὴ παρέμενε τῇ ἀδιαλείπ To Jiα to лatçıxov ßádovs. Ib. p. 51. [By being with God he always continues to be God; for this he would not have obtained unless he had been with God; nor would he have continued to be God, unless he had continued to abide in the unceasing contemplation of the Father's depths.'] † ̓Αλλ' ὅμως τῶν τοσούτων καὶ τηλικούτων ὑπερέχων οὐσίᾳ, καὶ πρεσβείᾳ, καὶ δυνάμει, καὶ θεότητι . . . καὶ σοφίᾳ, κατ ̓ οὐδὲν συγκρίνεται τῷ naτgi, x. t. λ. Ib. p. 255. ['But at the same time that he surpasses such and the like beings, in substance, and in dignity, and in power, and in Godhead... and in wisdom, he is in no respect to be compared with the Father, etc.'] |