in fact it is altogether the same opinion, with the exception, that in regard to the continued abode of the divine nature in the person of Christ, it is expressed in a more definite manner. We have, indeed, no information on this point which was communicated by Beryll himself; but the few notices that we have from others, are harmonious.

I am aware of Huet's opinion,* that Eusebius and Jerome do not agree in their statements respecting Beryll. This arises, however, from his not rightly understanding and translating Eusebius. The words idia ovolas neoуoagy do not mean propria substantiae differentia, as Huet translates them. This is contrary to the well-known use of περιγράφειν and περιγραφή. They must mean propria substantiae circumscriptio. Nor can we assume, in order to vindicate Eusebius, that Beryll used οὐσία in the room of ὑπόστασις, (as we have seen above to be the case with Hippolytus); but the whole expression is a periphrastic explanation of ὑπόστασις or ύπαρξις, in the very sense of the church Symbols. For if we assume a plurality in the divine Being, yet so that the essence of all three persons is the same, and then go on to aver, that, separately from the modification of the second person by his union with the human nature, and of the third person by his union with the church, nothing but what is strictly appropriate to Godhead remains; how then can we explain personality in the Trinity otherwise than by saying, that the divine Being is circumscribed in such a way in each person, that in respect to the others he has certain limitations, and is at the same time more definitely designated as he is in himself? And this idea may be very well expressed by the use of the word neдiyoan.‡ That Eusebius, however, in * Origeniana, I. 3. 8.

† Τὸν σωτῆρα καὶ κύριον ἡμῶν λέγειν τολμῶν, μὴ προυφεστάναι και ἰδίαν οὐσίας περιγραφήν, πρὸ τῆς εἰς ἀνθρώπους ἐπιδημίας· μηδὲ μὴν θεότητα ἰδίαν ἔχειν, ἀλλ ̓ ἐμπολιτευομένην αὐτῷ μονὴν τὴν πατρικήν Hist. Ecc. VI. 33. ['Daring to affirm, that our Saviour and Lord had no existence as to the peculiar circumscription of his substance, before the incarnation; neither a proper Godhead of his own; but that the Father's only took up its abode in him.' The reader will note, that this is what Eusebius says respecting the opinions of Beryll. TR.]

See passages cited and compared, under yoάer and лɛiroach, in Stephani Thesaurus. In particular the passage in Origen (Comm. in Johan. IV. p. 47), which has respect either to Noetus or Beryll, probably to the latter, should be compared here; where the expression κατά περιγραφήν occurs several times.

the passage quoted, does not employ language which is simply his own, but in fact uses that of Beryll, or at least expressions that appropriately describe the transactions of Bostria, is probable for two reasons; the first, that language like this was not commonly employed in the like disputes in the time of Eusebius; the second, that Eusebius probably had before him, in writing, an account of the transactions at Bostria, as may be seen from inspection of the passage in him which is now under examination. This probability is much increased by the fact, that Beryll could very appropriately have made use of the same phraseology, in making a representation of his own opinions. He assumed with Noetus, that the Godhead took up its abode and acted (Eurohirevoμivn) in the Redeemer; consequently he must represent this dwelling and acting as of a different kind from that which is common to all beings by virtue of God's omnipresence and universal agency; and therefore he might well describe the specific difference between the two modes of indwelling and acting, as being (in respect to the Redeemer) an ἰδία τῆς θείας οὐσίας περιγραφή. According to this view of the subject, something might be said of the Redeemer in relation to his divine nature, which could not properly be predicated of any thing else. The sum or tout ensemble of these relations, (which constitutes what we call the divine nature in Christ), was in fact an ίδια τῆς θείας ουσίας περιγραφή, i. e. an appropriate circumscription of the divine Being.

Beryll, then, might properly say, that the divine nature subsists now not merely in and by itself, but also in its own circumscription or peculiar limits. Person he could not appropriately call this peculiar neдiyoaqn, because he (in common with his opponents) thought that the development of the three persons in the Godhead could not be something merely temporary and local; and therefore that the word person (vnóoraois or 1000лov) could not properly be applied to the divine Being, inasmuch as this word (in his view) designated only a unity that is temporary and local. Person, therefore, as he defined it, could be predicated only of the man Jesus; and still, at the same time, he viewed the dwelling and acting of the Godhead in Jesus, as something appropriate only to the one and undivided Being.

Huet, then, does injustice to Eusebius, when he blames him for finding fault with Beryll because he maintained that Christ has no ίδια θεότης; because there can be but one θεότης, since

on other grounds we must adopt the principle of Tritheism. The expression criticised upon does not belong to Eusebius, but to Beryll. Eusebius might quote this in the sense of its author; but he could not give it his approbation, because Beryll attached to it a meaning the correctness of which Eusebius would not allow. It was the opinion of the former, that if we maintain the existence of several persons in the Godhead, without reference to this or to that indwelling of the Son and of the Spirit, then such persons would be not mere circumscriptions (neoroaqai) of the divine Being in such a sense as he admitted, viz., circumscriptions in reference to the connection of the Godhead with humanity, (and no other neoiyoaqai could he admit in common with his opponents); but they would then be of such a nature as would divide and dissever the Godhead, in regard to what is correlate and antithetic in it (e. g. Father and Son); and therefore one Godhead would thus be one thing, and another a different one.

Beryll would have always said, no doubt, that the unbegotten Godhead was somewhat different from the begotten one in Christ. To him it would have seemed to be substantially of the same import, to assert that the Son of God before his incarnation had subsisted as a peculiar лɛoуo¤¶n of the Godhead, and to assert that during the incarnation a peculiar Godhead dwelt in the person of Jesus. The case, however, was different with his opponents; for inasmuch as they admitted the former of these propositions, and denied the latter, so they could not regard the two assertions as in any measure equivalent. In like manner Beryll regarded as substantially equivalent, the assertion that the Godhead simply which dwelt in the Redeemer was not to be distinguished from that of the Father, and the assertion that the Godhead dwelling in the Redeemer did not subsist before the incarnation in a peculiar neoyoaqn of the divine Being, but previously to this was from eternity simply Godhead; while his opponents could not agree to this, inasmuch as they admitted the former and denied the latter. We may therefore well conclude, that the phrase in question out of Eusebius, was one taken by him from the doings of the Synod at Bostria, and employed by them in settling the controversy between Beryll and his opponents.

If now it appears, that Beryll denied only the лɛoуcapń of the person of the Logos at a period antecedent to the incarnation; but did not at all deny, nor was even accused by his opVOL. VI. No. 19.

3

ponents of denying, that when this regiуoaqn had once commenced, it would continue to exist; then we may confidently believe, that he admitted its continued existence after the ascension of Christ: in like manner as the Romish creed admits its continuance at least until the final judgment; and Christians in general have in fact believed it will continue forever in future time, inasmuch as we do without doubt connect the happiness of believers in the eternal world, with the continuance of such a union in the person of the Redeemer.

What Jerome says moreover concerning Beryll,* agrees not only in a general way with the explanation here given of the passage in Eusebius, but affords us some particular testimony for Beryll in regard to this point. In explaining what Jerome says of Beryll's views, we are not to suppose his assertion, that the bishop of Bostria denied the existence of Christ before the incarnation, to have any respect to the pre-existence of Christ's human soul; for there is no evidence that the question respecting this was then agitated. Indeed no essential difference between the human soul of Christ and other human souls can be supposed, if we admit that he possessed a nature truly human. What Beryll then is here said to have denied of Christ, cannot have respect to his humanity, but only to his Godhead; nor has it respect to this, when considered simply and in itself; for there can be no doubt that he admitted the reality of this, as Eusebius expressly testifies. The point of denial was, that the Godhead of Christ existed before the incarnation as a person in and by itself.

The manner of the expression in Jerome, on which we are commenting, is easy to be explained. In the strictest sense, Jerome himself did not believe that Christ existed before his birth; and one is fully entitled to say of him, (as Huet says of Eusebius), that if Beryll asserted this, and Jerome blamed him for so doing, he himself must have been a heretic. Jerome, however, here understands the word Christ, just as if the word Logos had been employed, i. e. as designating the second person in the Godhead; and he ascribes to Beryll only the opinion, that his personality (ἰδία ουσίας περιγραφή) commenced with his incarnation.

Ad extremum lapsus in haeresim quae Christum ante incarnationem negat; De Viris Illust. cap. LX. ['At last lapsed into the heresy, which denies that Christ had an existence before the incarnation.']

The very same thing Gennadius also asserts;* in a manner indeed which is somewhat confused, yet so that we are not at a loss on the whole for his meaning, if other witnesses be consulted.

If now any thing had been known, which could establish the fact that Beryll believed the Godhead would ever withdraw from his connection with the human nature of Christ, then would Jerome unquestionably have said, not only that Beryll denies Christ before his birth,' but with still more reason: 'He denies him after his ascension, or after the final judgment,' according as Beryll might have decided.

I say this with the more confidence, inasmuch as the question, whether human souls have an individual existence before birth, is not of much interest to Christian faith; but the endless being of souls has always been a position which has most earnestly been contended for. The human soul of Christ, then, might have existed forever, and yet Christ in his true character be denied. But if Beryll, by more definite declarations, had removed from the positions of Noetus all suspicions of such a nature, then every imaginable interest of Christian belief appears to remain unassailed by these opinions, and this advantage is gained, viz., that the unity of the divine Being is preserved altogether pure, and not only remains uninjured but is not even in appearance assailed.

* Neque sic est natus ex virgine, ut et divinitatis initium homo nascendo acceperit, quasi, antequam nasceretur ex virgine, Deus non fuerit; sicut Artemon, et Beryllus, et Marcellus docuerunt; de Dogm. Eccl. c. 4. ['Neither was he so born of a virgin, that the man by birth received the beginning of divinity, as if, before he was born of a virgin, he was not God; as Artemon, Beryll, and Marcellus taught.'] We pass by Marcellus here, because he may be accused of approximating near to Sabellius; and on essential points must have agreed with Beryll. But as to Artemon; it is only by the most arbitrary deductions and inferences, that we can rank him with Beryll; viz., one must say, that by the Godhead of the Father he meant only the universal presence of God in every thing; and that this only dwells in the Redeemer, and therefore he differs from other men in nothing that is important. This was a heresy from which Origen not only kept himself free, but in the most definite manner he distinguishes the opinion of Beryll from that of those, who hold that Christ is a mere man. But apart from this, it is clear that even Gennadius holds the opinion of Beryll to be merely, that the peculiar subsistence of the Godhead of Christ first began with the incarnation.